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iSUMMARY
This thesis attempts to examine the main criticised aspects of the 
Algerian Family Code of 1984, on the assumption that the Code has not 
improved the legal position of the Algerian Woman. In order to draw a 
coherent picture of those criticised aspects it is considered appropriate to 
compare them with their equivalents in other legal systems.
Before doing that, however, it is essential to determine some 
perspectives such as family and marriage, and to manifest some characteristics 
of the Algerian family and the Algerian woman. This is done in chapter one.
Chapter two aims to set out some of those aspects related to the woman 
and the marriage contract, and show whether it is necessary to establish a 
difference between males and females in breach of promise of marriage, age of 
marriage, and parental consent and matrimonial guardianship.
Chapter three discusses the rights and duties of the wife, and shows 
which of these rights and duties are the same as those of the husband, and which 
are different. The modem trend in western legal systems is to accept equal 
rights and duties between husband and wife, whereas in Islamic law and 
Algerian law, due to certain perspectives and circumstances, some rights and 
duties are still different between husband and wife, such as maintenance, 
dower and head of the family.
Chapter four examines the role of the woman in divorce by mutual 
agreement and in divorce by the wife’s initiative, on grounds which are often 
assumed to be limited. This study will show that the grounds on which the wife 
can claim divorce are not limited, and that the court should have the power to 
decide divorce in Khula when the wife wants it.
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1E M T j R O I D I I J C T I I O M
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 is the first Code promulgated to 
cover in general most aspects of the family since the independence in 1962.1 
This Code has been criticized by some Algerian writers and jurists as well as 
western writers as the rules of the Code are based entirely on Islamic law (the 
Shari’a). These criticisms focus in one point, that is, the Code by applying the 
classic Islamic rules which establish the difference between men and women 
and husband and wife, has not improved the legal position of the Algerian 
woman. As the criticisms are directed at both the Algerian Family Code of 
1984 and classic Islamic law, the point of view of both should be examined, if 
these are different, at every relevant point in this study. Since some of this 
criticism aims to exclude Islamic law from the area of the family law, or at 
least to modify the Code to resemble a western one, a comparative study with 
western legal systems becomes essential. The western legal systems which are 
chosen in this comparative study are the Scottish and the English since the 
study is carried out in Great Britain, and the French because of the colonisation 
of Algeria by the French and its clear effect on parts of Algerian law. The 
chosen laws are also examples of the major legal families in the world; French 
law representing the Romanist family, English law the common law family and 
Scots law mixed jurisdictions.^
Because some institutions such as dower and polygamy do not exist in 
these western laws, the position of Algerian law will be compared with 
contemporary Muslim laws.
Determination of some concepts is necessary in a work where different 
legal systems are compared. The family and its characteristics, the marriage 
and its features and solubility, and the effects of colonisation on Algerian
1 Except the Law of 1963 on Limitation of the Age of Marriage.
2 See in general David & Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today. 3rd ed., 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1985); and Derrett P.. An Introduction to Legal Systems. 
(London: Sweet & Maxweel, 1968).
2family and on the Algerian woman in particular, all these which affect and 
shape the law will be analysed.
The woman and the marriage contract is the second part of this study, 
where the differentiation between men and women becomes very clear. In 
breach of promise of marriage Algerian law adopts the modem view of some 
Muslim jurists which allows compensation of damages for both pecuniary loss 
and for feelings, besides the differentiation between the couples in recovery of 
the marriage gifts. Whereas, the modem trend in the west, as in Scots law, is 
to abolish the action of breach of promise. Not only Algerian law but many 
other legal systems fix a different minimum marriageable age. This study will 
examine whether there can be a right age for marriage and whether there 
should be a difference between males and females as regards this minimum 
age. Some western laws require parental consent, whereas Algerian and other 
Muslim laws require the consent of the matrimonial guardian even for an adult 
woman.
The third chapter aims to clarify the wife's rights and duties. 
Maintenance is one of the important financial rights of the wife. Islamic law as 
well as Algerian law consider maintenance as an obligation upon the husband; 
whereas western laws establish the equal duty between the spouses to maintain 
each other. Dower is the second financial right of the wife which should be 
determined in the marriage contract. In the case of non determination or 
disputes over it, the equivalent dower should be provided to the wife. Fidelity, 
cohabitation, obedience and justice to all wives are the main non-financial 
duties and rights of the wife. There is an assumption that the duty of fidelity 
for the husband does not exist in Islamic law since it permits polygamy; this 
will be refuted. Adherence, sexual relations and rape of the wife by her 
husband will be discussed under the obligation of cohabitation. The concept of 
head of the family is necessary for the control and guidance of the family. This 
rule which still exists in Algerian law has been abolished in many western laws. 
Although Islamic law and Algerian law permit marriage with more than one
3wife, they require certain conditions to be respected;
The positive role of the woman in divorce appears in two cases: divorce 
by the wife's initiative and divorce by mutual agreement. The first one covers 
the grounds on which the wife can claim divorce from the court. These 
grounds will be discussed and compared with their equivalents in western laws 
in order to show whether they are limited, as it is often assumed, or not. The 
second one covers divorce by means of Mubara'a^, divorce by means of 
Khula, and the role of the court in deciding divorce in Khula when the wife 
wants it and the husband opposes it.
3 See the meaning of these terms in chapter four section two.
4C M A F I T j E I R  (Q )M D £
AMTIEMMMATION OF SOME MMSIWCTKVIES
Introduction:
"It is symptomatic of the curious inversion of much legal 
scholarship that whilst much ink has been expended on the examination of 
the details of provisions in statutory material relating to family law, and on 
attempts to explain and reconcile the decisions of the courts in this area, little 
time has been spent looking at the rather more basic, and rather more 
important question, what kind of family should we have in family law?
Indeed, does family law demand a fixed, single notion of the family?... To 
debate the merits and demerits of particular patterns of divorce law, or even 
particular types of law relating to child custody, is a trifle premature if you 
have not yet debated, thoroughly, the nature of the family in your legal 
system. Comments on the 'rightness' of a certain type of divorce law, or 
child custody law,are inevitably couched in terms dependent upon particular 
concepts of the family. At the moment such concepts tend to be implicit 
rather than explicit. The result is that arguments ostensibly about one 
particular issue rarely, if ever, reveal the true cause of contention between 
the parties- their different perception of the place and definition of the family 
in law."*
In accordance with this statement, and as this study is about the legal 
position of the Algerian woman under the Family Law Code of 1984, in 
comparison with that in some other legal systems, it is appropriate to look first 
at the characteristics of the Islamic and Algerian family, and those of the 
western family; point out the most important features of marriage and the 
changes that have occurred in it as an institution and its effects and solubility. 
The matter of colonisation of Algerian society by the French for more than 
one hundred and thirty years, and its effect on the Algerian family in general 
and on the Algerian woman in particular, must be considered in any study 
1 Bradney A., "The Family in Family Law", 9 Family Law (19791 244-248, at p. 244.
5about the Algerian woman or the Algerian family.
These points will be looked at in the following sections:
Section one : a perspective of the family and marriage.
Section two: the effects of colonisation on the Algerian family and 
Algerian women.
SECTION (ONE 
A EEMSIPECTIVE OF THE FAMILY AND MAMRIAGE
I- Family:
The family is commonly defined as a group of persons related to each 
other by blood or by marriage. It is seen as the basis of society and it may 
affect the society or be affected by it. Closed societies have a great deal of 
control over the family, because the family is regarded as a group within 
which the most fundamental appreciation of human qualities and values takes 
place, for better or for worse. Values which are of the most fundamental 
importance for the formation of the adult character are first experienced and 
exercised by children in the context of the family.^
The family is the first educational area of the child.^ He spends his 
time with his family, learning their characters, their moral values and human 
qualities which "are not taught or learned in any straightforward or all 
together rational way; they are actually embodied in people and their 
behaviour. "4
2 See in general Bott E., "Urban Families: Conjugal Roles and Social Networks", in 
Anderson M. (eds.l. Sociology of the Family. (England: Penguin Books, 1971), 217-232; 
Hogget and Pearl, The Family. Law and Society: Cases and Materials. 2 nd ed., (London: 
Butterworths, 1987), p. 13.
3 De Lestapis S., "Evolution de la Pensee Exprimee de l'Eglise Catholique", in Prigent 
R. (ed.), Renouveau des Idees sur la Famille. (France: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1954), 254-268, at p. 255.
6Many different external factors affect the family, economic, religious 
and political. The religious factor will be examined here, because it has great 
effect on the family and its variation from one society to another. The 
relationship between religion and the family is more intimate than the 
relationship between religion and the state, or religion and the economy. 
Religion is intimate to family life, it reflects the ethics and standards of the 
family's broader social environment.^ The influence of religion on the 
society is, as Nimkoff states,: "religion, when it does not ignore a given mode 
of social behaviour, may take one of four positions on it: religion may permit, 
or prefer or prescribe or proscribe it."6 According to these positions a 
person models his behaviour. For instance, religion prefers the marriage of 
persons of good faith, and proscribes marriage with close kin and the same sex. 
Moreover, the social effect of religion on some family behaviour is either to 
strengthen them or to weaken them. This is what is meant by referring to 
religion as a means of social control which extends to family lifeJ  It is 
according to the strength and effect of religion that marriages may be found to 
be monogamous in some societies, and polygamous in some others; according 
to its effect also premarital sex and sexual freedom are permitted in some 
countries and forbidden in others. Fosterage and differences of religion are 
impediments to marriage in Islamic law, they are not in western Christian 
laws. Adoption and cohabitation outside marriage are proscribed by Islamic 
law, but through them a person becomes a member of the family in many 
western laws.
From these examples it is obvious that religion has a great effect on the 
family. Since Islam is not only a law but also a way of life, and since this study 
is about the Algerian Woman under the Family Law Code of 1984 which is
4 Hogget and Pearl, op. cit. 13.
5 Fluehr-Lobban C., Islamic Law and Society in the Sudan. (Great Britain: Frank 
Cass, 1987), p. 88.
6 Nimkoff M. F., Comparative Family Systems. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965), p. 45.
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7based on Islamic law it is necessary to point out briefly the characteristics of 
the Muslim Algerian family in comparison with the western family.
"Family, from the Islamic point of view, is an extended network of kin 
related by blood or through marriage, living and working together toward a 
common goal, namely the prosperity and happiness of all its members."** 
The members of the Islamic family are not only a husband and wife and their 
children but a large household consisting of husband and wife, unmarried 
children, married sons and their wives and their children. This kind of 
extended family is the predominant family system in Muslim and Arab 
societies.^
The Muslim family is extended because the status and the value attached 
to parents in Muslim society is very high. The Holy Quran says: "Thy Lord has 
commanded that ye worship none but Him and has enjoined benevolence 
towards parents. Should either or both of them attain old age in thy lifetime, 
never say: Ugh; to them nore chide them, but always speak gently to them. Be 
humbly tender with them and pray: Lord, have mercy on them, even as they 
nurtured me when I was little." 1^ In accordance with God’s commands for 
the happiness of the parents, the Muslim son usually stays with his parents even 
after he marries; as William Goode noticed in his work on comparative family 
systems : "Moslems were more likely to stay (one half of the Moslem sons left 
as against two thirds of the Christian sons)..." ^
The Islamic family is also defined as a patriarchal family. Since it is an 
extended network of kin, it needs a head to control its members and supervise 
them to establish the stability and happiness of the whole family. Therefore, 
when Islamic law distributes rights and obligations between the members of
8 Haeri S., "Women, Law, and Social Change in Iran", in Smith Jane (ed.), Women 
in Contemporary Muslim Societies. (London: Associated University Presses, 1980) 209-
, 234, at p. 212. '
9 See Goode W. J., World Revolution and Family Patterns. (London: The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1963), p. 123.
1® The Quran, sura 17, verse 24, translation by M. Zafrulla Khan, (London: Curzon 
Press, 1971).
H Goode W., op. cit. p. 127.
8the family, it regards the interest of the family as a whole not as husband and 
wife, as very clearly seen in the Islamic law of inheritance. This responsibility 
is not given to the woman because she is not responsible for handling the 
family finances. It is common also in Islamic societies that after the father's 
death, the brothers still live in harmony with some respect and authority given 
to the eldest one who bears the father's responsibility towards the whole 
family.
The most outstanding characteristic of the Arab and Islamic family is its 
deep attachment to honour, sexual purity and chastity, as Peter Dodd says: "yet 
much of the organization of the Arab family can be understood in the terms of 
'ird' (honour) as a controlling value, legitimating the family structure and the 
'modesty code' required of both men and women. The importance of 
family honour still affects contemporary Arab Islamic families especially in 
rural areas; even though the influence of western civilization, urbanisation and 
political revolution have reduced its effect. The value of 'ird' and its associated 
norms still resist the processes of change even in the contemporary urban 
sector as Dodd notes. 13
Although the characteristcs of the Islamic family (patriarchal, extended 
and honour) are considered as traditional and old fashioned by many educated 
urban people "the intensity of family ties even among educated Arabs remains 
strong" 14, as long as the Islamic religion still exists in society.
These characteristics are the same for the Algerian family since it is one 
of the Arab and Islamic families. In Algerian society the extended family is 
seen in the city as the 'big house' and in rural areas as the 'big tent'. 15
Whereas the western family is a nuclear family consisting normally of a 
husband and wife and their c h i l d r e n .  16 The character of the western family
12 Dodd P., '‘Family Honor and the Forces of Change in Arab Society", 4 International 
Journal of Middle East. Studies.(19731 40-54, at p. 40.
13id.
14 Goode W., op. cit. p. 129; see also Benmelha Ghaouti, Elements du Droit Algerien 
de la Famille. (Paris: Publisud, 1985), p. 15.
15 See Benmelha G., op. cit. pp. 15-16.
9as a nuclear family is described by Peter Laslett and his co-workers at the 
Cambridge SSRC group; their major conclusion is that: "a nuclear familial 
form may have been one of the enduring and fundamental characteristics of the 
western family system." ^  Ronald Fletcher, in his book 'The Family and 
Marriage in Britain' asserts the characteristics of the contemporary British 
family as:
"1- Contracted or founded at an early age, and therefore of long 
duration.
2- Consciously planned.
3- Small in size.
4- To a great extent separately housed, and in improved material 
environment.
5- Economically self-responsible, self-providing, and therefore (a) 
relatively independent of wider kindred, and (b) living at a 'distance' from 
wider kindred,...
6- Entered into and maintained on a completely voluntary basis by 
partners of equal status, and therefore entailing a marital relationship based 
upon mutuality of consideration.
7- Democratically managed, in that husband and wife (and 
frequently children) discuss family affairs together when decisions have to
be taken,..."
These are the most important characteristics of the western family and 
they differ from those of the Islamic family.
''Reflecting the centrality of the family in Islam, family law has been 
the heart of the Sharia and the major area of Islamic law that has remained in 
force to govern the lives of more than 800 million Muslims from North 
Africa to Southeast Asia. While most areas of Islamic law have been 
replaced by modem western legal codes, Muslim family law has provided
16 See Sussman and Burchinal, "The Kin Family Network in Urban-Industrial 
America", in Anderson M. reds.), op. cit. (2 nd. ed. 1980), 202-222, at p. 202.
17 As cited by Hogget and Pearl, op. cit. p. 6.
18 Ibid. pp. 13-14.
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the major area of Islamic reform." 19
Though some radicals in Islamic countries regard Islamic law as an 
anachronism and aim to remove it and replace it by Civil Codes, Islam still 
governs the lives of all Muslim societies. The best examples of these radicals 
are Ataturk and Shah Raza, who replaced the Islamic personal law by 
European Civil Codes, although not all the Turkish and Iranian families have 
lost their Islamic traditional character.^
In most western countries all the areas of law are separate from religion 
and governed by Civil Codes. However even in these countries there are some 
effects of religion on the family and society as a whole.
As has been said the definition of the family either in Islamic law or in 
western law has great effect on law in general and on family law in particular. 
While Islamic law does not recognise any person as member of the family, if 
the relation between this person and the family is from outside the marriage or 
blood relationship, western perspective regards two unmarried persons living 
together as a family as section 113(1) of the Housing Act 1985 (England & 
Wales) states : "a person is a member of another’s family... if - (a) he is the 
spouse of that person, or he and that person live together as husband and 
wife,..."21 Moreover, Cretney says that: "it would be quite unsatisfactory to 
ignore the fact that the family can exist outside marriage, and that the law is 
increasingly recognising this fact to some e x t e n t . "22
19 Esposito J. L., Women in Muslim Family Law. (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1982), p. x of the Preface.
20 See in general Sayid M., "The Radicals and the Fundamentalists and Muslim 
Personal Law", 5 Islam and the Modern Age. (1975) 74-80; Ray Joanny, "Facteurs 
devolution de la Famille Musulmane", in Prigent R., op. cit. 283-287.
21 As cited by Hogget and Pearl, op. cit. p. 4.




The effects of religion are not only on family and its characteristics, but 
on marriage as a whole. The task of defining the word family in statute is not 
an easy one; this is why it has fallen to the courts and jurists. One area from 
which useful determination of the family can be derived is the legislative view 
of marriage. Both in Islamic law and in western law marriage is a contract 
between a man and a woman, or as defined by Lord Penzance in the case of 
Hvde v. Hvde^3 "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to 
the exclusion of all others". Marriage in Islamic law has a certain resemblance 
to a civil contract, but it would be wrong to say that it is a purely civil contract 
as there are some considerations which make clear the distinction between the 
two.
The difference between the Islamic and western definitions of marriage 
can be clarified thus:
Firstly, marriage must be voluntary. In both Islamic and western laws 
the marriage contract requires the true consent of the woman and of the man. 
In addition to that Islamic law requires the consent of the woman’s 
guardian.24 Algerian law provides also for the consent of both the woman 
and her matrimonial guardian in article 9 of the Family Law Code of 1984.
Secondly, marriage is for life. It is clear from the statement of Lord 
Penzance and the Christian perspective that marriage is a sacrament, as Ellul 
Jacques states that marriage lies under the will of God and the light of His 
promise makes it a total reality, permanent and constant, and divorce is not 
admissible.^ Moreover, the Catholic Church is more strict on this point as 
De Lestapis points out in that marriage between Christians is indissoluble and a 
sacramental contract and that divorce ruins the s o c i e t y . 2 6  This is the
23 Hvde v. Hvde (1866) L. R. 1 P. & D. 130, at p. 133.
24 The matter of the woman's guardian in marriage will be discussed in chapter two 
section three.
25 Ellul J., "Position des Eglises Protestantes a l'Egard de la famille", in Prigent R., 
o p . cit. 269-274, at p .  271.
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theoretical view of Christianity in western countries, but the fact is totally 
different, since the law requires that " it must be the parties' intention when 
they enter into the marriage that it should last for life."27 The English law 
goes further than that as Bromley states : "if, say, two people enter into a 
marriage for the sole purpose of enabling a child to be bom legitimate, 
intending never to live together but to obtain a divorce by consent at the 
earliest opportunity, it cannot be doubted that their union is a marriage by 
English law. "28 The only interpretation that can be put on Lord Penzance's 
statement is that marriage must last for life unless the contrary is previously 
determined by a decree or some other act of dissolution.^^ Whereas, Islamic 
law, now as in the past, requires the intention of the parties when they contract 
the marriage to be that it should last for life. However, during the conjugal life 
if any problem makes the continuation of marriage impossible, dissolution of 
marriage is permissible for both parties. Any marriage contracted for a period 
fixed previously is deemed null and void.^O
Thirdly, marriage must be contracted by a man and a woman. There are 
no qualifications attached to this in either perspective.
Fourthly, marriage must be monogamous in the western perspective. 
This is also the general mle in Islamic law, except that in some circumstances 
Islamic law allows the man to marry another woman^l for instance, his 
prior wife is sterile or disabled, with the permission of the prior and the, 
second wives; both of them have the right to divorce in the case of their 
disagreement.
The most important distinction between Islamic law, which still governs 
marriage and its effects in all contemporary Muslim societies and western law,
26 De Lestapis S.. op. cit. at p. 256.
27 Bromley M., Family Law. 6 th ed., (London: Butterworths, 1981), p. 17.
28 Id.
29 See Nachimson v. Nachimson (1930) p. 217. C. A.
30 See Nasir J.. The Islamic Law of Personal Status. (London: Graham & Trotman, 
1986), p. 53.
31 This point will be discussed in chapter three section three.
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is the emergence in western systems of a new legal institution which imitates 
legal marriage. The social change in western societies has made informal 
marriage as heavily regulated as legal marriage. Moreover, the effects of a 
legal marriage have become nearly the same as the informal, and the status of 
unmarried couples has been gradually recognised to be similar to that of 
married couples. Cohabitation and de facto marriage have become more and 
more widespread and have become acceptable in many legal systems of 
western countries. For instance, "in West Germany Die Zeit has reported a 
remarkable change in attitudes of young people toward informal cohabitation 
as evidenced by polls taken in 1967 and again in 1975. Of the 1967 group only 
24 % of the young women and 48 % of the young men said they ’found nothing 
wrong' with a man and woman living together without marriage. Of the 1975 
group, 85 % of the young men and 92 % of the young women 'found nothing 
wrong' with this s i t u a t i o n . " ^  in France free union (union libre) has not only 
been accepted by society but a proposal has been made to give judges the power 
to award damages for rupture of this free union if one partner is left in a state 
of need. Moreover, there are cases where damages have been awarded to an 
abandoned mistress, under the general principles of French tort l a w . 3 3  in 
addition to that, damages were awarded for a mistress for the wrongful death 
of the man with whom she was living and by whom she was being supported. 
Furthermore, in one case the court refused to grant damages to the legal wife,
32 D i e  Zeit, Apr. 30, 1976, POLITIK at 4 (International ed.) cited by Glendon M. A., 
State. Law and Family. (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1977), p. 106, note no: 9. See also in English law the statement of Poulter : "it 
seems likely that living together outside marriage is a widespread phenomenon in our society 
at the present time, both among the unwed and among those who are on the 'rebound' from a 
divorce or separation." Poulter Sebastian, "The Death of a Lover-I", 126 New Law Journal 
(1976)417-420, at p. 417.
33 See Weill Alex, Droit Civil, vol. ii, 2nd ed., (France: Dalloz, 1970), p. 349; Civ. 17 
Juin 1953 Prec; 30 Nov. 1959, Gaz. Pal. 1960, 2, 250; see also Amzalac, "les Proces entre 
Concubins a la Suite de la Rupture de leurs Relations", Sem. Jur. 1969,1,2216; Carbonnier 
Jean, Droit Civil, vol. 2 , 8th ed., (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 192; 
Civ. 7 Oct. 1957, J. C. P., 57, 2, 10235, D. 58, 493; Ripert & Boulanger, Traite de Droit 
Civil, vol. 2, (Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1956), p. 453.
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and granted damages to the woman who was actually living with the 
deseased.34 in another case both women were granted damages.35 There is 
no big difference between the position of English law and that of French law 
with regard to free union and cohabitation. Poulter says: "where the deceased 
left a widow as well as a mistress, both of whom had been dependent upon him, 
there seems no logical reason why both should not be entitled to succeed in 
their claims since at present both legitimate and illegitimate children are 
afforded the right to claim concurrently."^
With regard to illegitimate children, most western legal systems give the 
child bom out of the legal marriage the same status as the child bom in a legal 
marriage as declared by the English Family Law Reform Act 1969 s. 14, the 
French Law of 3 January 1972 (loi no: 72-3, 3 Jan. 1972 sur la filiation), the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights 1967 the General Principles of Equality 
and Non-Discrimination in Respects of Persons Bom out of Wedlock, and the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Bom out of 
Wedlock.37
With regard to adultery as a criminal wrong caused by one of the 
spouses to the legal marriage, it has been abolished in many western countries.
After comparing some western legal systems on the matter of 
cohabitation and free union Glendon concludes that: "it seems likely that
34 See Trib. Seine 12 Feb. 1931, D. H. 1931, 57.
3  ^See Paris App. 18 March 1932, D. H. 1932, 88; *1 Mazeaud 51. See Also the case of 
Cass. Ch. Mixte 27 Feb. 1970, D. S. 1970. Jur. 201, note R. Combaldieu, and further 
detail, Nerson Roger, "Les Couples Non-Maries en France", in Eekelaaar & Katz (eds.), 
Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 198- 
211.
3  ^Poulter Sebastian, "The Death of a Lover-II", 126 New Law Journal (1976) 433- 
447, at p. 434. For further detail about the rights of mistresses see cases Cooke v. Head 
[172] 2 All E.R. 38; Richards v. Dove [1974] 1 All E.R. 888: Colin Smith Music Ltd. V. 
Ridge [1975] 3 All E.R. 290: Eves v. Eves [1975] 3 All E.R. 768; Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 
£ All E.R. 776;_W v. W. [1975] 3 All E.R. 970; Duson Holdings Ltd. v. Fox [1975] 3 All 
E.R. 1030; and other cases cited by Poulter, M- See also Brissett-Johnson A., 125 
"Mistress’s Right to a Share in the 'Matrimonial Home’", New Law Journal (1975), 614- 
616.
37 Reported in 125 New Law Journal.(1975 .^ 1196.
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informal marriage -whatever it is called- will gain further ground as a legal 
institution in England as it has in France and the United States."3 8 
Furthermore, Professor C live^ states that marriage is not a necessary legal 
concept with regard to personal effects such as name, the freedom of the 
couples to separate and 'set up other relationships they please1, nationality, and 
domicile or residence of the married persons. The rules on the duty of the 
wife to obey her husband and the right of the husband to moderately chastise 
his wife are unnecessary and intolerable. The mutual duty of fidelity and 
cohabitation "are manifestly unenforceable in modem conditions and could be 
discarded without any difficulty". Nor is the marriage a necessary legal 
concept with regard to children since in many countries children both 
legitimate and illegitimate are in the same legal position. ( p.71) With regard 
to matrimonial property he says that the system of separation of property is a 
reasonable and acceptable one on the evidence of the workings of the mle of 
Scottish law since 1920 which "has been that marriage has no effect on the 
ownership and management of property."( p. 75) In the same way regarding 
other legal effects of marriage he concludes that: "it may be that in the future 
marriage will become both an unnecessary and an inconvenient legal concept 
in various European countries."( P. 78)..This development has no parallal in 
Islamic societies.
131- Dissotatriom ©if m&mag©:
The last important difference between Islamic law and western law is in 
the possibility of terminating or disolving marriage by divorce.
"In accordance with the Roman-Catholic dogma of indissolubility of 
marriage, restoration to the freedom of remarriage through divorce is still 
not obtainable in Spain, Eire, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Colombia. In Portugal divorce is not available to couples who
38 Glendon. op. cit. p. 99.
39 Clive E., "Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal Concept?", in Eekelaar & Katz (eds.), 
op. cit. 71-81, at p. 71.
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have initiated their marriage by a Catholic church ceremony, as it is done in 
some 95 per cent of all Portuguese marriages. In Italy divorce was not 
obtainable until 1971 and a strong movement to bring about the repeal of the 
Divorce Law ofl970 is under way. "40
In English law judicial divorce was not available until the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 by which divorce was admitted only on the ground of 
adultery. Even then there was a distinction between the husband and the wife. 
The husband could divorce his wife for a single act of adultery, whereas the 
wife could not unless his adultery was aggravated by special circumstances 
such as incest, bigamy, desertion or extreme physical cruelty. In 1923 the wife 
was given the right to divorce her husband for a single act of adultery. After 
1937 divorce was available on the following grounds: adultery, desertion for 
three years, cruelty and supervening incurable insanity. After suggestions and 
investigations by Law Commissions, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 now 
declares that the sole ground for divorce is the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage which can be justified by the following facts : adultery, unreasonable 
behaviour, desertion for two years, two years separation and five years 
separation. Even when one of these facts has been proved divorce may not be 
granted unless the court is satisfied that the marriage has in fact broken down 
irretrievably.41 Divorce by mutual consent is permitted in English law after 
two years separation, and the unilateral divorce after five years separation.
In France under Roman Catholisism marriage was a sacrament and thus 
indissoluble. After the revolution of 1789 the law of 20 September 1792 
admitted divorce for cause, divorce by mutual agreement and incompatibility 
of temperament. The Civil Code abolished divorce for incompatibility of 
temperament and admitted divorce only on the grounds of adultery, 
condemnation and cruel behaviour, and divorce by mutual consent was made
40 Rheinstein Max, "Introduction", International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
vol. iv, chapt 1, p. 8.
41 For these points see Bromley, op. cit. 1981, pp. 186-191; Glendon, op. cit. pp. 
192-195.
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more difficult. Under strong Catholic influence divorce was entirely repealed 
by the law of 8 May 1816, and France returned to the Roman Catholic tradition 
of indissolubility of marriage. No movement had succeded in changing the law 
until 1884 when the law of Nacquet of July 27,1884 which allowed divorce for 
cause but not divorce by mutual consent. The same grounds for divorce 
remained unchanged, except with small modification by the law of 2 April 
1941, and the law of 12 April 1945, until 1975 when a new divorce law was 
introduced.42 This new law affords three alternative forms of divorce:
1) Divorce by mutual consent which can be claimed by joint petition of 
the spouses (art. 230), or by petition of one of the spouses and accepted by the 
other (art. 233).
2) Divorce for prolonged disruption of the common life, by de facto 
separation of six years (art. 237), or by incurable mental illness for at least six 
years (art. 238).
3) Divorce for fault, for intolerable and imputable facts which constitute 
a grave or renewed violation of the duties and obligations of marriage, or for 
conviction and sentencing of one spouse by one of the penalties provided by 
art. 7 of the Penal Code.
Islamic law as well as Algerian law consider marriage as a contract 
which can be dissolved by agreement of the parties or by either of them. 
Divorce is allowed by unilateral will of the husband on the condition that he 
should recompense his wife in the case of his arbitrary divorce. It is also 
allowed by the mutual consent of the spouses, or by the wife's initiative on 
certain grounds as will be seen in the last chapter.
42 See for these points Yiannapoulos A. N., Civil Law in the Modem World. (U. S. 
A.: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 43-44; Lawson et al., Amos and Walton’s 
Introduction to French Law. 3rd ed.,(Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967), 71-73; 
Glendon, op. cit. pp. 202 et seq.
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SECTION TWO 
THE EFFECTS OF COLONISATION ON THE ALGEMAN .
FAMILY
It has been seen in the previous section that the Algerian family differs 
from the western family in several respects. In this section another aspect of 
the problem will be considered, that is colonisation, which has left its mark on 
the Algerian family, both in social and economic areas. "The French presence, 
in the form of political control...and the eventual settlement of almost one 
million Frenchmen on Algerian soil, did have profound effects, both positive 
and negative, on Algerian culture in general, and on the status of women in 
p a r t i c u l a r . "43 This one hundred and thirty years colonisation affected 
generations of Algerians, especially from the intellectual point of view. 
Before and after independence, two different kinds of people reacted to the 
French colonial in two different ways. There were those who were resentful 
of the colonial and were attached to their own traditions and rules; and others 
who being affected and educated by the French , rejected their own traditions 
and mles and applied French traditions and rules as a way to modernisation.
This is one of the effects of colonialism everywhere. However, it will 
be seen how the French affected the Algerian family in general and women in 
particular.
The French, by their policy of naturalisation and conversion, tried to 
abolish the traditions and customs of the Algerian people. This caused many 
Algerians to cling more closely to their traditions not only because they were 
good, but because the French tried to abolish them. By encouraging 
emigration and mixed marriages, the French caused many families to be 
concerned about their sons and daughters. These families persuaded their sons 
to get engaged to any girl in the neighbourhood even if the couple were very 
young.,
By spreading prostitution everywhere in Algeria, the French put women
43 Gordon David, Women of Algeria : An Essav on Change. (U. S. A.: Harvsard 
University Press, 1968), p. 35.
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in a critical situation: the families favoured early marriage for their daughters 
and seclusion in the house, and forbade them to go out, except under very strict 
supervision, veiled and accompanied by one of her family.
These are the main points that will be discussed below in some detail.
I -  Natoiallisatiiom:
When the French colonised Algeria, they made great efforts to make the 
Algerians assimilate to the European people as much as possible, by abolishing 
their traditions and customs and spreading French traditions and mles. They 
tried to justify their actions by assuming that the superior race has the right to 
do that because it has a duty to modernise the inferior race; and a civilised 
people should bring in their products and their methods to a people who are 
barbarians.^
The way to modernise the colonised people was, as one of the White 
Fathers says; "in order to create one european people of different origins, you 
have to eradicate their personality, and deprive them of their unity, then re­
organise and unify them into one race with a French way of life and
thinking. "45
The French pretended to establish a real national and moral unity 
between the colonial and the colonised peoples, as Maunier said. But in his 
introduction to "Notion du Contract des P e u p l e s " 4 6  Maunier himself came to 
the final conclusion that the Algerian and French peoples did not move towards 
any liaison and any fusion; because between the two there was a disparity of 
ideas, morals and manners.
They encouraged illiteracy among Algerian people by preventing them .
44 See Ferry J. speech in the chamber, 1885, cited by Saadia and Lakhdar, L'Alienation 
Colonialiste et la Resistance de la Famille Algerienne. (Lausanne: La Cite-Editeur, 
1961)p. 13; Maunier.Rene, Loi Francaise et Coutume Indigene en Algerie. (Paris: Les 
Editions Domat-Montchrestien, 1932), p. 13.
45 Maunier Rene, op. cit.pp. 24-26.
46 M i, p. 26.
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from learning Arabic or Islamic culture. Charles Richard said that the French 
would not see any harm in closing those institutions (for example schools, 
mosques), and let the Arabs go back to the stone age. Since only then, it would 
be possible for the French to educate them and appropriate them by 
education.4^
The schools and centres of education that existed during that time were 
run by white fathers and sisters to convert Algerian youth to Christianity. The 
French not only encouraged illiteracy among families, but also tried to break 
down family unity when they built the military schools and induced young 
people to join them. Great harm was caused to the Algerian family when the 
French decided to achieve their policy of naturalisation and declared the 
obligatory military service for all Algerian youth as an accomplishment of 
duty towards France, their mother country. Thousands of young Algerians 
were sent by the French to fight against the people of Vietnam4**, another 
French colony.
The French used seductive methods to attract Algerians to 
naturalisation. If an Algerian took French nationality he obtained the 
advantages of the French natives. He could be promoted to high position in his 
work and have access to various jobs. His salary would be equivalent to that of 
his French colleagues. His children could go to French schools, continue their 
studies in the university, and obtain a grant from the State and many other 
advantages such as family allawances, social security benefits and reductions in 
public transport costs 4^
The French were sure that the great obstacle preventing Algerian 
people from mixing with the French was their Islamic belief. The best way of 
dominating the whole country, they thought, was to deprive people of their 
belief. Towards this aim the secretary to Marshal Burgeand wrote: "The last
47 Charles Richard,cited by Lacheraf Mostefa/'Constantes Politiques et Militaires dans 
les Guerres Coloniales d'Algerie",16 Les Temps Modemes (1961) 727-800, at pp. 779-780.
48 See Saadia and Lakhdar. op. cit. p. 70.
49 Ibid, pp. 50, 54.
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days of Islam are coming. In Twenty years, Algiers will have no other God 
but Christ...In order that this soil becomes French property, it is essential that 
Islam must lose its hold on it...Arabs will not be French unless they become 
Christians".^.
Within two years of colonialism, in 1832 the most important mosque in 
Algiers was converted into a church. Of the 132 mosques in 1830, there were 
only 12 mosques left in 1865.51
This is why the white fathers were keen on opening new schools as soon 
as they settled. To educate children, they had established many schools in the 
majority of the Algerian towns, and even in the countryside, the mountains and 
the Sahara. Many families refused to allow their children to enter those 
Christian schools. When the French minister of Public Instruction came to 
Algeria in 1890, a young man gave him a letter which stated: "it would be 
better for you to stay in Paris; you come to establish schools; know that the 
people of kabyles do not want them".52
Despite the fact that the French pretended to respect religions, religious 
discrimination, especially against Muslims, was very obvious: the budget 
allocated to Islamic religious institutions was seven times less than that 
allocated to the Jewish, twenty two times less than that allocated to Catholic and 
one hundred and twenty times less than that to other Christians institutions.^ 
The French opposed Islam both as religion and law. Although there was 
an article in the (Senatus consulte) law of North Africa of 1865, which 
declared that the beliefs and customs of the Algerians would be respected , the 
French interfered in the Islamic law by alteration, transformation and 
abolition, as will be seen in the following analysis.
Firstly, in the field of jurisdiction, they substituted the traditional courts 
by new French courts and transferred the authority of the muslim judge of 
Kabyle to French judges,"Judges of the peace".54 The great invasion of the
Charles Richard as cited by Lacheraf M., op. cit. p. 779 et seq.




Islamic law by the French, was in two steps: (i) the statute of 1873 subjected 
many buildings and properties to French law; (ii) the statute of 1902 altered 
some marriage conditions and formalities to agree with French manners in 
Kabyle.55
Secondly, crime and punishment were not determined by parliament, as 
in France, but by the governor or the administrator.(Ibid,p.75). The French 
also imposed several statutes to create some changes in family relationship. 
The law of 1882 which organised the personal status of the Algerians, obliged 
each person to have a family name chosen by the head of the family, or even by 
the French authorities if the person did not respond quickly. Furthermore, 
each person had to have an identity card so that the French authorities could 
identify him, know his date of birth, his family and his personal status in order 
to be able to put their hands on him easily at anytime.^
The statute of 1928 supporting the previous one of 1882, especially 
concerning punishments, obliged the Algerians to report births, deaths, 
marriages and divorces to the personal status officer, and obliged the husband 
to report the marriage and divorce to them.
I I '  P m stiM fen :
Having seen the effect of French colonisation on the religion and the law 
of the Algerian people, it is now worthwhile to inquire into its effects on 
family life in general and on women in particular."One area of the life of 
women in which the French are accused of having done considerable harm is in 
that of prostitution".^ The French themselves seem to be in agreement on 
this point. Shaeffer, for example, admits that before the French regime, open 
and public prostitution did not exist in Algeria on a purely commercial basis
Maunier. op. cit. P. 73.
55 Ibid. pp. 73-74.
56 Ibid. pp. 75-84.
57 Gordon, o p . cit. p. 42
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and he regrets that even when made illegal in France, houses of prostitution 
were kept open in A l g e r i a . ^
The main goal of the French was to assimilate the Algerians to the 
French culture, and since this was impossible because of the differences in 
moral values, they thought that prostitution could weaken those values and 
destroy the unity of the Family; besides, they knew how much the Algerian 
community was attached to the respect of the dignity of their women. 
Prostitution therefore,was the only and the best way to get rid of respect and 
dignity.
Because women were the heart of the Algerian family and the first 
teachers of a generation, the best way for full assimilation was to "gallicize the 
Algerian woman under the assumption 'cherchez la femme’ that if the woman 
was up-rooted from her culture the rest would follow."?^
Prostitution was spread in different ways. The French took the majority 
of the cultivated land of the Algerians. Accordingly famine obliged many 
families to move looking for food and work. Many girls tried to contribute to 
the family income. There were no jobs for them because they lacked a French 
training, and all jobs were reserved for the Europeans. Many of them worked 
as housemaids in French houses. "Women were procured through the Bordel 
Mobile de Campagne (the BMC) and through the police encouraging elderly 
procuresses to solicit unattached women into houses of prostitution".^ 
Rapes were also organised by the procuring agents for the houses of 
prostitution or BMC, or with the agreement and complaisance of the 
administration that tried to extend these institutions over the whole country. 
Many rapes were carred out by French soldiers in different parts of the 
country: most attractive women were forced to sleep with French soldiers. 
Any girl or woman arrested by the police for any reason, had her name put on 
a card and ordered to pass a medical investigation, and was then considered as a 
prostitute before she was set free. In most cases the police put her in a house of
59 Ibid, p. 58
60 Ibid. p. 42.
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prostitution.
Here, it is worthwhile to point out the discrimination that developed in 
this field. There were two kinds of prostitution houses: (i) houses reserved for 
European clients, tourists and soldiers where hygiene service and protection 
were introduced on a regular basis, and where Algerians were not permitted; 
and (ii) other houses reserved for Algerians clients without any medical 
control.
These are the main ways that were used by the French to encourage 
Algerian women into prostitution. Some of the effects of prostitution on the 
Algerian family in general and on women in particular will be considered 
now.
Prostitution which was supported by the French law and authority 
resulted in the destruction of families and the meanings of respect and shame. 
Girls like 'Daughters of the Nile' 'the prostitute girls of the Sahara' "without 
shame or disapprobation from their kinsmen enter prostitution, often in houses 
run by their mothers."^
The Algerians who lived in the areas which the French reserved for the 
spread of prostitution and alcoholism were obliged to put on their house doors 
the expression of "Dar M 'd e y n a " ^  which meant that the members of the 
family in this house were good and were not expected to practice prostitution. 
This was to avoid any mistake or misunderstanding. Furthermore, young 
women were not permitted to go out of the house unless they were 
accompanied by one of their parents or an old woman.
The situation forced men to stress the honour of their wives, sisters and 
daughters whose behaviour was controlled and supervised by the men of the 
family.
Early marriage became the rule for both boys and girls in order to avoid 
the temptation of the French. Families preferred marrying off their 
daughters, rather than allowing them to continue their studies. This has now
61 Ibid, p. 19.
®  Saadia and Lakhdar. op. cit. p. 126.
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become a custom in Algeria especially in the countryside, where many families 
still prefer early marriage for their daughters rather than letting them attend 
high schools or universities.
Most important of all, Algerian people opposed the policy of 
prostitution and tried to fight against it. Fatwa of Cheikh Mohamed El Assimi, 
the great Hanafi Muphti of Algiers in 1951, asked for the abolishing of
prostitution.^
Nationalists had encouraged young men to end prostitution by marrying 
those prostitutes, but some problems faced them. A prostitute could not be set 
free until she gave a certain amount of money to the responsible owner of the 
house she worked in. Besides, the French created some administrative 
obstacles to prevent young men from marring prostitutes. They had :
(1) to prove that they have sufficient income to supply the new family 
with all its needs;
(2) to show proof of a rented house;
(3) to pay in some cases a large sum of money as a price to the 
administration.^
In spite of the efforts of the Algerian people, prostitution still exists even 
after this long time since independence. It is difficult to understand why the 
houses of prostitution are still open and being run under government authority 
and the protection of law in some Algerian cities.
EDI-' M ixed m am age:
The French also encouraged mixed marriages. They intended to 
minimise the differences of religion, language, and race between the French 
and the colonised people. There were many ways to achieve this aim. One of 
these was to persuade Algerian men to marry European women. By mixed 
marriages they intended to create a generation which was half French and half
63 Ibid, p. 130.
64 Ibid, p. 142.
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Algerian, so that by the lapse of time, the following generations would become 
wholly French. This plan was suggested by some of the French writers 
themeselves.65 Algerian men were encouraged to marry European women 
in order to enjoy the rights of the French after military service. The French 
capitalists needed a pool of cheap labour to create a degree of competition with 
French workers. For this reason, they encouraged young Algerians to 
emigrate to work in France. If an Algerian married a French woman, he was 
guaranteed a more stable life than in Algeria. He could have a business, have 
access to any job, and even obtain permission to keep a weapon or hold a 
shooting licence which was forbidden in Algeria. The hope of the French was 
to create from two disparate families one mixed family, or as was done in 
Canada, when Golbert sent many girls who had been arrested for bad 
behaviour to Canada to create a new race: French- Canadian.^6
The consequences of mixed marriages were; firstly, according to Islam 
and Algerian customs, young men were responsible for supporting and 
looking after their parents, but by emigration and mixed marriages, those 
relationships between the young men and their parents, especially the mother, 
were broken. Secondly, many engaged and married women waited for a long 
time for their husbands to return from France. Moreover, nobody supplied 
those jilted with their needs.
These are some of the social effects of mixed marriages. But there were 
also some juridical problems. On 30 June 1919 the Appeal Court of Algiers 
declared that in a marriage between a Muslim Algerian man and a Christian 
French woman, the spouses had to conserve their personal statute, and in case 
of conflict between the two, that of the French woman should prevail for 
reasons of public policy, and that the fundamental laws of France should 
prevail over the laws and customs of the annexed p e o p l e . ^  Moreover,
6$ El-fessi.A, "Protection of the Muslim family", Revue Tunisienne de Droit(1975). no: 
1, 13-18, at p. 18.
66 D' Annam Nhu-May, "Le Role de la Femme dans la Colonisation", in Congres de la 
Colonisation Rurale. Alger, 26-29 Mai 1930,441-477, at p. 454.
67 Marchand Henri, Les Marriages Franco-Musulmans. (citation untraceable) pp. 84-
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discrimination was practised within French law. If, for example, a French 
person was converted to Islam, this conversion did not affect his nationality or 
personal statute, he or she was still subject only to French law and not to 
Islamic law. But if an Algerian was converted to Christianity, he or she was 
strangely enough, subject to French law and not to his own Islamic law. This 
was even contrary to the French declaration that the change of religion did not 
affect nationality and personal statute. Consequently if marriage contracted 
between a French man or woman converted to Islam before a Cadi (Muslim 
Judge) was void, the change of religion, they said, had no influence on 
nationality and personal s t a t u t e . 6 8  But in defiance of this the court of Guelma 
declared that the Muslim Algerian who was converted into Christianity could 
not contract his marriage before a Cadi (Muslim Judge), the French officer of 
Civil Status was the only competent officer, otherwise the marriage was liable 
to be voidable.^
Even after the promulgation of the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984, 
the problem of mixed marriages still exists, for Algerian women married to 
non-Muslims. There are thousands of Algerian women married in France to 
foreigners. Yet, article 31 of the Code declares that a Muslim woman cannot 
marry a non-Muslim. Art 31/2 declares that marriage between Algerian men 
and women and foreigners of either sex must comply with the regulatory 
provisions; provisions which will state the general mles of mixed marriages 
between Algerians and foreigners, are as yet not promulgated.
85. The same view was also declared by the Correctional Court in 1951, Ibid. p. 86.
68 See different judgments in Ibid. p. 91.
69 Ibid. p. 93.
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Conclusion:
It has been seen that the family differs from one society to another 
because of the effects of certain factors. The religious factor has the greatest 
effect on it. Algerian family since it is an Islamic one, differs from the western 
family in these main characteristics: the Algerian family is an extended 
network of kin related by blood or through marriage, it is patriarchal, and it is 
deeply attached to honour, sexual purity and chastity.
The marriage contract is also affected by the religious factor. Algerian(
law requires besides the consent of both parties, the consent of the matrimonial 
guardian. Monogamy is the general rule in Algerian and Islamic laws, but in 
certain circumstances and wih certain conditions polygamy is permitted.
Owing to social change in western countries, many features of marriage 
as a legal institution, have been changed in informal marriage; and the modem 
trend in western countries is to abolish the following features of marriage:
(I) the obligation of one spouse to take the name of the other;
"(2) the obligation on spouses to live together;
(3) the obligation on spouses of sexual fidelity;
(4) the obligation of maintenance;
(5) the husband's right to rape his wife;
(6) the criminal offence of bigamy;
(7) legitimacy of children;
(8) names of children;
(9) nationality, domicile and residence;
(10) the special position of spouses in contract, tort, civil and criminal 
evidence;
(II)  the special position of spouses in taxation and social security 
laws."?0
The possibility of terminating or dissolving marriage is one of the 
important distinctions between Algerian Muslim marriages and western
O' Donovan Katherine, "Should All Maintenance of Spouses Be Abolished?" 45 
Modem Law Review (1982\ 424-433. at p. 431.
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marriages. However, the modem trend in western countries is towards the 
free termination of marriage as is clearly seen in the new French divorce 
provisions of 1975.
The colonisation of Algerian society by the French has affected Algerian 
family and Algerian women. Naturalisation, illiteracy, mixed marriages and 
prostitution are results of colonisation, which still affect Algerian society in 
general and the family and women in particular.
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CHAPTEE TWO 
THE WOMAN AMD) THE MAEEILAGE COOTEACT
Introduction:
The most important aim of the law in general is establishing equality 
among people and removing as much as possible any discrimination or 
distinction between the parties of any act or contract, as long as they are in the 
same position and under the same circumstances. Marriage is one of the parts 
of the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 where distinction between the man 
and the woman appears very clearly.
It is customary for a couple to become engaged for a period before they 
marry. This promise of marriage is an engagement that either party has the 
right to break. Algerian law makes a distinction between the man and the 
woman in returning gifts after the breach of the engagement. Article 5 allows 
not only the recovery of damages for pecuniary loss, but also compensation for 
the innocent party's injured feelings.
In order to clarify this distinction and the recovery of damages it is 
better to look at the position in Islamic law on which Algerian law is based, and 
compare this with Scots law which has recently abolished the action of promise 
of marriage by s. 1 (1) of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 
1984.
The minimum age for marriage is another aspect where distinction 
between males and females exists not only in Algerian law, but in most of laws 
in the world. Religious laws encourage marriage even at early age. Whereas 
modem legislation try to fix a limit to the age for marriage and prevent 
marriage to be contracted below this limit. A look at these religious laws and 
modem legislation will show whether there is a right age for marriage, 
whether there should be a distinction between males and females in this age, 
and whether the marriage below this age can be validated.
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Legislations which allow minor's marriage require the parental consent 
besides the consent of the two parties. According to some Muslim jurists the 
guardian may force his ward into a marriage.
Algerian law as well as Islamic law require, besides the consent of the 
parties the consent of the matrimonial guardian of the woman. The woman 
previously married cannot be contracted into a marriage without her consent; 
whereas the virgin daughter according to some jurists can be contracted into a 
marriage by her father even without her consent.
All the above points will be discussed in detail under the following 
sectons:
section one: breach of promise of marriage.
section two: age of marriage.
sectiontree: parental consent and matrimonial guardianship.
SECTION o n e
BEEACH OF IPEOMSE OF MAEEEAGE
In classic Islamic law promise of marriage is viewed as an engagement 
that either party has the right to break. This view still exists under die Algerian 
Family Law of 1984 article 5/1 which declares :" Khutba (engagement) is a 
promise of marriage and either party may break it."
Under the old law of Scotland a promise of marriage was a contract 
that could be enforced by imprisonment or excommunication , especially in 
the period of canon law , when judges had power to compel the party to fulfill 
his or her promise or pronounce the sentence or withhold it.l That contract 
amounted to matrimonium per verbis de praesenti, which constituted a 
marriage in that period. :" In such a case, even if in the meantime one of the 
parties had actually solemnized a marriage with some one else,the ecclesiastical
1 Fraser P., Treatise on Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland, vol.l, 
2nd ed., (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1876)
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courts (at the time of their full power) would have treated the latter as void and 
would have enforced the formalities of the original contract.
By engagement, a man and a woman promise to marry each other 
without any terms or conditions. However it is common that they promise to 
marry on the fulfillment of certain conditions or the expiry of a certain time. 
In Scotland a promise of marriage’does not require any formalities. It can be 
contracted orally or in writing, personally or in a ceremony. While in Algeria 
it is customary that a promise of marriage is contracted in a religious 
ceremony, which takes place in the house of the woman's parents. The couple 
invite their friends and their families. The couple's fathers or tutors agree 
about the conditions of the Khutba (engagement) and then the Imam recites 
Fatiha and makes Dua'a^. This kind of Muslim formal engagement prevents 
the parties from agreeing to such conditions as " if you become pregnant", " if 
you become a prostitute " and " if you have yourself sterilized"^
Islam in Algerian society prohibits the engaged couple to meet or travel 
together alone. The only way for them to meet each other is in the house of the 
girl’s parents and with at least one of her family, usually her mother present. 
This strictness is in the interest of the girl, since at any time either party is 
entitled to break the engagement.
The Scottish couple exchange gifts and rings or receive gifts from their 
families or friends. This is also the case in Algeria but In addition, the 
Algerian man usually offers his fiancee the whole dowry or part of it.^
Both Algerian^and Scots^law declare that promise of marriage is
2 White Dundas, "Breach of Promise of Marriage", 10 The Law Quarterly Review 
(1894) 135-142, at p. 136.
3 This is a kind of prayer after an engagement and a marriage contract. It is an Islamic 
custom.
4 Hahlo H.R.. The South African Law of Husband and Wife. 4 th ed., (Wynberg, 
Cape Town: Juta & Company L.,1975), p. 49.
5 The dower is one of the four elements of the marriage,but it is customary that part of 
it is given to the woman during the engagement.
6 Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 5/1
7 LaW Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984.
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not a contract; it does not create any rights or obligations between the couple.
Now, as in the past, Algerian and Scots law deal with damages arising 
from breach of promise in totally different ways. When the early Islamic rule 
on personal status was finally determined in the period of scholar-jurists, as 
part of the vast structure of the Shari'a which derived from the Holy Quran 
and the Prophetic traditions^, the law recognised neither damages for 
pecuniary loss nor for solatium. The only effects of the breach of promise of 
marriage that the jurists took into consideration were the return of the gifts 
and the dowry. However, in the beginning of this century when society 
changed, the Muslim jurists and judges were forced to allow not only the 
compensation for pecuniary loss arising from breach of promise of marriage, 
but also compensation for solatium for injured feelings.
Scots law on the other hand, at one time, allowed only damages for 
pecuniary loss. Then in the leading case Hogg v .Gow^ the court decided that 
the damages could be allowed not only for pecuniary loss but also for solatium. 
From that date both damages have been allowed by courts until 1983 when the 
Scottish Law Commission recommended abolition of the action of breach of 
marriage p rom ise^ , which was implemented by the Law Reform Act 
1984.11
Before the Algerian Family Law Code 1984 was promulgated, the 
matters relating to family status were regulated mostly according to the 
Maliki’s jurisprudence.^ Concerning the current problems, judges resolve 
their cases according to legal opinions of the Muslim jurists in the whole 
Islamic world, especially in Egypt^.
8 See in general Anderson Norman, Law Reform in the Muslim World. (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1976).
9 Hogg v. Gow. 27 May, 1812, F.C. 654.
Scottish Law Commission no: 76 (1983) Family Law Report on Outdated Rules in 
the Law of Husband and Wife, p. 4, paras 2.11, 2.12.
11 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984.
12 There are four great Islamic schools or jurisprudence among the Sunni Muslim: 
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali. The Maliki's jurisprudence is widely dominant in Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Lybia.
34
The matters effected by a breach of promise of marriage in both 
Algerian and Scots law are: dower^, gifts, and damages. These matters will 
be discussed in both Algerian and Scots law in more detail, c
All the Sunni ju ris ts^  agree that the dower given by the man to his 
fiancee should be returned to him when the engagement comes to an e n d .  
Firstly, because the dower is one of the effects of the marriage, as Pearl 
says:"...the obligation to pay the mahr (dower) is an effect of the marriage, 
rather than an i n c i d e n t . " ^  Moreover, in the Maliki jurisprudence, the dower 
is one of the constituent element of the marriage^,and since the marriage is 
not yet consummated, the dower should be returned. Secondly, by the 
consummation of the marriage the woman will own the dower, but without 
that consummation it is still the property of the man. Therefore she must 
return it; if she no longer has it, she must return an equivalent or its value. This 
resolution has been adopted in the Algerian Family Code: "The consummation 
of the marriage or the death of the husband entitles the wife to the whole 
dower. She is entitled to half of it in the case of divorce before the 
consummation of the marriage."!^
In spite of the fact that all the Sunni jurists agree that the dower should 
be returned, they disagree about the gifts (including the ring) given by a man 
to his fiancee. The Hanafi jurists declare that what is given by one party to 
another constitutes a gift; and from their perspective, the gift can be recovered
13 Because, the bigest and the oldest university of Islamic studies, El'ashar contains the 
majority of greater Muslim jurists.
14 Dower is not a consideration in Scots law , it does not exist in Scottish society, 
whereas in Algerian law it is one of the constituent elements of the marriage.
13 see note no: 14.
16 Sabak Sayid, Fiqh Essouna. (in Arabic), vol.2, 5th ed., (Beirut: Dar-El-Arabi, 
1983), pp. 31-33.
17 Pearl David, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law. 2nd ed., (Kent: Croom Helm, 
1987), p. 61.
18 This view is adopted by the Algerian FamilyLaw of1984 in article 9 : "marriage is 
contracted by the consent of both parties, the presence of the matrimonial guardian, two 
witnesses, and the dower."
1^  Article 16 of the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984.
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unless there is prohibition of recovery of the gift, such as consumption or loss 
of the gift. Therefore the donor can recover his gift if its form has not 
changed, like a ring or a chain, and if it is not sold or lost. There is no 
distinction between breach of promise by the man or by his fiancee. The Shafii 
jurists require the recovery of the gift itself or its value if it is lost. This 
applies also to both couples in breach of promise. The Hanbali jurists declare 
that there can be no recovery of the gift even when it still exists, because from 
their perspective it is not permissible to recover the gift after it is handed over. 
This is the case whichever party is responsible for the breach of promise of 
marriage. The Maliki jurists distinguish between the breach by the man and 
the breach by the woman. If the man breaches the promise of marriage, he 
cannot recover anything even when the gift is still in the hands of his fiancee. 
On the other hand if the woman breaches the promise, her fiance can recover 
the gift itself or its value if it is lost or consumed.
It seems that this detail by the Maliki jurists corresponds more to justice, 
in giving a protection to the woman to return the gift if the breach of promise 
is by the man. Because this breach by him itself is an oppression to the woman, 
so it is unfair to add another oppression by asking her to return the gift which 
she considers her own property. For this reason the Algerian law of 1984 has 
taken the view of the Maliki jurists. Furthermore the Algerian law has given 
another protection to the woman even if the breach is by her individual will; 
she is asked to return only what is not consumed or lost.^0
It is clear from the Family Law Code 1984, that the Algerian legislator 
has examined the breach of promise of marriage and the cases of recovering 
the gifts given by the man to his fiancee, but has not mentioned anything about 
that given by the woman to her fiance. The reason could be that, it is 
customary in Algerian Muslim society that the gifts are always given by the 
man to the woman.
Whereas, in Scots law, at present, there are no special rules applying to
20 Algerian Family Law Code 1984, article 5/4 translated as:" if the breach of promise 
of mamage is by the woman, she returns to her fiance what is not expired."
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the gifts or property disputes. Therefore the general principles of the law of 
property apply. The Scottish Law Commission in 1983 made no 
recommendation for legislation on property disputes between engaged couples 
and concluded that the existing law on unjustified enrichment would provide 
adequate remedies for any problems which might arise in relation to property 
between engaged c o u p l e s . T h e  matter stands on the proof of intention as in 
the example given by the Scottish Law Commission: "if a man has spent money 
without any intention of donation, on improving property belonging to his 
fiancee, he may have a claim based on the general law of recompence."^
Concerning the engagement rings, in the absence of express intention, 
Clive suggested three possible v i e w s ^ 3  of which courts can choose one to 
adapt in their cases;
1- If one of the couples has given a ring unconditionally to the other 
party, for example as a birthday or Christmas present, it will be 
unrecoverable, however the engagement is broken.
2- If a ring is given on the implied condition, it is recoverable, if the 
marriage does not take place for any reason other than the breach by the 
donor.
3- If a ring is given on the implied condition that it is returnable, then it 
is recoverable for whatever reason the marriage does not take place.
The Law commission declared that the engagement rings did not differ 
from various other gifts between couples; and it concluded that the majority of 
those who commented, thought that no special statutory rule on engagement 
ring was necessary. Therefore, it could be left to be regulated by the general 
law.24
Given that actions for breach of promise have been abolished by the 
„ Law Reform of 1984^5; engagement now gives rise to no legal rights or
21 Scottish Law Commission no: 76. o p . cit. p. 5, paras 2.14..
22 ibid. P. 5, para. 2.13, and Newton v. Newton 1925 S. C. 715.
23 Clive E.M , The Law of Husband and Wife inScotland. 2 nd ed. (Edinburgh: W.
Green & Son, 1982), pp. 27-28.
24 s cot Law Com. no: 76, p. 6, para. 2.15.
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obligations between the couples. Yet Thomson says: "if engagement rings 
were presumed to be outright gifts; but that this presumption should be able to 
be rebutted on proof that the gift was intended to be subject to the condition 
that it should be returned if the marriage did not take place. "26
Engagement gifts given by a third party are returnable if the marriage 
does not take p laced
Damages for breach of promise:
It has been said that the promise of marriage is not an enforceable 
contract and that either party is entitled to break it. The breach of it may be 
justified or wrongful, but: "...if the wrong is of that nature that it cannot be 
repaired by specific implement of the obligation, if you cannot remove it by
fulfilment, then damages must be paid for it."28
The classic Islamic law did not recognise any damages for breach of 
promise for either pecuniary loss or solatium. The reasons may b e ^ :
1- Damages are awarded only for breach of an obligation such as a 
violation of contract, or for tort; and since the engagement is just a promise, 
not a contract, the breach of it creates no material right or obligation. 
Moreover such breach is not a material action which causes a material tort such 
as the waste of someone else's property.
2- The marriage will not be perfect without the consent of both parties, 
and if damages are awarded for the breach of promise, this will, by 
implication, force the defender to accept the marriage under the threat of legal 
action.30
25 Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984.
26 Thomson J. M., Family Law in Scotland. (London: Butterworths, 1987), p. 8.
27 M.
28 Lord Meadowbank, in the case of Hogg v. Gow. May 27, 1812, F.C. , 654, at p. 
657.
29 These opinions were given by Shahin, a lecturor in Oran University in 1986.
50 This opinion is the same given, as a second criticism of Scots law, by the Scot. Law.
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3- In earlier periods of Islamic society, there was no way that the fiancee 
could be injured by breach of promise, since the woman was secluded from her 
fiance. There was no relationship between them till the time of marriage. In 
this case the woman had no injured feelings or reputation.
The same situation existed, and still exists in several parts of rural areas, 
in Algerian society: "most Algerian marriages are arranged both because 
young women and men are kept separated and because a marriage has 
important consequences for other members of both families."31
But nowadays, Islamic society has changed by the development and the 
influence of the western civilization; as a result many engaged couples arrange 
their marraiges with their own conditions. This may cause some injury to one 
party by the breach of promise by the other.
Muslim jurists have thought about damages and consequently their 
opinions were divided in three different ways-^:
1- The first opinion is given by Sheikh Muhamad Bakhit who argues that 
no damages can be awarded for a breach of promise since it is a right for both 
parties. It is accepted by custom and law that whoever uses his own right is not 
responsible for any damage arising from the use of his right.
2- Doctor Mustapha Essiba'i suggests that in cases of injury the mle of 
damages for a breach of promise is an equitable principle acknowledged by the 
Shari'a by two legal principles; the first is the misuse of a right which was used 
by the Hanafi jurisprudence such as the guardian misusing his right over a 
minor. The second one is the principle of obligation under the Maliki 
jurisprudence: if someone voluntarily engages to do something, he must do it.
3- Sheikh Abou Zahra argues that breach of promise itself is not a cause 
of damages, since it is a right of both parties, but if that breach is accompanied 
by an injury caused by the other's will, for example if a man requests his
Com. no: 76, for abolition of actions of breach of marriage promise, p. 2, para. 2.5.
31 Stiem Judith, "Algerian Women : Honor, Survival, and Islamic socialism", in 
Iglitzing & Ross (Eds.), Women in the World: A Comparative Study. (Santa Barbara, 
Oxford: Clio Books, 1976) 229-241, at p. 231.
32 An unpublished Arabic Lecture by Shahin, in Oran University 1986.
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fiancee to give up her job, or a woman askes her fiance to prepare a particular 
house for their marriage and so on the party does not injure the other by his 
breach of promise but by the injury which accompanies that breach which he 
or she participates in. Therefore if that woman gives up her job at the request 
of her fiance, he will be resposible for her damages, and vice versa.
Like the jurists, the judges in the early days were divided into two 
groups. Some of them did not allow damages relying on the view that the 
breach of promise is an act allowed by law, so it cannot be the subject of a 
claim of compensation. Moreover the Shari’a charges the husband who 
divorces his wife before the consummation of the marriage only the half of the 
dower that he gives to her, so it will be unreasonable to charge him for 
damages which may be more than that if he breaches his promise of marriage.
But many other judges have allowed damages^ on the basis that the 
breach of promise was permited to enable the parties to avoid an undesirable 
marriage which would not accomplish its expected purpose. The law should 
not protect an unreasonable and unjustified breach. Furthermore the court 
could not waive its authority to evaluate the actions of one party causing injury 
to another.
This last view was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal of Egypt in 
its decision of 14 December 1 9 3 9 .^ 4  Doctor Sanhouri has summarised that 
decision in the following principles:
1- an engagement is not an enforceable contract.
2 -the mere breach does not give rise to any damages.
3- if the breach is accompanied by other actions causing injury to one 
party, it may give rise to damages on the ground of tort.
Algerian law has adopted the view that allows damages for pecuniary 
loss and solatum in the section 5(2) : "if the breach of promise causes any 
material or moral injury to' one of the parties, damages may be awarded."
From this section and from what has been seen before, it is clear that, 
Algerian law has only general rules for breach of promise, and has left many
33 Naser J., op. cit. p . .
3  ^The Egyptian Court of Cassation, Cassation Hearing of 14 December 1939,no: 13.
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details without resolutions. Yet, it is true that it says in section 222: "in the 
absence of a provision in this Act, the case must be resolved according to the 
principles of Islamic Shari'a."
It has been seen before that the view of allowing damages is new in 
Islamic law. The first court adopting that view is the Egyptian Court of 
C a s s a t i o n . 35 So, many details are still left without provision. This is 
especially important in Algerian law where legislation is the primary source of 
rules that judges must adopt, unlike Scots law where precedents are the 
primary source of law which judges must follow.
There is only one section in Algerian law which discusses damages for 
breach of marriage, for that reason the matter is still confusing or uncertain. 
It is not clear from that if the damages are awarded against the party whose 
breach is justified, or awarded only if there is a wrongful failure to implement 
the promise.
Scots law in this matter, is very clear: "such breach of promise, if 
without legal justification, gives the other party an action for d a m a g e s . . . " 3  6  
Therefore damages may be awarded, if the party has wrongfully refused to 
implement his promise, or delayed it, without good reason, for more than a 
reasonable time, as in Currie v. G u t h r i e ^ . "...in which continued and 
unjustified delay in fulfilling a matrimonial engagement could be held to 
amount to breach t h e r e o f 8 ,  or it has been inferred from his conduct or 
words which justified that he would not implement it, as in Stoole v. Me 
Lejsh39; or by conduct to force the other party refusing to implement his 
promise, for example by marrying another party, as in the case of Cattanack 
v. Robertson^.
35 see note 35.
36 Walker David, Principles of Scottish Private Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975) p. 235.
31 Currie v. Guthrie. (1874) 12 S.L.R. 75.
38 Liddell v. Easton's Trs (1907) S.C. 154.(argued for the defender).
39 Stoole v. Me Leish (1870) 8 M.613 per Lord P.Benholme at 614.
40-Cattanack y. Robertson (18641 2 M.839.
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It is not as clear in Algerian law, as in Scots law , whether or not the 
pursuer can be awarded damages, if the defender has the above justifications 
for his breach.
The main purpose of the engagement is to permit either party to know 
the other well; therefore it may come to his or her notice after the engagement 
that the other party is unfit for him or her; for example, if a woman discovers 
that her fiance is a drunkard or is impotent, or the discovery by a man that his 
fiancee is pregnant.41
Even so in Scots law "there can be no precise rule on what will or will 
not justify a breach of promise. Everything depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case, and on the social attitudes of the time"42
From article 5/2 of the Algerian Family Law, which declares that for 
any material or moral injury caused by breach of promise, damages may be 
awarded, it is expressly understood that damages may be awarded whether or 
not breach of promise is justified. But the best way would be to reform that 
section by adding the expression "without good cause", so that it reads: "for 
any material or moral injury caused by breach of promise without good cause, 
damages may be awarded". Otherwise the law will be contradictory for the 
following reasons:
1- The same article 5/1 says that: "engagement is a promise of marriage 
and each party could breach it". So it is not reasonable that the law allows the 
party to breach the promise of marriage, and asks for damages, even if he or 
she has a good cause.
2- While dealing with divorce, Algerian law declares that if the judge 
notices that the husband divorces his wife abusively, the judge should allow 
damages for her.43 Not only that, but furthermore, the law has given the wife 
the right to ask for divorce on several g r o u n d s ^  which will be discussed
41 Clive, op. cit. p. 23.
42jd .
43 Article 52/1 of the Algerian Family Code of 1984.
44 Article 53 of the Algerian Family Code of 1984. .............
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later in the divorce chapter.
In these two articles, Algerian law allows the parties to breach the whole 
contract of marriage (by divorce) without any damages awarded if there is a 
good cause for that breach, while in the breach of a mere promise of marriage, 
allows damages for material and moral injury, without mentioning whether 
any reason or ground should exist for that.
Concerning damages for breach of promise, as has been said before, 
Algerian law allows damages for pecuniary losses as well as solatium. But 
what are these damages and on what basis are they awarded?
In the Scottish case of M'lntvre v. C u n n i n g h a m ^  it was declared that: 
”...damages may be divided into three distinct heads; (1) outlay caused in 
expectation of marriage; (2) injury to feelings, and (3) prospective or future 
loss."
A claim for outlay caused in expectation of marriage entitles the pursuer 
to compensate any expenses incurred in reliance on the marriage, such as 
wedding clothes, furniture as in Grahame v. Burri^ .
A claim for injured feelings depends on the manner of the breach and 
the justification that this was particulary shocking or hurtful^; the example 
given for this is: ’’the defender was already m arried . "48
A claim for patrimonial loss or future loss, entitles the pursuer to 
financial advantages or opportunities which might have accrued if the 
marriage had taken place.
Do these three kinds of claim succed in Algerian law?
The first kind seems to be logical for compensation, but its importance is 
reduced by custom; especially for woman. She will not undertake expenses for 
the engagement ceremony; And even if she does, it will be little, since it is 
customary that although the ceremony takes place in the house of the girl's
45 M'lntvre v. Cunningham (1920) 36 Sh. Ct. Rep. 54.
46 Graham v. Bum (1685) Mor. 8472.
47 See Walker D. M., The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland. (Edinburgh: W. Green 
& Son, 1974) pp. 986-987.
4 8 see e.g Beyers v. Green [1936] 1 All E. R. 613; Shaw v. Shaw [1954] 2 All E. 
R. 638.
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parents, the parents of her fiance are asked to bring all that is necessary for that 
ceremony, moreover, even if the engagement is broken by the man, she will 
not lose her wedding clothes or furniture, but as is customary, she keeps them 
for a future marriage.
Concerning the second kind of damages (injured feelings) Scots law 
compensated th em ^  before abolition of actions of breach of promise in 
1984. Algerian law still allows damages for injured fe e lin g s^ . This may be 
criticised in the following manner:
1- Allowing damages for injured feelings in breach of promise means 
that this promise is more binding than the contract of the marriage itself, since 
the parties have the right to break the marriage contract by divorce at any 
time.^l
2- The husband who divorces his wife for a reasonable cause is not 
bound to pay any damages.^^ Therefore it is not logical to bound him to pay 
damages not only for pecuniary loss but also for injured feelings in the case of 
breach of a mere promise.
Damages for injured feelings might be awarded in Scots law by an action 
for breach of promise combined with a claim for s e d u c t i o n ^  in the case of 
the pursuer's prior chastity. Therefore evidence of prior unchastity of the 
pursuer defeats the claim completely^. Whereas in Algerian law, there is no 
claim for damages for seduction, since the law forbides any intercourse 
between a man and a woman outside marriage, even if they are engaged.
Regarding the third kind of damages (future loss) as when the woman 
gives up her job, there is a general principle that the pursuer "must take
49 M'lntvre V. Cunningham (1920) 36 Sh. Ct. Rep. 54.
50 The Family Law Code of 1984, article 5/2.
51 See articles 48, 52,53 of the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984.
52 The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984, article 52.
55 See Walker D.M..Principles.... 3rd ed., 1982, p. 222; Cathcart v. Brown (1905) 7 
F. 951: Marrav v. Fraser. 1916 S. C. 623, 625; and some other cases cited by Walker, p. 
222, note no: 34.
54 See Walker D.M., The Law of Civil Remedies.... p. 988
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reasonable steps to minimise loss applies, and she must have tried to obtain 
other comparable employment, and can be compensated only in so far as 
reasonably comparable alternative employment cannot be obtained."^ 
Another loss of financial advantages which may have accrued from not the 
marriage taken place, is the loss of the marriage itself. This kind of loss has 
been criticised as: "the evidence shows that the marriage, if it had taken place, 
would have brought neither prosperity nor happiness to either of the 
parties."^6 Moreover "this factor is much less important than in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when "a good match" was in many cases the 
only career open to a girl and her only chance of livelihood "^7
In Algerian law, the compensation of this kind of loss may be criticised 
in that the woman who is divorced has certainly lost the marriage, and may 
never be married in the future, especially if she has children. This woman has 
never been entitled to damages for that loss, so it is inconsistant with allowing 
damages to the woman who has lost only a mere promise of marriage, and who 
will be more probably married, especially if she is still a virgin.
Additionally, the criticisms of Scots law by the Scottish Law 
C o m m i s s i o n ^  can also be applied to Algerian law as the following:
1- It seems that many people regard the engagement as a social 
commitment rather than creating a legal relationship.
2- It is not in the interests of the parties to induce them to enter into 
marriage by the threat of legal action.
3- This situation may afford scope for blackmail claims, even though 
there are few blackmail attempts, this may be thought to be too many.
4- Allowing damages for breach of promise is inconsistent with the 
approach taken to financial provison on divorce (aliment in Algerian law) 
which is no longer generally regarded as providing damages for breach of the 
obligations assumed on marriage.
55 ibid. p. 987, See e.g. Quirk v. Thomas [1916] 1 K.B. 516.
56 M' Intvre V. Cunningham (19201 36 Sh. Ct. Rep. 54.
57 Walker, M-
58 Scot. Law. Com. no: 76, pp. 2-3, paras. 2.4-2.7..
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5- It may seem anomalous that damages can be awarded against someone 
for withdrawing from an engagement but not for withdrawing from a 
marriage.
From what has been said it is in the best interest of the parties and of 
society that Algerian law should abolish the actions for breach of promise; or 
at least abolish any damages for moral loss or injured feelings, and provide 
that damages may be awarded only for pecuniary loss with justification of an 




All laws in the world, past and present, agree that being below a certain 
age is an impediment to marriage. The only disagreement is as to what this 
certain age should be. Some laws, like the English and the Scottish, in the past 
allowed minors to marry. Some others went to the other extreme by raising 
this minimum age to 25 in the case of the female and 30 in the case of the male 
such as the French law .^
Indeed, child marriage was widely accepted in old societies, but in 
modem societies, even though it still exists in some countries, there is some 
movement to abolish it. This movement started in the 1920's when the League 
of Nations was concerned about the white slave traffic .^  The method to 
combat child marriage was shown by the convention of New York on 
December 10 1962 which declared in its article 2:
"States parties to the present convention shall take legislative action
59 Brissaud Jean. A History of French Private Law. (London: John Murray, 1912), pp. 
116-117.
60 Clive E, "The Minimum Age For Marriage", Scottish Law Times (1968), 129-132, 
at p. 129
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to specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage shall be legally 
entered into by any person under this age, except where a competent 
authority has granted a dispensation to age, for serious reasons, in the 
interest of the intending spouses."^
In some legislations marriage is an occasion for the emancipation of the
minor. The minor girl, for instance, who marries at 15, is fully a major even
at that early age.^2 Whereas other jurisdictions such as Scots law before
1984, adopted the rule that a minor wife passes from curatory of her father to
that of her husband. Now marriage automatically frees a minor so that neither
spouse is subject to the curatory of the o th er .6 3
Modem legislations tend to restrict the minor's marriage in different
ways: some limit it by only specifying a minimum age without further
restriction such as parental consent, such as in Scots law. Some others, besides
this, require the parental consent before a certain age such as the English and
the French laws. A few, in addition to parental consent, require the Minister's
permission under a certain age, such as the Marriage Act 1961 of South
Africa.64 Further than that, the majority of Islamic countries require the 
consent of the girl's father or her guardian, even if she is an adult, and make
his consent to her marriage one of the main requisites of the validity of the
marriage contract.
Even though modem legislators agree about limitation of minor's
marriage there are wide differences between them as to the precise minimum
ages of marriage. Since this is due to the differences in societies and the
historical origins, the above differences cannot be understood without a prior
knowledge of history. The following points will be discussed below:
I- The view of religious laws on the minor's marriage.
61 United Nations.* Convention on Consent to Marriage. Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages. New York, 10 Decembre 1962.
62 See Stoljar S. J., "Children, Parents and Guardians", International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, vol.iv, chap.7, at p. 75; and the French Civil Code article.476.
63 Scottish Law Commission no: 65,1985, at pp. 62-27.
64 Hahlo. op. cit. p. 88.
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I- A historical background of some modem laws in this matter.
HI- Is there a right age to marry?.
IV- Should there be a different age for males and females?
V-Validation of under-age marriage.
I--The view of leMgioims laws ©m ft© mmoir’s irnmage:
According to earlier canon law^S the age of capacity to marry was 
fourteen for a boy and twelve for a girl, the Codex Iuris Canonici (C.I.C) 
raised these ages by two years each.66 Canon law allowed marriage of young 
people even against the will of their parents, because parental consent or other 
compulsion might prevent the fidelity to the marriage sacrament. Even though 
this marriage was regarded undesirable, it appeared less of an evil than pre­
marital sexual intercourse.^
In Jewish law a person can contract a marriage as soon as he or she 
attains the age of puberty which is presumed to be the age of thirteen for boys 
and twelve for g i r l s . ^ 8  The Jewish law is totally different from Christian law 
in regarding the parental consent. Whereas Christian law encourages the 
minor’s marriage even without parental consent, Jewish law, gives a power to 
the father or husband over the daughter or the wife, based on the tmst that the 
power would be used in her interest. As a result a minor girl can be 
represented in her marriage by her father who can give her in marriage even 
without her consent.^
In Islamic law there is discord of opinions between Muslim jurists on 
minor's marriage. Though the majority of jurists think that children below the
65 The Christian law's view will be shown later in the brief study of the historical 
development of French and English laws.
66 Neuhaus P. H., "Christian Family Law". International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol.iv. chap. 11. p. 13.
67 id.
68 Menachem Elon (ed.), The Principles of Jewish Law. (Jerusalem: Encyclopaedia 
Judaica,1975) p.363.
69 Falk Ze'ev W., "Jewish Family Law", International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, vol.iv. chap.ll, pp. 29, 42.
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age of puberty, can be given in marriage by their guardians, a few like Uthman 
al-Batti, Shubruma and Abou bakr al-Asamm declare that children under 
puberty may never be married or given in marriage by their guardians, and if 
that happens the marriage would be void.70 Their arguments are:
1- The Holy Quran says: "Check up on the orphans till they attain the age 
of marriage; then if you find them sensible hand over their property to 
them."71 It is clear from this (according to their view) that the age of 
marriage is the sign of termination of minority, so it is not permitted to marry 
the ward before his or her puberty.
2- The aims of marriage are cohabitation, posterity and creation of a 
family and these aims will not be fulfilled by the minor's marriage.
3- It is unfair to force and attach the minor's in marriage which may not 
suit them after attaining their majority.
The majority of Muslim jurists do not require puberty as a requisite to 
validate the minor's marriage. They require the marriage contract to be 
submitted to the same rules as other civil contracts. Therefore, if the minor's 
marriage was contracted by his or her guardian other than the father or 
grandfather, he or she, after attaining the age of majority, has the right to 
ratify or invalidate that m a r r i a g e . 7 2
Apart from that, their arguments for the minor's marriage can be 
summarised as follows:
1- The Holy Quran makes it valid as it appears from this verse: "the 
prescribed period for those of your wives who have lost all expectation of 
monthly courses, in case of doubt, is three months and also in case of those who 
have not had their monthly courses."(lxv, 5). Ali Yusuf comments on this
70 Anderson N., "The Syrian Law of Personal Status", 17 Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies University of London. (1955) 34-49, at p. 37, and Anderson 
N., "Islamic family Law". International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol.iv. chap.ll 
pp. 58, 62.
71 Sura iv, verse 6.
72 Chehata Ch. "La Conception Nouvelle de la Famille Musulmane dans les Recentes 
Reformes Legislatives en Matiere de Marriage", Rapports Generaux 7eme Congres 
Intematinal de Droit Compare UPPSALA 6-13 August 1966. 56-66, at p. 60
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verse by saying that: "for normal women, the Iddat is three monthly courses 
after separation: if there are no courses or if the courses are in doubt, it is three 
calendar months. By that time it will be clear whether there is pregnancy: if 
there is, the waiting period is till after deli very.
2- There are many facts which attest to the validation of minor's 
marriage everywhere, in Islamic law, even in the earliest period of Islam; the 
Prophet himself affirmed that, by marrying Aisha when she was six years old 
and he consummated his marriage when she was nine years old.74
These jurists who allow minor's marriage, require that the marriage 
must be contracted by the consent of the minor’s guardian.
II- A Mstorkal Mdkgironmd rf som© modem laws:
A-French law:
As everywhere is Europe, canon law exercised a great influence on the 
formation of the French matrimonial law. During several centuries the church 
governed all matters pertaining to this subject. Only in the sixteenth century, 
the Kings tried to limit the power of the church. According to canon law it was 
dangerous to discourage young people from concluding a union which is 
considered to be a sacrament. Therefore, a rule was adopted that a marriage 
concluded by young people even against the will of their parents was valid.75 
Facing this situation the Kings fought the church to establish the mle that 
marriage of persons under-age required parental consent so as to be valid. In 
order to establish the Kings' views, the juridical expedients were as follows:
1)- Public bans were introduced declaring that marriages carried out 
without the consent of the parents had to be declared clandestine, and 
clandestine marriages were contrary to the church rules which prescribed that
73 Commentary of Ali Yusuf .A on the Holy Quran lxv, verse 4.
74 Al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari.(translation by Khan M.), Vol.7, (Beirut: Dar Al- 
Fiqr) p. 50.
75 Simon Manfred, "Parental Consent in French Law", 56 Juridical Review (1944) 
109-122, at p. 114.
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the canubial marriages should be made p u b l i c . ^ 6
2)- The courts assumed that where minors contracted a marriage 
without parental consent, it was a case of seduction and this exposed the 
husband to the penalties attached to abduction, which could give rise to an 
annulment of the marriage on the ground that the consent of the spouse was 
deemed to have been extracted by f o r c e . 7 7
As a result of these developments two Royal Ordinances were 
introduced; the Edict of February 1556 and the declaration of November 26th 
1635.
The first one declared that girls under 25 years of age and boys under 30 
could not marry without the consent of their parents. Those who passed the 
age of marital majority must nevertheless send to their parents "un acte de 
sommation respectueuse"(an act of formal respect) asking their advice and 
consent. After two attempts (ie sommations) the couples could marry despite 
their parents’ refusal. Moreover, parents had the right to disinherit their child 
and to revoke donations previously made.7 **
The second one declared the punishment of the young couples who had 
concluded a marriage without their parents consent, by the loss of their rights 
of succession and advantages which may be bestowed by the marriage contract 
or by testament of their parents.
Article 40 of the Ordinance of Blois of 1579 prohibited priests from 
celebrating a marriage not approved by the family of the future couples. The 
priest was to be punished as the abettor of a crime of abduction if he did not 
respect this rule.
The law of September 20th 1792 maintained the necessity of parental 
consent only for the future couples under the age of 21 years of age. Above 
this age the person obtained a full matrimonial independance. It abolished also 
those "sommations respectueuses" 7^
76  M .
77 and Weill Alex, op. cit.p. 138.
78 Weill Alex, op. cit. p. 139.
79 Simon, op. cit. p. 115.
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The Civil Code reintroduced the old system which made a distinction 
between the matrimonial majority of men and women, and declared girls 
under 21 and men under 25 were not to marry without their parents' consent. 
It reintroduced also the "sommations respectueuses" for women between 21 
and 25 and for men between 25 and 30. The law of June 21st 1907 reduced the 
matrimonial majority to 21 years for both sexes, and abolished the "actes 
respectueux" for persons attaining the age of 30, and changed them to simple 
notifications.
The law of April 28th 1922 decreased the limit of 30 to 25, and the law 
of February 2nd 1933 modified the article 151 of the Civil Code and abolished 
totally the modifications.^
By the law of July 5th 1974 the age of legal capacity to marry, was 
reduced from 21 to 18 for males and to 15 for females, and couples above the 
age of 21 could marry without parental consent. Males between 21 and 18 and 
females between 21 and 15, could not marry unless they obtained the requisite 
consent of their parents.
Furthermore the Procureur of the Republic of the place where the 
marriage to be celebrated, can issue dispensation orders to reduce those 
minimum ages.^1
The pregnancy of the woman was usually a sufficient reason to give
those dispensations.^
B-English law:
According to canon law and common law a person could contract a 
marriage if he or she reached the legal age of puberty which was 14 in the case 
of a boy and 12 in the case of a girl. If the marriage was contracted when one 
or both parties were under the relevant age, it was not void, but either party
80 Carbonnier. op. cit. p. 42.
81 Civil Code art. 145.
82 Glendon M., op. cit. p.3 0.
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could avoid it when he or she attained the age of m a j o r i t y . 8 3
There are suggestions^ which show that child marriage existed even 
for children under seven years of age, provided that the parties at that age were 
capable of consummating it; furthermore, a ’’marriage between a boy of four 
or five years and a girl who was no older seems capable of ratification, and as a 
matter of fact parents and guardians often betrothed, or attempted to betroth, 
children who were less than seven years old."^^
The parental consent was not required due to the policy of canon law 
which opposed restrictions on young people from concluding a sacramental 
union. Because of the old common law rule that a wife's property was vested 
in her husband on marriage, a girl with a large fortune was a very attractive 
catch, and as a result "the 'Fleet' parsons thrived-profligate clergy who traded 
in clandestine m a r r i a g e s . A s s u m i n g  that there was danger to society if 
such marriages became the rule, Lord Hardwicke's Act was passed in 1753 to 
stop these abuses. This Act had two main solutions to prevent clandestine 
marriages and establish the solemnisation of marriage:
1- A marriage would not be valid unless it was solemnized according to 
the rites of the church of England, in the presence of a clergyman and two 
other witnesses.
2- Parental consent had to be obtained if either party was under the age 
of 21, if this was impossible or unreasonably withheld, the consent of the 
chancellor had to be obtained.^
Although Lord Hardwicke's Act had effectively put an end to the 
clandestine marriages in England, it was not completely effective in putting a 
stop to marriage without parental consent. It caused a great social ev il^  such
83 Cretnev. op. cit. p. 16.
84 Jackson.J., The Formation and Annulment of Marriage. 2 nd ed.,(London: 
Butterworths,1969), pp. 26-27, and Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law, vol. 
2,2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press,1968) pp. 390-91.
85 Pollock & Maitland, op. cit. p. 391.
86 Bromley P. M., Family Law. 5th ed., (London: Butterworths,1976) p. 34.
87 Ibid. pp. 34-35.
88 Jackson, op. cit. p. 24.
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as runaway marriages and as a result many couples evaded it simply by 
marrying in Scotland so that the 70 years following the passing of the Act saw 
an increasing number of "Gretna Green" m a r r i a g e s . 8 9  This was why in 1823 
the legislator repealed Lord Hardwicke's Act and replaced it by a new 
Marriage Act. It declared that when a minor's marriage was contracted 
without the parent's or guardian's consent, it was procured by fraud, and the 
Attorney-General, on the request of the parent or guardian, might sue for the 
forfeiture of any property acquired as a result of the marriage by the party 
who had perpetrated the fraud.
In 1929 the Age of Marriage Act enacted in its first section that a valid 
marriage could be contracted only when both parties had reached the age of 
16, and any marriage in which either party was under this age was made 
void.90 The provision that both parties must be over the age of 16 had 
stopped the runaway marriages, so that no person under this age could contract 
a valid marriage even if he or she was not domiciled in England and even if he 
or she had the capacity to marry by his or her own lex domicilu as it was 
declared in the case of Pugh V. Pugh^l.
The reasons for the change of minimum age to 16 can be summarised as 
follows:
1- The age of maturity was higher than it had been in the past.
2- It was inconsistent, to have sixteen as the age at which a girl could 
consent to sexual intercourse outside marriage if she could marry at twelve. It 
was said that men threatened with prosecution for unlawful intercourse with a 
girl under sixteen would stifle it by marrying her (so that she could not be 
compelled to give e v i d e n c e ) . 9 2
3- The League of Nations in the 1920’s was trying to outlaw the 
institution of child marriage because of the white slave traffic. It was found
89 Bromley, op. cit. p. 35.
90 Ibid. pp. 30-31.
91 Pugh v. Pugh (1951) 2 All.E.R. 680.
92 Crctuev. op. cit. p. 16
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that low ages of marriage facilitated the movement of young girls across 
borders. "The British representatives were therefore hardly in a position to 
preach the merits of a low minimum marriage age"93? as a result the age was 
raised to 16.
In 1949 the Marriage Act took away the Attomey-General's power to 
sue for the forfeiture of property, which was introduced by the Marriage Act 
1823.
In 1969 the age of consent was lowered from 21 to 18 by the Family 
Law Reform Act 1969. Therefore any person over 18 could marry without 
the consent of any other person.
Below are some of the arguments supporting the reduction of the age of 
free marriage from 21 to 18:
1- Parents are not always wise and disinterested in their 
recommendation to their children in marriage. There are some cases of 
mothers forbidding marriages which remove their useful daughter from 
home, and "sometimes unacknowledged problems in the parent's own 
marriage entirely distort their judgment".94
2- Putting the power of an absolute veto into the parents' hands may 
embitter relationships between parents and their children. Moreover persons 
under 18 may feel that the wait until 21 too long, so they may force parental 
consent by getting pregnant or running away to marry, or avoid consent by 
applying to the courts.
3- Nowadays the young person is often living apart from his parents 
when consent is required. "The Free Church Federal Council stresses the fact 
that with the greater mobility of modem life the law in practice often decrees 
that the child, far from submitting to a judgment based on intimate knowledge 
and concern, has to dig out an absent parent, present him with an entirely 
unknown intended, and then accept whatever pronouncement the parent sees fit 
to make.".95
93 Clive E., "The Minimum Age for Marriage". Scottish Law Times (1968)129-132, at 
p. 129.
94 Latey Committee on the Age of Majority. 1967, cmnd. 3342, p.48.
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C- Scots law:
Here it was the canon law which applied; the age of fourteen in the case 
of males and twelve in the case of females. Persons under these ages could not 
marry nor could their parents give their consent for them to marry. Although 
there were some cases where persons married under these ages, (for instance 
one girl married at the age of ten, another under twelve, a boy was only ten), in 
all these cases marriages were declared by the consistorial court, null and 
void.96
The consent of parents was not essential for the validity of the marriage 
even if the court regarded it as highly desirable. Especially after the 
Reformation, the church of Scotland attached some importance to the parental 
consent and required it as an essential. Fraser said that "another requisite to 
the regular celebration of marriage during the sixteenth century was the 
consent of parents. In the First Book of Discipline (Voce "Marriage"), the 
consent of parents (under the control of the magistrates) was required; and 
there are many entries in the ecclesiastical records showing how this enactment 
was enforced.".^
There are some suggestions showing that during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, regular marriage without parental consent was 
prohibited, but it was not regarded as null.98 This provision of parental 
consent was disused before the end of seventeenth century, and the canon law 
rule of marriage age remained till 1929 when the Age of Marriage Act 
declared that marriage between persons either of whom was aged under 16 at 
the time, was void. There were some suggestions for increasing the minimum
95 Latey Committee 3342, pp.48-49.
96 Fraser P.. Treatise on Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland. Vol.l, 
2nd Ed.,(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark,1876), pp.51-52.
91 Ibid. p.246
98 Clive E., "Parental Consent to Marriage", Scottish Law Times 1968, 133-136, at p. 
133.
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age and others for reducing it, but Kilbrandon Committee recommended that 
the minimum age of marriage should remain at 16.99
The difference between Scots law and English law on the matter of age 
of marriage and parental consent, is the result of the fact that the Lord 
Hardwick's Act of 1753, which required the parental consent of either party 
under the age of 21, did not extend to Scotland.-^ This was why many 
English couples ran away to marry in Scotland.
D-Algerian law:
As has been seen under Islamic law, the majority of the Muslim jurists 
allow minor's marriage. This was abused by many customs in Islamic and 
Arab societies especially among the countryside people. Therefore some 
reasons which encourage the minor's marriage among these people:
The first is the economic motive which makes the minor's marriage an 
opportunity to bring in a wife to serve the husband's parents and to help him in 
his farm, and to bring up a large number of children to work and contribute to 
the family income.
The second is the emotional motive which encourages minor's marriage 
to attach and strengthen the family ties. 101
In Algeria and in all Arab countries, the minor's marriage was wide 
spread and the child, especially the girl, was given in marriage without or even 
against her c o n s e n t .  102 This situation has pushed many modem Muslim jurists 
to criticise it and as a result the majority of Muslim legislators opposed it by 
limiting the minimum age. The first legislation was the Ottoman Family Law
99 Kilbrandon Report, the Marriage Law of Scotland, 1969, cmnd 4011, p .ll and the 
Marriage (Scodand) Act 1977.
100 Clive E.. op. cit. P. 133.
101 For further details see Diab Fawzia, The Values and Social Habits, (in arabic), 
(Beirut: Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia, 1980), p. 246 et seq.
102 Breugel H.. La Valeur du Mariage Musulman Traditionnel. en Algerie et en Tunisie. 
(London: Pontiflcia Universitas Gregoriana, 1962) p. 32 et seq.
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Ordinance in 1917 which provided in art.4 that a condition of competence for 
marriage was that the bridegroom should be at least eighteen and the bride at 
least seventeen.
This legislation was the first guide for all other Islamic and Arab 
legislations that followed it, though with some differences: the Egyptian 
Family Code of 1923, the Syrian Family Law of 1953, the Tunisian Personal 
Status of 1956 and the Moroccan Law of 1 9 5 7 .^
Under the French colonisation, the first law which regulated the 
Algerian minimum age for marriage was the law of 1930 which in art.l, 
restricted the age of marriage to fifteen for both sexes. Article 5 of the law no: 
59-274 of 1959 stated that males under 18 and females under 15, can not 
contract a marriage. However, the president of the court of first instance can 
give dispensation for serious reasons. Males between 18 and 21 and females 
between 15 and 21 were already able to marry with their parents' consent 
according to the law no: 57-778 of July 1957.
The law no: 63-224 of 1963 on limitation of marriage age abolished by 
art.l the article no: 5 of the law 59-274, and raised the minimum age for the 
girl from 15 to 16 and added that the president of the High Court can give 
dispensation after consulting the procurer of the state. Its article d  stated that 
as the agent of Civil Status the judge, couples and their legal representatives 
who do not respect the ages provided for in article 1, will be punished by 
imprisonment from 15 days to 3 months and fined from 400 tolOO FF, or by 
either one of these penalties.
After 1963 some Algerian draft la w s ^ ^  were prepared for 
promulgation for a new Family Law, but they were not successful.
In June 1984, the new Family Code was promulgated. It stated in art.7
103 Chehata, Ch., op. cit. p.51 et seq.; Chehata Ch., "Le Lien Matrimonial en Islam",
21 Revue du Droit Canonique (1971) 57-69, at p. 61 et seq.
105 The Algerian Law no: 224-63 on Limitation of Age of Marriage.
105 The first draft (1963-64), the second (1966), see Borrmans M., Statut Personnel et 
Famille au Maghreb de 1940 a Nos Jours. (Mouton, Paris, La Haye: Mouton & CO.,1977), 
pp. 521, 525.
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that:"the capacity for marriage is set at 21 years for men and 18 years for 
women. However, a judge may accord an age exemption in the interest of the 
couple or in the case of necessity. Now, a man above 21 years of age can 
marry even against his parents' consent, but a female requires the consent of 
her parents or guardian whatever her age.
From what has been seen previously, it is obvious that religious laws, 
Jewish, Islamic and Christian, .favour marriage even at an earlier age since 
they disapprove of any relationship that may be formed outside marriage. On 
the other hand, the modem secular laws disapprove the minor’s marriage and 
see it as an evil in society. French law was an extreme representative of this 
view, when in the sixteenth century it provided the age of marriage of 30 for 
men and 25 for w o m e n . M o d e m  laws are against minor's marriage 
because of changes in societies, and because the Convention of 1962 
recommended to all states, the complete elimination of child marriages, and 
any customs or practices inconsistent with human rights, and to specify a 
minimum age for m a r r i a g e . I n  response to this, modem laws have 
specified a minimum age for marriage, which is higher in some laws and lower 
in others, and even in some there are two different minimum ages, one for a 
male and another for a female. These differences in minimum ages in the 
modem laws raise the question of "is there a right age for marriage"?.
HI- Is inhere & rigM sig© for murmge?:
It is worthwhile to note that the precise age for marriage has changed in 
all societies. As already seen in the historical background, French law, before 
the sixteenth century permitted minor's marriage and without parental 
consent.
After 1556 the 'marriageable' age was raised to 30 for males and 25 for 
females, in 1792 it was lowered to 21 for both sexes, and raised later again by
106 §ee p g 0f this section.
108 See the Convention of 1962, New York, 10 Decembre , on Consent To Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, art. 2.
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the Civil Code to 25 for males and 21 for females. In 1907 it was lowered to 
21 for both sexes, and in 1974 it was further lowered to 18 for males and 15 
for females. Now, only males between 18 and 21 and females between 15 and 
21 require parental consent.
English law also has changed from child marriage even without parental 
consent before 1753, to the age of 21 for both sexes and a requirement of 
parental consent; in 1929 marriage under 16 was made void, and in 1969 the 
age at which parental consent was required, was lowered from 21 to 18.
In Scots law, child marriage was permitted without parental consent 
before 1929. After this date minimum age was introduced at 16 for both sexes, 
under which marriage was void.
In Algerian law, child marriage was wide spread until 1959, when the 
law introduced the marriage age of 18 for males and 15 for females. In 1963 
the age for the female was raised from 15 to 16. Now by the Family Law of 
1984, capacity to marry is 21 for males and 18 for females.
If we look at other legal systems we see that under Turkish law, the child 
marriage was accepted till 1917 when the first Family Law introduced the 
minimum age of 18 for males and 17 for females. These ages were amended 
by the Turkish Civil Code of 1926 and lowered to 17 for males and 15 for 
females in exceptional cases, the age of capacity being 18 for both sexes.1^8 
Under Soviet law, in 1918 the RSFSR Code of Laws on Acts af Civil 
Status, Marriage, family and Guardianship, required for marriages the age of 
18 for males and 16 for females. In 1926 the RSFSR Family Code raised the 
ages to 18 for both males and females. 109
Each law has its own reasons corresponding to its social system, which 
leads the legislator either to raise or lower the minimum age for marriage. 
For example, Soviet law raised the minimum age for marriage for women 
from 16 to 18 assuming that early marriage would deprive her of equal
108 §ee Onicu E., "Turkey: Reconciling Traditional Society and Secular Demands", 26 
Journal of Family Law (1987-8) 221-236, at pp. 225-226.
109 See Butler W.E., Soviet law. (London: Butterworths,1988), pp. 204-205.
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opportunities for education and vocational training, and it could be harmful to 
her health as mother as well as to her child.^ 0  Turkish law allows the 
lowering of the minimum age from 18 to 17 for males and 15 for females in 
the belief that these ages reflect the special circumstances of Turkish society, 
and because of the increased suits seeking the consent of the judge for early 
marriages, m
Even though the majority of laws in the world today, fix a minimum age 
for marriage, they disagree about the determination of this minimum age. 
Some of them make it an absolute one, so that any marriage contracted under 
this age will be made void, as in Scottish law and English law; some others 
make it flexible by giving the court the right to allow dispensations in some 
circumstances, as in Algerian, French and all the Muslim laws. For example 
the Algerian Family Law of 1984, says that:" The capacity for marriage is set 
at 21 years for men and 18 years for women. However, a judge may accord an 
age exemption for reasons of interest in the case of necessity.'".112
A glance to the modem laws in the world shows the divergence between 
them on even the supposed minimum age, in spite of certain similarities of 
climate and morals. It can be expected that the western countries, especially 
Western Europe, have the same minimum age for marriage since they share 
nearly the same climate, culture and the same moral values; and that the 
Oriental countries, especially Muslim to have also the same minimum age for 
marriage due to the similarity of their climate and their moral values. In spite 
of that similarity the western countries, as well as the Muslim countries, have 
different minimum ages for marriage as it appears from the following tables.
HO See Butler, op. cit. p. 205.
HI See Orucu E., op. cit. p. 226.
112 The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984. art.7.
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COUNTRY.....................MALE.....................................FEMALE.
Algeria...............................21......................     ...18.
Egypt......................... ...... .18......   16.
Jordan................................16.......................................   15.
Kuwait...............................17.......................     ..15.
Syria................................  18.....       17.
Morocco.......................... 18.........................   ..15.
Iraq... ........................18.............   18.
Tunisia  .... ............... . 20..........    17.
Mali...................................  18............  15.
Tanzania............................. 18........   ....15.
Pakistan...................   18.......     16.
Senegal  ..............  ..20..........         ...16.
The Minimum age for marriage in Islamic and African countries. ^
The age of 21 for males in Algerian law, is the most exaggerated one 
compared to all Islamic and Arab countries, and this is the case in spite of the 
fact that the age is presumed appropriate by some jurists of the Maleki 
jurisprudence which mles in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
In order to chose a right, or the common age which corresponds to all 
the countries shown above, it is essential to take into account two approaches:
1- Take the average age which is between the lower and the higher ages.
2- Take the age which is most common in the majority of the countries. 
In keeping with the first approach the age of 161/2 for females is the
average age between the lowest age which is 15 and the highest age 18, and the 
age of 181/2 for males is the average age between the lowest 16 and the highest 
21.
113 These ages are taken from: Borrmans M., "Le Nouveau Code Algerien de la Famille 
dans l'Ensemble des Codes Musulmans de Statut Personnel, Principalement dans les Pays 
Arabes", 38 Revue International de Droit Compare (1986) 133-139, at p. 134; and Hamdan 
Leila, "Les Difficultes de Codification du Droit de la famille Algerien" 37 Revue International 
de Droit Compare (1985) 1001-1015, at p.1009, note.29.
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In the second approach, the age of 15 for females and 18 for males are 
the most common ages, because the majority of the countries have the age of 18 
for males (7 countries from 12) and the most common age for females is 15.
As a result of the two approaches the suggested ages for marriage which 
may correspond to the Oriental countries are:
male:..............................18 1/2 or 18
female:.... .. 16 1/2 or 15
However, another approach is to combine the two previous approaches: 
to find the most common average ages for males and females. It is clear that 
the age of 18 for male and 16 for females are the most common average ages 




England................... ,..16 ................. .............16.
France.......................... ...18................. ....., , , , 1 5 .
Ireland................... . ....14................ ...............12.
West Germany........... .... 21................ ............. .16.
Denmark..................... ....21......:........ , , , , , , , 1 8 .
Belgium....................... ....18............... ............... 15.
Finland.........................,..18................. ................... , , 1 7 .
Norway........................ ...20......... ....... ......... , ,1 8 .
Sweden................... . ,..21..................... ..........18.
Italy.............................. .,1 6 ................. .............. 1 4 .
U.S.A.New York114.. ....  1 6 ...................... ................. 1 4 .
Austria........................ . ,2 1 ............ .. ..............16.
114 The minimum age in U.S.A differs from state to state, it is between 20 and 16 for 






18...    .....18
18.
.
The minimum age in Western countries.
From this table, the following results can be drawn:
1- The averages for this group of countries are 171/2 for males and 15 
for females.
2- The most common ages are 18 for males and 16 for females.
A third result can be taken from the combination between these two: the 
most common average ages are 18 for males and 16 for females.
The result which appears from the two tables, is that the ages of 18 for 
males and 16 for females could be the ages of the capacity to marry in all 
countries considered, since these two ages are the most common average ages 
in both Oriental and Western countries. If this were accepted as a standard 
rule it might reduce in some way the conflicts of laws and avoid runaway 
marriages.
There are some suggestions in different countries to raise the minimum 
age for marriage. In England and Scotland there are views e x p r e s s e d * ^  to 
raise the minimum age from 16 to 18 for both sexes, but two committees 
(Lately Committee and Kilbrandon) recommended that the minimum age for 
marriage should remain at 16 for both sexes because:
1- The evidence shows that the age of puberty has been going down and 
"now stands in girls at an average of 13.2 years".
2- "Any raising of the minimum age for marriage would inevitably 
result in an alarming increase in the number of illegitimate births."
3- To raise the age to 18 will prevent "at least some mature and sensible
These ages are taken from the Lately Committee on the Age Majority cmnd 3342, 
Appendix 7; and from Clive E.M., The Minimum Age.... p. 129; so there may have been a 
few changes since.
11  ^See Lately Committee cmnd 3342, p.52.
117 Ibid. para. 174.
ibid. para.175.
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young couples who are well able to take on the responsibilities of marriage 
between 16 and 18 years of age.".119
4- It is essential that the minimum age of marriage and the age of consent 
to sexual intercourse be the same.
5- There is no strong demand for raising the minimum age to 17 or
While some countries stress that the minimum age should not be raised 
above 16 as in Scotland and England, some others emphasise that it should be 
raised to 18 for both males and females as is the case in the Soviet Union in the 
belief that marriage at an early age could be harmful to the health of a mother 
and her child, and could prevent a woman from equal opportunity to continue 
her studies or vocational training. 121
Under these different circumstances, it is difficult to fix a right age for 
all the countries under consideration, but it is possible to establish at least the 
minimum age between 16 and 18, neither below nor above these ages.
It is not possible to fix it under 16 for the reason that among Western 
societies it is inconsistent to have 16 as the age at which a girl could consent to 
sexual intercourse outside marriage if it were possible for her to marry under 
16.122 In the majority of Islamic and Arab countries child marriage was 
abused with the result that many of these countries raised the minimum age for 
marriage. It may also be that the common reason between Western and 
Eastern countries against reducing the minimum age to under 16, is based on 
the fact that "the lower the age at which a couple marry the greater the chance
of divorce". 122
It is undesirable to fix the minimum age for marriage above the age of
Id. para. 176.
1^0 Kilbrandon Report, cmnd 4011, para.18.
121 Butler W.E.. op. cit. p. 205.
122 As in Scots law and English law, see further reasons in Cretney, op. cit. p. 16, and 
Clive E, The Minimum Age.... p. 129, and the Convention of New York 1962, op. cit. art. 
2 .
123 Cretney. op. cit. 4th Ed.. 1984. p. 58.
18 for reasons previously pointed out, given by the Lately committee on 
rejecting the raising of the age to 18. Especially the first and third reasons 
submitted by that committee, are also applicable in Islamic countries as 
arguments against raising the minimum age above 18.
If the suitable ages for the minimum age for marriage are between 18 
and 16, should there be a different age for males arid females?
IV* SIhomM ttih©ir© b© a <dHiftf©ir©3niit ag© fo r  mal©s m<& f©mal©s?:
It is clear from the above two tables that the majority of laws in the 
world fix different ages for men and women. It may be that Soviet law was the 
first which introduced the same age for both sexes by the law of 1926 for 
reasons of equality between men and women. 124 Therefore all socialist 
countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia influenced by Soviet law 
established the same rule as it appears from the table. From the table of 
Islamic and African countries, Iraq is the only country which fixes the same 
age for both sexes and this may be related to the influence of the socialist 
regime.
From the western table it is seen that all laws fix different ages for male 
and female except Scots law and English law, and "it is not exactly clear why 
the minimum age for marriage in Britain was made the same for both sexes in 
1929."125. The Lately Committee suggested a reason that "only too often an 
attempt to save a young man from the premature responsibilities of being a 
paterfamilias under 18 would succeed only at the cost of making some equally 
unfortunate young woman assume the responsibilities of being an unmarried 
m o th e r " . 126 But the real cause that is worth considering in fixing the same 
minimum age for marriage for both sexes, is the movement against any rule 
which discriminates against women. "To fix a lower minimum age for women
124 Butler, op. cit. at pp. 205.
126 Clive E.. op. cit. p. 131.
126 Lately committee 3342. op. cit. p. 52 para. 172. - '__ • • • : - ....
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would be to give legislative recognition to the attitude that a woman's natural 
role is that of housekeeper and child minder - a role which requires less in the 
way of training, money and maturity than the man's role of breadwinner and
head of the house." 12*7
, ^  In spite of the fact that there is no evidence showing that in classical 
Islamic law there was a different minimum age for men and women, the 
modem laws in all Islamic countries except Iraq do fix a different minimum 
age for males and females. Some reasons can be shown to justify this 
difference:
1- Some evidence suggests that girls mature sooner than boys.
2- "There is no doubt that a man on marrying takes on a heavier 
commitment in undertaking to provide for . a family than does a girl,
irrespective of their personal maturity".128
3- It might also be part of a legislative policy to activate a birth control 
mechanism; the higher the minimum age of marriage age, the lower the 
number of children.
Can these reasons really justify the majority of laws that make a 
difference of 2 to 4 years between the minimum age for males and that for 
females as it appears from the previous tables?
The real reasons behind the differentiation of minimum age might be the 
general custom that a man marries a woman at least two or three years younger 
than himself. For this reason, the majority of laws in the world fix a minimum 
age for marriage for woman two or three years lower than for man. 129
From the theoretical point of view this reason can not justify that 
differentiation between men and women in the minimum ages, since that 
distinction is based on sex discrimination and this is why some laws such as the 
English and Scottish abolished that distinction. But from the practical point of 
view it is hard to make a case for the same age for both sexes since women tend
l^? Clive E.. op. cit. p. 131, and the Scot.Law. Com. no: 76, p. 1
2^8 Lately committee 3342 op. cit. para. 172, p. 52.
129 See the previous tables.
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to marry men a year or two older than t h e m s e l v e s a n d  this usage is well 
rooted in societies in such a way that the majority of laws considered, including 
 such systems as the German and the French, accept different minimum ages for 
males and females and three years or more between t h e m .  131
V- ValidatioE off m<dfeir«sig© m&irrag©:
As has been seen the laws can be divided into two categories in 
connection with fixing a minimum age for marriage:
A- Some of them fix the minimum age as an absolute limit, so any 
marriage under this minimum age is void (Scots law and English law).
B- Some others introduce flexibility by giving the court the power to 
give dispensation (Algerian law and French law).
A-The absolute minimum age:
Both in English law and Scots law marriage is void if either party is 
under 16.132 The marriage (Scotland) Act 1 9 7 7  states in S.l that: ”no person 
domiciled in Scotland may marry before he attains the age of 16. A marriage 
solemnised in Scotland between person either of whom is under the age of 16 
shall be void."
There were some suggestions that under-age marriage might be 
validated after the younger person reached the minimum age for marriage if 
the parties continue living together as husband and w i f e .  133 in the case of 
Johnston V. F e r r i e r l 3 4  a hoy of 1 3  years and 1 0  months went to Edinburgh 
with his father's servant aged 2 0  years. They were married by a person who
130 Lately Committee 3342, op. cit. para. 172, p. 52.
131 In French law male 18 and female 15, and in West Germany 21 and 16, see the 
table.
132 The Age of Marriage Act 1929, the Marriage Act 1949, the Marriage (Scotland) Act
1977.
133 Clive E.. op. cit. p. 132. .n
134 Johnston V. Ferrier (1770) M. 8931.
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was said to be a minister in the presence of witnesses. They were seen in bed 
.together after interchanging marriage vows. After the boy reached the age of 
14 (the minimum age for marriage according to the canon law rule at that 
time) it appeared that there had been no cohabitation. Therefore, a judgment 
was delivered to the effect that there was no marriage; and it was unanimously 
approved by the Court of Session. It was stated that:
"The maxim of the canon law ni si malitia was not received in the 
law of Scotland, and it was observed, that though a marriage contracted 
under pupillarity might, without any new ceremony, be validated after 
pupillarity, when done solemnly and ex animo, yet it would be highly 
dangerous if this could be accomplished merely by lying with the woman, 
as that was done ex animo, but ex libidine, and from enticement". ^
Clive comments on this case by saying that: "it is not clear, moreover, 
what had to be 'done solemnly and ex animo’ in order to validate the 
marriage".136 Fraser also stated that the marriage of pupils who continued 
"to cohabit as husband and wife after pupillarity has expired, the prior 
imperfect contract would be rendered valid by the subsequent homologation, 
the express consent by words being thus held to be u n n e c e s s a r y " .  137 These 
statements were related to the old common law as Lord Guthrie referred to in 
A.B. V. C D .  1 3 8  a n c j they w e r e  before the statutory provision which requires 
a certain age for marriage and declares marriages void performed under that 
age. According to Clive now the matter is one "of statutory interpretation. 
Parliament has provided that under-age marriages are void. It could easily 
have added "unless validated by continued cohabitation as husband and wife 
after the younger party has attained the age of 16. Its failure to do so suggests 
that validation was not meant to be possible". 139
135 Ibjd, at p. 8933.
136 Clive, Husband and Wife. 2nd Ed., 1982, p. 89.
137 Fraser, op. cit. p. 53. The same ideas in Erskin 1,6,2, and Walton F., A Handbook 
of Husband and Wife According to the Law of Scotland. 3rd ed., (Edinburgh: W. Green & 
Son,1951) p. 134.
" 138 A. B. v. C .D .1957 S. C. 415-427. -
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This view can be supported by the reasons given by the Law 
Commission paper no: 33 rejecting proposal which suggested that under-age 
marriage should not be void but only voidable.
These reasons are:
a- "It may seem hard on innocent persons who after years of 
marriage discover that the marriage is void because a party was under-age at 
the time of marriage, but this result flows from the law's requirements to the 
observance of fundamental conditions as a foundation for a valid marriage 
and its refusal to treat cohabitation as equivalent to matrimony. The parties 
are in a similar predicament where after years of 'married life' the parties 
discover that their marriage is void because a former spouse was still alive at 
the date of marriage". ^
b- The parliament has decided that sexual intercourse below the age of
16 should be illegal so it is a question of social policy to allow it by validating
, . 141under-age marriage.
c- It is essential that the age of consent to sexual intercourse and the
142minimum age for marriage be the same-
The same view is adopted by English law as it appears from the case of 
143Pugh V. Pugh where an Englishman over 16 domiciled in England married 
a girl aged 15 and domiciled in Hungary. The marriage was celebrated, in 
Austria. Although the marriage was valid by Hungarian and Austrian law, it 
was held that it was void in England since the Englishman had no capacity to 
marry her under English law.
B- The nominal (flexible) minimum age:
As already noted many countries fix a nominal (flexible) minimum age
139 Clive, op. cit. p. 90.
140 Law Commission no: 33.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Pugh v. Pugh (1951) 2 All.E.R. 680.
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for marriage, by allowing dispensations to be obtained in certain cases. The
French Civil Code declares that: "nevertheless, it is lawful for the Prosecutor
of the Republic of the place of celebration of the marriage to grant
144dispensations of age for grave reasons." Pregnancy of women is the most 
frequently given example of grave reasons cited by the jurists in different legal 
systems. ^ 5 .  Under-age marriage is void under French law except in the 
following cases:
-the pregnancy of the future minor wife.
-the expiry of six months after the minor attains the legal age, as it is 
stated by the Civil Code in art.185: "nevertheless, marriage contracted by 
spouses who did not yet have the required age, or of whom one of the two had 
not attained such age, may no longer be attacked: (1) when six months have 
elapsed since such spouse or the spouses have attained the competent age; (2) 
when the wife who did not have such age has conceived before the expiration 
of six months."
The Algerian law of 1963 on minimum age of marriage stated in article 
1 that males before 18 and females before 16 cannot contract a marriage. 
However, the president of the court can give dispensations for grave reasons, 
after consulting the prosecutor of the state.
Its article 3 declared that :" Any marriage contracted against article 1 
will be void before the consummation, and can be challenged by the spouses, 
by any person who has an interest in, or by the prosecutor of the state. It will 
be avoided by the spouses after the consummation.".
Article 4 stated that:" It is not permitted to challenge a marriage 
contracted by spouses when, both or one of them did not have the required age:
1-When the spouses attained the legal age.
144 The French Civil Code art. 145, translated by Crabb John H., (South Hackensack, 
N. J. E. F. B. Rothman, 1977).
145 s ee for French law: Weill A., op. cit. p. 126; Carbonnier J.. op. cit. p. 30; Mazeaud 
& Mazeaud, Leyons de Droit Civil, vol. 3, 5th ed., (Paris: Editions Montchrestien,1972), p. 
71. For Algerian law see Belhadj Larbi, Essai sur la Formation du Lien Matrimonial en Droit 
Maghrebin. thesis, Rennes, 1984, p. 432. -
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2 -When the wife who has not yet attained such age, has conceived.
Furthermore, article 2 punished the persons who did not respect the 
legal age and declared that The agents of civil status or the judge, the couples 
and their legal representatives and the accomplices who do not respect the ages 
provided for in article 1, will be punished by imprisonment from 15 days to 3 
months and fines from 400 to 1000 FF or by either one of these two penalties.
Now the Family Law of 1984 states in its article 7 the capacity for 
marriage is set at 21 years for males and 18 years for females. However, a 
judge may accord an age exemption for reasons of interest of the spouses or in 
the case of necessity.". Some writers*^ suggest that article 2 of the law of 
1963 can be applied even now to punish the judge, the spouses and other 
persons who do not respect the required age because the present law of 1984 
has not abolished that article since it does not provide those penalties. 
However, this view can be rejected by saying that:
1- Article 223 of the law of 1984 abolishes all laws contrary to it 
including the law of 1963, as it s a y s a l l  dispositions contrary to the present 
law are abolished.".
2- It may be unreasonable on the one hand to trust the judge and give 
him the right to allow dispensations of age, and on the other to punish him if he 
does not respect the legal age of marriage.
3- The legislator could easily have added those penalties of the law of 
1963 to the law of 1984; but this was not done even in the laws reforms of 
1966, 1973 and 1982. The failure to do so means that those penalties are 
abolished.
4- Article 22 of the law of 1984 declares that when the marriage is not 
registered, it can be made valid by a judgment if the constitutive elements are 
present according to the present law.' Therefore, the marriage contracted with 
these constitutive elements can be validated by a judgment, even if the legal age 
has not been respected since the age according to the present law, is neither one
146 Saad Abdel-Aziz, Marriage and Divorce in Algerian Family Law, (in Arabic) 
(Algeria: DarAl-Baath,1986), p. 81.
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of the constitutive elements (article 9) nor one of the causes of void marriage 
(articles 32 to 35).
As already noted, the advantage of the system of nominal minimum age 
and giving the court the right to allow dispensations in certain cases, can 
contribute to "a general attitude in favour of later marriages while the the 
trouble and expenses of applying for dispensation will directly encourage 
many young couples to wait. At the same time hard cases can be relieved."147.
The disadvantages of this system can be summarised as:
1- Giving the court the job to allow dispensations, is an extra work-load 
thrown on it.14^
2- Differences and conflicts may develop between the courts when some 
of them for example regard pregnancy as enough for a dispensation while 
others regard it not enough.14^
3- "If it became known that pregnancy secured a dispensation in a 
particular area there would be an obvious temptation for young couples to take 
this route to early marriage".1^
4- As already seen pregnancy is the most common case that jurists in 
different legal systems state as an example for dispensation so what other 
conditions could count as grave reasons or exceptional cases?
5- It will be dangerous to society that the law and the courts protect 
pregnant girls and provide that they could marry two or three years earlier 
than non-pregnant girls,1^ 1 as a result this will be the easier way for young 
couples to marry.
147 Clive, The Minimum Age.... p. 130. 
148jd.
149 Id.




PARENTAL- CONSENT ANUD MATRIMONIAL GUARBIAN
Paieimttal consemtt:
As previously seen in the section on religion law and the historical 
background, many legal systems require parental consent to the marriage of 
young people, and only a few do not require it. French law was the most 
exaggerated one when it required parental consent to the marriage of a 30 year 
old male and 25 year old female. 152 The matter changes over time and from 
society to society.
The French system and the others which require parental consent below 
a certain age, justify that requirement by claiming that:
1- It protects the minors in their entry into a critical phase of their life. 
The minor who is seen to be unable to deal with his or her legal acts of civil life 
cannot at even at an earlier time of puberty be expected to appreciate the value
of marriage.153
2- Lack of experience of the minors justifies the need of parental 
consent.
3- Marriage concerns not only the couples, but also the family as a whole 
in a way that even adults do not have absolute liberty in this area. Therefore, 
the interference of the parents protect the family from an embarrassing 
marriage.
The situation in French law now is that parental consent is required till 
the age of 21. Article 148 of the Civil Code says: "minors may not contract 
marriage without the consent of their fathers and mothers, in case of dissent 
between them, such division imports consent".154
In English law there were arguments to abolish parental consent and
152 See Weill Alex, op. cit. p. 139; Brissaud J., op. cit. pp. 115-16.
!53 See Planiol and Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Franpais. vol. 2, 2nd ed. 
(Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1952), p. 110.
i54 See Belhadj Larbi. op. cit. p. 345.
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establish a free marriage, as was seen in the section on historical 
b a c k g r o u n d ,  155 but the Latey committee only reduced the age of free 
marriage from 21 to 18 and recommended that the requirement of parental 
consent should be retained where either party was under 18; the committee 
thought that there were distinctions between the young persons of sixteen and 
seventeen and those of eighteen to twenty one:
1- Young people under 18 are more dependent on their parents 
materially and psychologically than the over eighteens.
2- The persons of eighteen are more mature than those of sixteen and 
seventeen who may marry as a reaction to or rebellion against home
circumstances.
In Scots law there were some arguments to introduce parental consent: 
"(a) that it would strengthen family ties and confirm parental authority;
(b) that it might help to prevent some undesirable marriages, and
(c) that i t  is the general rule in most other c o u n t r i e s " .  157
However, the committee recommended that parental consent should not 
be introduced in Scotland because:" There is very little evidence that public 
opinion in Scotland demands the introduction of compulsory parental consent. 
We are satisfied that most young people do seek their parents' approval to their 
proposed wedding and we fear that, if compulsory parental consent be 
introduced, there would be a danger of family relationship being in many cases
disturbed or destroyed.". 158
Under classic Islamic law a distinction must be drawn between parental 
consent in a minor's marriage, and the matrimonial guardian in the case of a 
female's contract of marriage. Some Muslim legislators who fix a lower legal 
minimum age for marriage, require both; parental consent of the two parties 
when the marriage is contracted under that age, and the consent of the 
matrimonial guardian of the female when the marriage is contracted above that
155 §ee the Lately Committee cmnd 3342, p.48.
156 s ee further points in the Lately committee, cmnd 3342, p. 51 et seq.
1 7^ See Kilbrandon Report cmnd.4011 para. 24, p. 12.
158 Ibid. para. 30, p. 14. :
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age.
In spite of the fact that all Muslim jurists agree that a person under the 
age of puberty requires the consent of his guardian to contract a marriage, they 
disagree about a person above the age of puberty. The Hanafi school states that 
both the male and the female above puberty can contract a valid marriage, the 
Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali schools declare that only males can contract a valid 
marriage, whereas females require besides their own consent, the consent of 
the matrimonial guardian. Therefore there are two kinds of guardianship 
under Islamic law:
1- Guardianship with the right of compulsion (wilayatu’l-ijbar) or 
(patria potestas)^^, under which the guardian may contract a minor in 
marriage even without the consent or acceptance of the w a r d .  160
2- Guardianship without the right of compulsion (wilayatu'l-ikhtiyar); 
which means according to some jurists that an adult woman, whether a virgin 
or previously married, has to give her consent to her matrimonial guardian 
before she marries. 161
The legal guardian has the right to contract a minor below the age of 
puberty in marriage. Neither the consent nor the presence of the minor is 
necessary for the valid marriage arranged and contracted by the g u a r d i a n .  162
Jurists agree that the guardian must be:
(1) a person who has attained.legal majority.
(2) a person of sound mind, and
(3) a person of the same religion as that of the ward, because according
1^9 See Fyzee A, Outlines of Muhammadan Law. 2nd Ed. (London, New York, 
Bombay: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 179; Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 
46.
160 This kind of guardianship is exercised also over the adult virgin woman according to 
some jurists as will be seen in the next point of matrimonial guardian.
161 This point will be discussed later in matrimonial guardian.
162 See discussion of a recent case in 1986 where the Nigerian Federal Court of Appeal 
affiremed the power of a Maliki father to compel his virgin daughter in marriage, in Carroll 
Lucy, "Marriage-Guardianship and Minor's Marriage at Islamic Law", 7 Islamic and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (19871 279-299.
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to Muslim jurists there can be no guardianship over a musiim by a non-muslim 
and vice versa, as the marriage is a religion c o n t r a c t .  * 63
Persons who are entitled to act as guardians in marriage, are listed in 
order of priority according to each school of Muslim jurists:
According to the Hanafi school the guardianship falls upon the male 
agnates in the same order as in the law of inheritance, father, father’s father, 
son, son's son, full brother, consanguine brother, full brother's son, 
consanguine brother's son, full paternal uncle etc.... 164 The nearest agnate is 
the legal marriage guardian and has priority over the others. If he is 
disqualified by incapacity, illness or is unable to assume responsibility, the 
guardianship passes to the next relative in the above order.
According to the Maliki and the Hanbali jurists this right is given to the 
father or to the one to whom he accords this right in his w il l -^ , whereas 
according to the Shafii jurists it is given to the father or father's father alone.
If the marriage of a minor is contracted by his father or father's father it 
is valid and the minor has a very restricted right to avoid it. However, if it is 
contracted on the minor's behalf by a guardian other than the father or father's 
father, the Hanifi school gives the minor, on attaining majority, the right to 
terminate or ratify the marriage by exercising the 'option of puberty’ (khiyar 
a l - b u l u g h ) . 1 6 6  it is not clear whether only the declaration of a minor after 
puberty is enough to terminate the marriage or whether it requires a decree 
from the court. In Pakistan where the Hanifi law largely prevails, a Pakistan 
authority in the case of Muni V. Habib Khan 1956. declared that:
"Repudiation of marriage by the exercise of [the] option of puberty puts 
an end to the marriage without the aid of any court, and when the matter comes 
to court does not dissolve the marriage by its own act but recognizes the
163 Abou Zahra, Personal Status: On Marriage, (in Arabic), (Cairo, 1957), p. 132.
164 Abou Zahra, Ibid. p. 118; Carroll Lucy, "Muslim Family Law in South Asia: The 
Right to Avoid an Arranged Marriage Contracted During Minority", 23 Journal of the Indian 
Law Institute (19811 149-180, at p. 149.
165 Anderson N, Islamic Family Law.... p. 58.
1661^ .
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termination of the marriage".!67
Under the Hanafi interpretation the right of exercising the option of 
puberty will be lost if the minor does not exercise this right immediately after 
attaining his or her puberty unless he or she was not aware of the marriage at 
that time. However, the option continues to be available until the ward is
informed of the act of the marriage 168
These are the general rules on guardianship with the right of 
compulsion. Recent legislation in the Muslim countries adopt some of these:
In South Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) where the Hanafi school 
mostly prevails, the guardianship with the right of compulsion has been 
severely restricted and the right to exercise the option of puberty is given to 
the ward even if the marriage is contracted by the father or father's father as it 
is declared in India by section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 
1939: "a woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree 
for the dissolution of her marriage on any one or more of the following 
grounds, namely: ...(vii) that she, having been given in marriage by her father 
or other guardian before she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the 
marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years: provided that the marriage
has not been consummated.".!69
The same view applies in Pakistan and Bangladesh except that the age of 
fifteen years was raised to sixteen by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinances of 
1961 in Pakistan and B a n g l a d e s h . ! ^  Further restriction on this right was 
adopted by the Allahabad High court in India by following the rule of Imam 
Muhammed (one of the two disciples of Hanafi); the Court declared that:
"This Bench is of the opinion that the rule laid down by Imam 
Muhammed was the more reasonable and equitable rule to be applied in India, 
namely that a woman's right of option is prolonged until she is acquainted with 
the fact that she has a right of rescinding the marriage, she will have the power
167 Pearl David, o p . cit. p. 45.
168 Abou Zahra. op. cit. p. 127.
169 As it is quoted by Carroll Lucy, op. cit. p. 152.
170 id.
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to do so when she is aware of it.". 171
In the majority of Islamic countries, the legislators seek to preclude 
child marriage, as was seen in the section on the minimum age of marriage no 
marriage can be contracted below the prescribed minimum ages, except in 
certain circumstances with the permission of the c o u r t .  172 A few still have 
the "guardianship with the right of compulsion". The Moroccan Law of 
Personal Status gives the right to the judge for reasons of morals and 
temptation as article 12/4 says:" it is not permitted to the guardian, even if he is 
the father, to compel his daughter who has reached puberty even if she is a 
virgin, to marry without her permission and her consent, unless temptation is 
feared, in this case the judge can exercise the right to compel her to marry in 
order to put her under the protection of an equal husband who is able to ensure 
her support.".
The same view is adopted by the Sudanese Family Law, "where there is 
anxiety about the morals of a girl who has not reached puberty, but who is not 
less than ten years of age",173 and "on condition that she shall accept her 
husband, that he is her 'equal', that the dower is appropriate and that her 
trousseau is suitable". 174
In Egypt the legislator forbids the registrar to register any marriage 
contracted under the prescribed minimum age, and the court is forbidden also 
to entertain any disputed claim of marriage if either party is under the 
prescribed ages when the suit is begun. 175
Therefore guardianship with the right to compel the minor into a 
marriage is more or less precluded by the recent Muslim legislation. 
However, guardianship without the right of compulsion that is the matrimonial
171 Ibid, p. 154.
*7  ^See above the validation of under-age marriage.
173 ’Anderson, op. cit. p. 63.
174 Judicial Circular no: 54 of 1960 art.8, as cited by Anderson, id.
l 7  ^ The Law no: 78-1931, Abou Zahra. op. cit. pp. 128-29; Anderson N., "Modem 
Trends in Islam: Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East", 20 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (19711 1-21. at p. 13.
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guardianship in marriage still has a great role to play as seen in the most recent 
Muslim legislation. For this reason it is worthwhile to examine how it was 
envisaged in classical Islamic law and how far the recent Muslim legislation 
follow it.
EMThe mstrimmM
It has already been noted that the majority of Muslim jurists are in 
favour of the guardian's contracting the minor, whether male or female, in a 
marriage; however, they disagree in the case of an adult female. While the 
Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali schools accept that the guardian, especially the 
father, has the right to compel his virgin daughter even if she is over puberty, 
the Hanafi school declares that a female over puberty, whether a virgin or 
previously married, should not be given away in marriage without her 
consent, moreover she can contract her own marriage without the need of her 
guardian’s consent.
The arguments for the first v i e w  176 are:
1- Interpretation of some verses from the Holy Quran such as iv, 3; lxv,
4.
2- It is stated in Sahih Al-Bukhari that a marriage is not valid unless in
the presence of the woman's relatives.... 177
3- They justify the authority of the matrimonial guardian over the 
virgin adult female by stating that the virgin is ignorant of the character of 
men and practical life and she would be easily prey to temptation. 178
This last argument can be challanged by the question "why does not an 
adult man who has no experience of practical life and is ignorant of the
176 Ibn Al-Qasim, Mudawwana Al-Kubra.vol.4. 1st ed., (Al-Matbaa Al-Kheiria,1324 
AH) p. 158; Shafii. Al-Umm. vol.7, 1st ed., (Egypt: Maktabat Al-Kuliat Al-Azharia,1961) 
pp.164-65, 517.
177 Al-Bukhari. op. cit. p. 44.
178 Ibn-Oudama. Al-Mughni. vol.7, (Egypt: Maktabat al-Jamhuria Al-Arabia) p. 380, 
Shafii, op. cit. vol.7, p. 164, vol.8, pp. 516-17.
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haracter of women, not require a guardian to contract a marriage on his 
behalf?
The arguments for the second view are:
1- Interpretations of some verses from the Holy Quran like 2,229,231.
2- It is stated in Sahih Al-Bukhari in chapter 42 t h a t t h e  father or the 
guardian cannot give a virgin or a previously married woman in marriage 
without her consent. Narrated Ibn Huraira: the Prophet said:" a previously 
married woman should not be given in marriage except after consulting her, 
and a virgin should not be given in marriage except after her p e r m i s s i o n . " . ^
3- The reason why the guardian is empowered to contract a ward in 
marriage is the lack of maturity or capacity of this ward whether male or 
female, whereas virginity has no relationship with maturity or capacity.
The view of the Hanifi school which forbids the guardian to compel an 
adult virgin into marriage was supported by many classic jurists from 
different s c h o o l s  180 and it is also supported, now, by many contemporary 
Muslim jurists. ^
Further disagreement between the Muslim schools concerns the 
necessity of guardianship in marriage. While the majority of the schools 
require that an adult woman, whether a virgin or previously married should 
not contract a marriage by herself but with the consent of her guardian; the 
Hanafi school allows her to contract a valid marriage without the consent of 
her guardian. According to the majority of Muslim jurists the matrimonial 
guardian is the father, grand father, or male agnates. If there are no male 
agnates the guardianship passes to the judge but it never passes to the mother,
179 Al-Bukhari. op. cit. pp. 51-52.
180 Echawkani, Nail-Al-Awtar. vol. 6, (Beirut: Dar Al-Jil,1973) p. 256; Al-Askalani, 
Fath-Al-Bari. vol.9, (Riyadh: The Islamic University of A1 Imam Mohammad Ibn Sa'ud) 
p.191, Ibn-Al-Kaim, Zad-Al-Miad. vol.4, 2nd ed., (Cairo, 1369 AH), p. 2; Ibn-Ruched, 
Bidavatu-Al-Muditahid. vol. 2, (Beirut: Dar Al-Fiqr) p. 10.
181 Abou Zahra. op. cit. p. 115, Sibaii, The Woman Between Jurisprudence and Law, 
(in Arabic) 6th ed., (Beirut: Al-Maktab Al-Islami,1984), pp. 65-66; Rida Rachid, The Rights 
of Women in Islam, (in Arabic) (Beirut: Al-Maktab Al-Islami,1984) p. 26; Shalabi 
Mustapha, The Family Provisions in Islam, (in Arabic) 4th ed.,(Beirut: Adar Al- 
Jamiya,1983)p. 299.
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whereas according to the Hanafi jurists it can pass to the mother.
This is a brief summary of the general rules on guardianship in 
marriage in classic Islamic law. However, it is worthwhile now to examine the 
position of recent legislation in the Muslim family laws in this matter.
Most of the Muslim legislation have rejected the view of Maliki, Shafii 
arid Hanbali schools which gives the guardian the right to compel the adult 
virgin in marriage and adopt the Hanafi view. As a result, the consent of both 
parties is required by law as an institutive element of marriage before the 
judge or the registrar; as it is stated in Algerian law:" a marriage contract 
should be concluded on the consent of the two spouses and in the presence of 
the wife's guardian and two witnesses, and on an agreed dower". 182 The 
Hanafi view is now adopted in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia where the Maliki 
school is largely dominant. The Moroccan law, art. 12/4 says :" it is not 
permitted to the guardian even if he is the father to compel his daughter who 
has reached puberty even if she is a virgin, to marry without her permission 
and her consent". The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 declares in art. 13 
th a t:" no guardian, whether a father or another, can compell his daughter to 
marry, nor can he force her to marry without her consent". Therefore, the 
matrimonial guardianship that exists in some Muslim laws is not a 
guardianship with the right of compulsion nor .that of without the right of 
compulsion, but it is a matrimonial guardianship of association controlled by 
the judge. It is an association between the guardian and the ward since both 
should consent to marriage; and it is controlled by the judge because the judge 
can permit a marriage if the woman wishes it and her guardian prevents her 
from doing so.
This matrimonial guardianship of association controlled by the judge is 
very clear in Algerian law and Moroccan law with some exceptions:
The first exception is in Algerian law of 1984 article 12/2 which says: 
"However, the father may prevent his virgin daughter from marrying if that 
prevention is in her interest.". It can be gathered from this text that if the 
182 The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 art. 9.
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father prevents his virgin daughter, the judge cannot permit her to marry, 
because this text is an exception to art. 12/1 which states that " it is not 
permitted to the guardian to stop his ward from marrying if she wishes it, and 
it is in her interest, and if he does prevent her the judge may give her 
permission...".
The question which arises from the above text is what happens if the 
father prevents his virgin daughter from marrying when that prevention is not 
in her interest? Can the judge permit her to marry? Because if he cannot, who 
can decide that the prevention is in her interest or not? It is obvious that the 
law in this matter is not very clear. The best way to clarify is to abolish article 
12/2, otherwise article 12/1 has no effect, because in fact in most cases the 
guardian is the father and the ward is his virgin daughter. However, it might 
be more satisfactory if the law were changed to read "the guardian even if he is 
the father, cannot stop his ward even if she is a virgin, from marrying, if she so 
wishes and if in her interest. If he does prevent her from doing so the judge 
may give permission." In this way, it is clear that the father can prevent his 
virgin daughter if he can prove that the marriage is not in her interest. 
Because, it is not reasonable that the law should or appears to support the 
father in preventing his daughter from a marriage which is in her interests.
The second exception is in Moroccan law. Article 12 of the Family 
Code states that:" it is not permitted to the guardian even if he is the father to 
compel his daughter, who has reached puberty if she is a virgin, to marry her 
without her permission and her consent unless temptation is feared; in this case 
the judge can exercise the right to compel her to marry in order to put her 
under the protection of an equal husband who is able to ensure her support". It 
is clear from this article that the judge has the right to compel a female to 
marry in case of temptation, even against her consent. The Moroccan law in 
this matter is very extreme since the statement is neither in classic Islamic law 
nor in the recent Muslim laws. It is not even accepted by the Maliki school 
which is largely dominant in Morocco. The Maliki school gives the right of 
compulsion only in the case of a virgin and only to the father or the person to
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whom he accords this right in his will, since the father is always concerned 
with the interests of his ward, and for the same reason he gives that right to a 
person in his will.
Moreover, this statement on the one hand is against the intentions of the 
Islamic law which requires the consent of both parties in marriage, and the 
freedom of each person to choose his or her partner; on the other it is against 
the trend in recent Muslim laws and other secular laws in the world which 
show the consent of the future spouses as the most fundamental element of the 
marriage contract. It may be acceptable to state that the judge may be given the 
right to prevent the marriage in the case of fearing temptation, but not the 
right to compel a person in marriage against her consent.
It is generally held that this statement of Moroccan law is aimed at 
protecting morals of society and protecting young girls from temptation and 
prostitution. However, it is not reasonable to prevent one harm by another, the 
result being that a marriage without the consent of one of the spouses, in many 
cases, leads to the dissolution of marriage which affects the morals of society 
and causes many social evils such as prostitution. The protection of morals and 
society cannot be achieved by compulsion of persons into marriage, but by 
fighting prostitution and providing all necessary conditions that help to make 
the marriage satisfactory for every male and female.
As far as the right of a female to contract her marriage by herself is 
concerned, it is seen that most of the recent Muslim laws support the view of 
the majority of classic Muslim schools which declare that the presence of the 
guardian in the marriage contract is necessary. Majority of Muslim jurists 
consider that a woman must consent or choose her partner, but she is not 
permitted from the practical point of view, to contract a marriage; she gives 
her consent to her guardian, who is one of her male agnates, to contract the 
marriage on her behalf. The Hanafi view is that she can contract her marriage 
by herself, provided that she chooses a husband who is her equal, and that the 
dower involved is appropriate.
This Hanafi view is largely dominant in India,. Pakistan, Malasia and
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Singapore. In the case of Re Husseinah Banoo in Singapore in 1962.183 The 
learned president of the Shariah court decided that as the man was unequal to 
the girl and her father in position, employment, social status and in religion, 
the father was entitled to apply for judicial annulment of the marriage and the
court pronounced such an annulment. 184
The view of the learned president was supported by the Hanafi 
authorities; for example it is stated by H edaya-^ that:" if a woman should 
match herself to a man who is her inferior, her guardians have the right to 
remove the dishonour they might otherwise sustain by it.".186 Equality in 
marriage was interpreted in a vague manner. According to the Egyptian Code 
of Personal Law which was compiled under the supervision of Mohammad 
Kadri Pacha in 1875, the husband should be more or less equal in status to his 
wife in the following respects:




(e) Professional or social status".187
The Hanafi authorities disagree about the period during which a 
guardian can demand the court to annul the marriage; while some of them 
allow him to demand it at any time, others allow him to do so only before the 
marriage has been consummated and some others only before the apparence of 
pregnancy or before a child has been bom. 188
Few Arab Muslim laws apply the Hanafi view. Syrian law in article 27
1^3 Shariah Court case no: 2 of 1963, Singapore Magistrate's Appeal no: 20 of 1963, 
cited by Siraj M., "Enticement of Minor and the Validity of Her Marriage Under Muslim 
Law", 5 Malava Law Review (1963) 392-397, at p. 392 et seq.
184Ihid,p. 395.
185 pje is one of the most esteemed authorities of the Hanafi school of law.
186 suaj M., op. cit. p. 395.
187 Feroze M. R., "The Reform in Family Laws in the Muslim World". Islamic Studies. 
Vol.l, March 1962, no: 1,107-130, at p. 117.
188 Abou Zahra , op. cit. p. 136; Anderson Norman, Islamic Family Law.... p. 61.
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entitles the guardian to apply for annulment of the marriage if the woman 
marries a person who is not her equal without the guardian's consent.
Jordanian law in art.21 distinguishes between two cases: "(i) if the 
guardian gives in marriage his ward, whether she is virgin or previously 
married, with her consent to a man whose equality is known to neither of them, 
and then it becomes known that he is not an equal, neither shall have the right 
to object; (ii) if equality is stipulated at the time of marriage or if the husband 
declares he is an equal and then it transpires that he is not, both the wife and the 
guardian may apply to the court for the dissolution of m a r r i a g e . " .  189
This Hanafi view which allows a woman to contract her marriage 
without her guardian is strongly opposed by Abdelbaki^^, who suggests that 
from a judicial stand point this view opposes the majority of Muslim schools 
whose arguments are stronger than its own; and from a practical stand point, 
he argues that every day newspapers write of examples of unsuccessful 
marriages contracted according to this view
In spite of this criticism, many recent Muslim laws still adopt the Hanafi 
view and allow an adult woman to contract her marriage by herself, such as 
Tunisian, Iraqi, Syrian, Egyptian and others. Some others, such as Algerian 
and Moroccan laws however, adopt the view that the guardian is necessary for 
the marriage contract.
In Algerian law the judge or the registrar must be satisfied with the four 
elements of marriage required by article 9 before he concludes the marriage 
contract. It has been seen in article 12 that if the matrimonial guardian 
prevents the woman from marrying when she wishes it, the judge may allow 
her to marry. It is worthwhile to note that Algerian law does not require any 
equality in m arriag e^  since the woman and the matrimonial guardian must 
be present and consent before the judge.
189 Nadsir J., op. cit. p. 54.
190 Abdelbaki I., "The Wali is a Necessity in the Marriage". Revue Al-Azhar (in Arabic) 
January (1962), 959-963, at p. 959 et seq.
191 With the exception that muslim women may not marry a non-muslim. article 31.
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Moroccan law, not only does not permit a woman to contract a marriage 
by herself but even her consent must be represented by her matrimonial 
guardian. Article 5/1 states that:" It is a condition for the validity of the 
marriage contract that it be witnessed by two righteous men who shall hear at 
the same meeting the offer and acceptance from the husband or his deputy and 
from the guardian after the wife has given her consent and her authorisation to 
him to act on her behalf''.192
Furthermore Moroccan law requires equality in marriage. It is stated in 
article 14 that "the equality required in marriage is a special right of the 
woman and the matrimonial guardian. The equality must be considered at the 
time of marriage according to custom.".
In fact, from the view point of secular law this matrimonial 
guardianship in marriage in the case of an adult woman, is contrary to the 
spirit of the law, freedom of persons to contract their marriage, and equality 
between the sexes. Many jurists criticize matrimonial guardianship in 
marriage and oppose it as an obstacle to freedom in marriage. 193 However, a 
distinction must be drawn between the consent of the woman in marriage and 
the matrimonial guardianship. As has been seen, in Algerian law in article 9 a 
woman even a virgin must give her consent before the judge, or the registrar; 
and according to article 12, her matrimonial guardian, even if he is her father, 
has no right to compel her into a marriage without her consent and permission.
However, figures concerning marriages contracted in East Algeria show 
that 42% of marriages in urban areas and 65% in rural areas, a r e  i m p o s e d .  194 
From the juridical point of view such marriages, if contracted before a 
judge or a registrar, the only two way in which a legal marriage can be 
contracted, are not imposed, since, according to the law, the judge or the 
registrar must be satisfied that both the man and the woman agree to marry 
each other before concluding the marriage, in the presence of two witnesses
1^2 Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 50.
193 Belhadj Larbi, "Les Atteintes a la Liberte du Manage", 26 Revue Algerienne des 
Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques (1988) 425-447, at p. 430.
194 Id. -
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and the matrimonial guardian. However, from a factual point of view a certain 
percentage of marriages are contracted by the families. It is customary in 
Algeria that when the boy reaches the age of marriage, his mother looks 
around for a suitable wife for him in ceremonies where women and girls are 
gathered. This happens in many societies. In France Girard declares that 
family pressures are always important in that 34% of the couples under survey 
were brought together by family r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  195
It may be that the law establishing matrimonial guardianship is not the 
cause of the problems but customs rooted in Algerian society are. The law, 
whether recent or classic Islamic, does not require an adult man, to obtain 
consent even from his father. However, in fact, many men marry women 
whom they have not seen before, or they might have seen only in a photograph. 
The extended family still plays a dominant role in deciding on a suitable spouse 
for a young man as well as a woman. Because of ignorance of the principles of 
the Shari'a many consider these customs as principles of it, but in fact the 
Shari'a does establish the freedom of choice of partners and the consent of both 
parties to the marriage as is clear from certain words of the Prophet quoted by 
Al-Bukhari, that the father or the guardian cannot give a virgin or a previously 
married woman in marriage against her wishes; such marriage is invalid.-^ 
Therefore, the problem in Algerian society and in many other societies 
is two sided, the first one is the patriarchy that dominates the society, especially 
in rural areas, where the father governs all aspects of the family. Neither the 
boy nor the girl have the right to choose their partners. The second side of the 
problem is that people are confused between their habits and customs and the 
Shari'a; they always consider both as principles of Islam.
However, the solution might be to teach the people, since they consider 
themselves Muslims, and instruct young boys and girls in the actual Islamic 
principles which are far from that military patriarchy and which strongly 
recommend both males and females to choose their partners.
Girard A., "Le Choix Conjoint". I.N.E.D. PUF, 1981 p. 114 et seq., cited by 
Belhadj Larbi. op. cit. p. 430.
196 Al-Bukhari. op. cit. pp. 51-52.
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Conclusion:
Since the dower is one of the conditions of the marriage according to 
Algerian law it should be returned in the case of breach of engagement.
With regard to gifts given by the husband to his wife one of three 
possible views can be taken:
1- the Maliki view that if a man breaches the promise of marriage he 
cannot recover any gift, whereas if a woman breaches it she has to return the 
gifts to her fiance;
2- if one party breaches the engagement with a reasonable cause he or 
she has the right to recover his or her gifts, and visa versa;
3- the view of the Scottish Commission paper no: 76 that the general law 
of unjustified enrichment would provide an adequate remedy for disputes over 
property between engaged couples.
Concerning damages for pecuniary loss and injured feelings, taking into 
consideration those critisisms of Algerian law as well as of Scots law, it would 
be better if Algerian law abolished the action of breach of promise, or at least 
abolished damages for injured feelings and awarded damages for pecuniary 
loss only with justification of an unreasonable breach of engagement.
In the past, there was no restriction as to the age of marriage except in 
French law where in the sixteenth century the minimum ages were 30 for 
males and 25 for females. Now most of recent laws have introduced a 
minimum age for marriage. The highest age is 21 and the lowest is 12. It is 
difficult to fix a right age for all the countries, but it is possible to establish at 
least, the most common average ages (18 for males and 16 for females) as the 
minimum ages for marriage in order to reduce the conflicts of laws and avoid 
runaway marriages.
It is not necessary to establish different ages for men and women.
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Under-age marriage is void in the countries which fix an absolute minimum 
age, such as Scotland and England. Many others fix a nominal or flexible 
minimum age and allow dispensations. It is difficult to choose between the two 
systems, but it can be said that the first one is more precise in establishing a 
minimum age for marriage and the second one, even though it has some 
disadvantages, in allowing dispensations which prevent some successful 
marriages from becoming void.
Many laws require parental consent under certain ages, to prevent 
unsuccessful marriages and protect the honour of the family, but there is a 
trend towards the abolition of it and the establishment of free marriage.
It is not fair that some Muslim laws allow the right to compel a woman 
in marriage in certain cases as in Moroccan and Sudanese law, since it is not 
only against the spirit of the Shari'a-but against the aim of marriage contract 
itself. Those bad habits and customs which stand as obstacles in the way of free 
marriage can be shown to be wrong only by manifesting and teaching the 
actual principles of the Shari'a.
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CHAPTER THREE 
TH E W T f r  & MCMT& AMD M IT T O
Introduction:
Under the title of "Rights and Duties of the Spouses" the Algerian 
Family Law Code of 1984 has four articles :
Art. 36: " the spouses are obliged to :
1- maintain the conjugal ties and the duties of common life;
2- contribute together in serving the interests of the family, and 
protecting the children and providing their sound education;
3- maintain the parental tie and good relations with the parents and other 
relatives."
Art. 37: " the husband is required to :
1- support the wife to the best of his abilities unless her disobedience is 
established;
2- treat with full equality his wives in the case of marriage with more 
than one."
Art. 38: " the wife has the right to :
- visit her own relatives and to receive them in conformity with usage 
and custom;
- dispose of her property with complete freedom."
Art. 39: " the wife is required to :
1 - obey her husband and consider him as the head of the family;
2- nurse the children if she can and raise them;
3- respect her husband's parents and his other relatives."
The wife also has the right:
- to dower which is not mentioned in these articles, but it is mentioned as 
a condition of the marriage contract in articles 9, 14,15, 16,17, 33;
- to inheritance which is covered in the part on inheritance.
9 1
In order to discuss these rights and duties in more detail it is better to 
look at them under the following sections :
Section one: alimony or maintenance;
Section two: dower;
Section three: non-financial rights and duties.
However, the following rights and duties will not be discussed within the
above sections:
1- The wife's duty to nurse the children, since it is a natural one and 
raises no difficulties under the law. However, it is worthwhile to mention that 
according to Islamic law the wife is not obliged to suckle her children; and it is 
the duty of the husband to afford a wet nurse. If the wife accepts to suckle 
them her husband must recompense and provide support for her and her 
children; but if no wet nurse is available or the husband cannot afford a nurse 
the wife is bound to suckle them. 1
2- Her duty to respect her husband's parents and his relatives. According 
to Islamic law it is also the duty of the husband to respect his wife's parents and 
her relatives; but Algerian law in the above article stressed only the duty of the 
wife. This may be because it is customary in Algerian society and in many 
parts of the Islamic world that the wife lives with her husband's parents. 
Nevertheless it would be better if Algerian law mentioned expressly also the 
duty of the husband to respect his wife's parents in order to prevent a
husband's allegation that the law has not ordered him to do so; and there are
cases, even if few, where the husband lives with his wife's parents and her 
relatives. Failure to do so, shows clearly the inequality between husband and 
wife.
3- Her right to inheritance. The division of inheritance is clearly 
decided by the Holy Quran and no matter of Islamic law has been specified or 
detailed there more precisely than inheritance. As a result most of the 
contemporary Muslim laws adopt the classic Islamic rules of inheritance . The
1 See Vesey Fitzgerald, op. cit. p. 43.
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Holy Quran states the proportion due to each female in the family whether she 
be wife, mother, daughter, sister or grandmother...The general rule is that the 
wife is entitled to inherit half the share given to a man. When there are 
children the husband is entitled to a quarter of his w ife’s estate, whereas she is 
entitled to an eighth of her husband's estate. If there are no children half of his 
wife’s estate goes to the husband, and a quarter of her husband's estate goes to 
the wife. This division may, if taken in isolation from other aspects of Islamic 
law, appear to be unfair. However, Islamic law should be taken as a whole. It is 
not right to take part of a certain law in isolation from the other parts of the 
law. As has been mentioned before it is the responsibility of the husband to 
support all the members of the family and provide all kinds of maintenance to 
his wife and their children; and he is also responsible to provide dower to her. 
Whereas the wife is not responsible for any such things. Therefore, the half­
share of the husband is for him and his family including the wife, whereas the 
half-share that the wife inherits is for herself alone.
SECTTMM ©NL 
A L I M O N Y
I- D e iiitio i;
The classical view is that the duty to aliment in general is based on blood 
link and familial ties, whereas the modem trend has widened the reasons of the 
obligation to aliment as the Scottish Law Commission said: "we doubt whether 
the mere existence of blood link alone would be widely regarded today as 
justifying the imposition of an alimentary obligation, and our general 
approach will be to look for some other justification..."^
2 Scot.Law.Com. on Aliment and Financial Provision. Memorandum no: 22, 1976 
vol.2, p.7.
9 3
The word aliment differs in its meaning from one system to another. 
The French system knows more than one word for aliment: aliments, 
entretien, pension alimentaire and devoir de secours. Canadian law distingues 
between three types: during the common life of spouses it is called financial 
support, at the moment of separation or divorce the term used is interim 
alimony or aliment pendent lite, after the breakdown of common life and 
according to common law, the term of aliment means permanent alimony in 
the case of separation, and the term maintenance is used in the case of 
divorce.^
In English law, the traditional term is maintenance which is replaced by 
a modem term: financial provision which covers a periodical provision and a 
lump sum provision at the same time.4 Whereas in Scots law the normal 
term is aliment and the term financial provision is used only for periodical
allocations or capital sums in the case of divorce A
Algerian law has one term derived from the classic Islamic law. It is
called "Nafaqa" which covers the support of the family and the spouses during 
the marriage contract and also after the dissolution of marriage.
In spite of the variations of aliment in many legal systems, it has in 
general a common purpose that is the support of the family members during 
marriage or after the breakdown of marriage.
The duty to aliment exists by operation of law, it is not based on an 
implicit contract or anything else, it is imposed by law. According to Algerian 
law it is a religious and legal duty that a husband should maintain his wife and 
his children, that the parents are responsible for maintaining their descendents 
and the descendents are also responsible for their parents. This duty has its
3 Caparros Ernest, L'Obligation Alimentaire Etude de Droit Interne Compare 
(Canada), (Collection des Travaux de l'lnstitut de Recherches Juridiques Comparatives), 
(Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 15, Quai Anatole-France, Paris, 
1983), pp. 20, 21.
4 Clive E., ^Obligation Alimentaire Etude de Droit Interne Compare (Royaume Uni 
de Grande Bretagne) (Collection des Travaux de l'lnstitut de Recherches, Ibidl p. 453.
5 Ibid. p. 453.
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origin in the Holy Quran which stresses that the father should bear the cost of
food and clothing for the mother.^ Moreover it declares clearly in another 
sura:
"Lodge them (women) during the prescribed periode in the houses 
wherein you dwell, according to your means; and harass them not that you 
may create hardships for them. If they be with child provide for them until 
they are delivered. If they give suck to the child for you, give them their 
due recompense, and settle the matter between yourselves equitably; but if 
you encounter difficulty from each other, then let another woman suckle the
child for the father.
The Algerian Family Code of 1984 states clearly this duty in article 
37(l):"the husband is required to support the wife to the best of his abilities 
unless it is established that she has abandoned the home." The obligation to. 
aliment also derives from many Conventions to which Algeria is a party: the 
Convention of New York 30 June 1956 on the recovery of aliments abroad, 
ratified by the Algerian government in 22 May 1969, is one. Algeria has 
contracted other Conventions concerning aliment; with Tunisia on 26 July 
1963, with Morocco on 15 March 1963, with Egypt on 29 February 1964, with
Mauritania on December 1969 and with Belgium on 8 October 1970.^
Some arguments have been put forward by some classic Muslim jurists 
about the nature of the aliment^, but the most common and reasonable view
6 Sura: xi, 233.
7 Suratixv, 7.
8 All these conventions are published by the" Ministere de la justice, Direction de la 
legislation et de la documentation". About these conventions see Benmelha Ghaouti, 
"L'Obligation Alimentaire en Droit International, 21 Revue Algerienne des Sciences 
Juridiques Economiques et Politiques (1984) 832-843, at pp. 839, 843.
9 Some of them said that it is as a price for the intimate relationship with a woman, and 
others considered it as a price for reservation of the woman. Further details about these 
arguments are in: Haidar Ajlany, Des Rapports enter Epoux en Droit Islamic Principalement 
dans 1* Ecole Hanafite et en Droit Compare, thesis, Paris, 1949, p. 326 et seq.
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is that aliment is a personal duty imposed by law. It is worthwhile to examine 
some characteristics of the obligation to aliment:
It is bom from the law (ex l e g e ) ^ ,  and it is only the law which 
determines the persons who are entitled to aliment and those who are
responsible to provide aliment. A wife cannot claim aliment from her father
or. her son as long as her husband is able to provide for her. However, this
does not prohibit any agreement between the spouses about aliment, but to
avoid complications, English law for example requires that this agreement
must b e :
1- in writing;
2- and made between spouses or former spouse, (see the case in 
Bromley 11)
Another characteristic of the obligation to aliment is that it is regarded 
as part of public policy which means that any agreement made by the spouses 
or parents to release themselves from the duty to support each other or their
children will not be recognized by law. 1^
The obligation to aliment is a personal duty, it is unlike the other
obligations and contracts in which the parties (the creditor and the debtor) can
be changed without the disappearance of the obligation, since the alimentary
obligation is not a contractual or delictual obligation, but part of the actual
needs of the creditor. 13 As a result of this, after the death of the creditor his 
heirs cannot ask for his aliment, neither are the heirs of the debtor responsible
for his debt. The French Civil Code enacts two exceptions to the personal or
non-transferable nature of the aliment:
1- Article 207 says: "the succession of the predeceased spouse owes
support to the surviving who is in need... the substance of support is levied
upon the inheritance. It is bome by all the heirs and in case of insufficiency, by
10 Mendes J., "Obligation Alimentaire en Droit Compare", 24 Revista da Faculdade de 
Direito da Univ. de Lisboa (Portugal! (1972) 51-83. at p.56.
11 Bromley, op. cit. p. 490.
1^  Marty and Ravnaud. op. cit. p. 54; Weill Alex, op. cit. pp. 340-341.
13 Planiol and Ripert. op. cit. p. 39.
9 6
all the particular legatees, in proportion to their emolument."
2- The second exception arises from the marriage in which children 
bom into adultery can claim their aliment not only from the father, but also 
from his succession, so that the heirs of the adulterer remain responsible to
support these children bom into adultery.^
This personal characteristic of the obligation, to aliment has some
practical connection with the case of set off. The husband is not entitled to set
off against his wife's claim for aliment any pecuniary claim he may have
against her. So the law protects her against any pecuniary debts to be set off
since her daily needs cannot be satisfied after that reduction.
The alimentary obligation cannot be the object of a seizure judgment for
the benefit of a creditor of the aliment creditor, except for the case of that
creditor also being a creditor of aliment or a provider of aliment.^
The obligation to aliment is not subject to arrears ; this means that if the
wife who is the creditor of aliment does not bring an action to the court, she is
not able to claim aliment for the periods preceding her suit to the court. The
French jurisprudence establishes a rule in this case: "aliments ne s' arreragent
point" 16 (aliments are never in arrears). The reason of this characteristic 
may be that: "it is presumed that she preferres to suffer rather than unfold her
troubles before the court, and her silence will therefore be interpreted as a
waiver of her right for such a period."^ This argument cannot be sustained 
since the aliment is, as has been seen before, part of public policy so that the
creditor of aliment, especially the married woman, cannot renounce her right
to her aliment. Therefore, the reason can only be that when the creditor does
14 Article 762; Planiol and Repert. op. cit. p. 40.
1^  The Algerian Civil Procedure Code, art. 368; the French Civil Procedure Code, art. 
581; Marty and Raynaud, op. cit. p. 55; Scots law: Wilson & Duncan, Trusts. Trustees and 
Executors. (Edinburgh: W. Greens & Son L.,1975) p.96, art. 98 (2) Bankruptcy (Scotland) 
Act; Clive E., op. cit. p. 519.
16 Weill Alex, op. cit. p.342.
17 Menachem E.. op. cit. p. 398.
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not claim his or her aliment, it is presumed that it is not heeded. The need is 
the basis of the entitlement to aliment, and since the need disappears, the
aliment disappears with i t .^  The ratio of this argument is that if the creditor 
of aliment proves the persistence of her needs by showing, for example, that
she has contracted debts to subsist, then she may claim aliment for the
preceding periods. Similarly Scots law authorises the alimentary creditor to
claim for his aliment arrears^. However, some laws such as the Egyptian, 
Algerian and Sudanese, have restricted the period during which a claim can be
made to the court in order to prevent "exceedingly dubious claims for
maintenance alleged to have been due over many years." 20 The Algerian 
Family Law Code of 1984 declares in article 80: "aliment becomes due from 
the date of raising a suit to the court and the judge has the right to order the
payment of aliment on the strength of evidence for a period not more than one 
year prior to the introduction of the suit."
II- Subjects ©f ■ alimemtuury ©Migattiomu
The subjects of alimentary obligation vary according to the bases that 
impose it. It is not only the blood relationship which justifies the duty to 
aliment. The marriage contract has also a great part to play in this. Moreover 
law has introduced the right to aliment to any person who lives within the 
family and is unable to maintain himself: the Scottish law states that: "an 
obligation of aliment shall be owed by, and only by... a person to a child ( other 
than a child who has been boarded out with him by a local or other public 
authority or a voluntary organisation) who has been accepted by him as a child 
of his family. "21
1^  Marty and Ravnaud. o p . cit. p. 56.
19 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s. 1(4).
20 Anderson N., Law Reform.... p. 132.
21 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, subsection 1(1 )(d).
98
A-Aliment between persons other than the spouses:
There is no doubt that parents are under the duty to support their 
children. In most of the civil jurisdictions both parents are equally obliged to 
maintain their minor children. Under French law both spouses must support
their c h i l d r e n . 2 2  At common law it was the father who owed the primary 
obligation. However, in Scots law, as well as in English law, now parents are
equally obliged to support their c h i l d r e n . 2 3  Under Islamic law this duty is 
upon the father as the head of the family. It rests with the mother only when
the father is unable to maintain the children. Algerian Family Law states in
article 76: "in the case of the father being unable to maintain his children, the
duty shall be incumbent upon the mother if she is able to do so ."^  The duty 
of parents to aliment their children terminates when children can support
themselves. Article 75 of Algerian Family Law declares : "it is the duty of the
father to provide aliment for his child who has no means. For the male
children aliment shall continue until the age of majority and for the females
until the consummation of marriage. The father is still under this duty if the
child is physically or mentally handicapped or he is a student. This duty ends
when he is able to earn a living." The Family (Scotland) Act 1985 makes clear
that the child is entitled to the right to aliment by declaring in subsection (5)
that: "'child' means a person-
■(a) under the age of 18 years; or
(b) over that age and under the age of 25 years who is reasonably and 
appropriately undergoing instruction at an education establishment, or 
training for employment or for a trade, profession or vacation;..."
Under classic Islamic law which prohibits and does not recognise any
22 Article 207 of the French Civil Code; United Nations, Parental Rights and Duties. . 
Including Guardianship. (New York: United Nations, 1968), p. 50; Lawson et al.. op. cit. p. 
85.
23 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, 1(c); U.N., ibid. p.51; Nichols David, THe 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 (comments), (Edinburgh: Green, 1985), para.(c), p. 37-3.
24 The same view adopted by Tunisian law art.47; Moroccan law art. 129; Jordanian 
law at.70.
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relationship between man and woman outside the marriage, the illegitimate 
child has no right to aliment against his father. However, only according to the 
Hanafi school the mother is bound to aliment her natural child. The Indian 
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 488 provides that: "the putative father of 
an illegitimate child can be ordered to pay a sum not exceeding Rs 100 per 
month by way of maintenance."25
English common law was similar to the classic Islamic law in the case of 
the illegitimate child towards his parents: "he had no legal right to succeed to 
their property, or to receive maintenance or other benefits deriving from the
status of parent and c h i l d . " 2 6  However the modem trend is to place the
illegitimate child in the same status as that of the legitimate child^, and both
parent of the illegitimate child are under the duty to support him.28
The adoptive child is generally treated as the legitimate child in both
English law and Scots law^9. Islamic law prohibits adoption but establishes 
instead a similar system called "Kafala" which means rewarding or
bequeathing a child by a person to treat him as his child but it does not produce
parentage or legal effect. Algerian law prohibits adoption in art. 46: "adoption
is forbidden under the Shari'a and law." In art. 116 it provides the child under
"Kafala" the right of aliment and education.
As the parents are under a duty to support their children, they
themselves have also the right to be maintained by their descendents. In the
majority of civil law jurisdictions, children are under such an obligation.30 
Scots law declares that legitimate children are obliged to maintain their 
parents, and the same obligation is upon the adoptive child towards his
25 Fvzec Asal. op. cit. p. 184.
26 Cretnev. op. cit. 1984, p. 594.
27 Scottish Law Commission no: 82 on Family Law Report on Illegitimacy 1984, p. 66.
28 Scottish Law Commission no: 22, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 12.
29 Clive E., L'Obligation Alimentaire.... p. 468.
50 U. N.. op. cit. p. 61.
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adopter. 3 1 In Islamic law also, children are under the duty to support their 
needy parents, Algerian law declares in art.77 that: "aliment of the ascendents
is incumbent on the descendents and vice versa, according the possibilities,
need and degree of kinship in succession order." In the case of the absent his
needy parents may be authorised by the court to procure assets or funds on
behalf of their absent child. Furthermore they have the right to sell the means
of the absent child to provide their own needs.32
There can be some other subjects of alimentary obligation. In some laws 
such as the English and the Scottish, the aliment of collateral relations does not 
exist. The Scottish Law Commission declares that: "Scots law does not 
recognise any alimentary obligation between brothers and sisters as such. 
Neither does English law, French law or German law. Those consulted were 
almost unanimously of the view that there should be no change in the present
law and we so recommend."^
Algerian law adopts a general rule that covers the mutual duty between
ascendents and descendents according to certain degrees of relationship. Syrian
law makes clear that: "the maintenance of every indigent relative who is unable
to earn a living because of a physical or mental handicap shall be the duty of the
presumptive heirs among his able relatives according to their respective
inheritance shares."34
B- Aliment between spouses:
One of the most important areas of aliment is that between the spouses. 
This aliment manifests itself in two situations: during the life in common of the 
spouses and after the cessation of the common life.
51 Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978; Clive E., op. cit. p.468.
52 Benmelha Ghaouti, "L'Obligation Alimentaire en Droit Interne”, 21 Revue 
Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques (1984) 799-831, at p. 815.
55 Scot. Law. Com. no: 67 on Family Law Report on Aliment and Financial Provision, 
1981, p. 18; Clive E, Husband and Wife. 1982, pp. 215-216.
54 art. 159; the same view in Iraqi law art. 62, and Jordanian law art. 173; Nasir J., oj  ^
cit. pp. 181-182.
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1- During the common life of the spouses:
The traditional rule in English common law as in Islamic law is that the 
husband is under the duty to support his wife, and the wife’s duty is to 
undertake the domestic services. In common law the husband was entitled to 
the means and property of his wife and for that he was under the obligation to
maintain her.35 The modem trend in many legal systems is that there is no 
distinction between husband and wife concerning the alimentary obligation.
Some legal systems such as the Scottish and the English lay down the reciprocal
duty between the spouses to maintain each other. Other systems such as the
Algerian and many Muslim legal systems establish the traditional duty of
aliment on the husband. These differentiations between the legal systems in
this matter can be justified theorically: those which establish the alimentary
obligation on the husband, regard him as the head of the family and the one
responsible for all the needs of the family. Whereas those which establish the
reciprocal duty between spouses look towards establishing equality between
the spouses in their duties and rights and seek to abolish any discrimination
between men and women. This distinction between the legal systems may be
justified: in countries where the number of working wives outside the home is
nearly equal to that of husbands, the logical rule is the reciprocal duty to
support each other. Whereas in countries where wives are generally
housewives the logical mle is that the duty of aliment should be on the husband,
not only because he is traditionally the provider but also because he is actually
the main earner.
The wife's right to aliment continues as long as the marriage contract is 
still in existence. However, there are some cases where the wife loses her right 
to maintenance. In the English common law the wife was entitled to aliment as 
long as there was cohabitation between her and her husband. She lost her right 
if her conduct released her husband from the duty to cohabit, for example, by
her desertion or her adultery.36 while adultery terminated entirely the right
35 Levasseur and Glendon, rL'Obligation Alimentaire Etnde de Droit Interne Compare 
,(Etats Unis), (Collection des Travaux de l'lnstitut de Recherche, op. cif) p. 212.
36 Bromlev. op. cit. 1981, p.484.
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to aliment, desertion only suspended it, and the alimentary obligation revived
again when desertion c e a s e d . 37 This was the case also in Scots law. The 
Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 in section 7(1) has changed the rule by
distinguishing between different types of conduct: "the adulterous or cruel
wife can recover aliment; the deserting wife cannot."38 The Scottish Law 
Commission working paper no: 67 of 1981 recommends that the common law
rules on willingness to adhere as a condition of entitlement to aliment and the
statutory rules in section 7(1) of the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 should be
replaced by "a general provision to the effect that it is a defence to an action for
aliment that the defender, although not cohabiting with the other party to the
marriage, is holding out a genuine and reasonable offer to receive that person
into his home and to fulfill his alimentary o b l i g a t i o n  t h e r e .  " 3 9  The recent 
trend in both Scots law and English law is that the conduct of either spouse will
not be regarded as a cause to loose the right to alim ent.^ In his book "A 
guide to the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985" Macdonald comments on s. 4
(3)(b) related to the conduct of the spouses in the alimentary obligation: "under
the Act the court is not to take account of any conduct of a party unless it would
be 'manifestly inequitable to leave it out of account... The use of the word
'manifestly' seeks to make clear that conduct should only be taken into account,
so as to reduce or deny an award, in exceptional circumstances."^
Classic Muslim jurists also stated several instances in which the wife lost
her right to aliment. These instances differ from one jurist to another.^^
37 id.
38 §cot> Law. Com., no: 67. op. cit. p. 20.
39 Ibid., p. 35, also pp. 20, 21, 22.
40 Clive E. L'Obligation Alimentaire. p. 460.
41 Macdonald H. R., A Guide to the Family Law (Scotland! Act 1985. (London: CCH 
Editions, 1986), p. 25.
42 Meron Ya' akov, L'Obligation Alimentaire entre Epoux en Droit Musulman Hanefite, 
(Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence,1971), pp. 256-277; Ibn-Ruchd, <2jL 
cit. pp. 41-42; De Bellefonds Linand, Traite de Droit Musulman Compare, vol. 2, (Paris, La 
Haye: Mouton & CO, 1965) pp. 265-269.
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However, the main circumstance which is mostly considered by modem as 
well as classic jurists, and in which the wife loses her right to maintenance, is 
the case of the disobedient wife. The practical circumstances which are
considered disobedience are:^
(1) When the wife abandons the matrimonial domicile without her
husband's authorisation and without legitimate cause.
(2) When she goes out to work against her husband's will and the 
performance of that work does not permit her to return back home till the 
night.
(3) When she lives with her husband in a house that belongs to her and 
she refuses to permit him to enter. However, if she asks successively her 
husband to provide a conjugal domicile other than her own, she will not loose 
her right to aliment. Most of the recent Muslim family laws take into account 
these circumstances: Egyptian law declares that the woman who abandons the 
conjugal domicile without her husband's authorisation and without a legal
cause will be considered as disobedient and loose her right to maintenance.^ 
Syrian and Jordanian laws take the same view in which the wife "who leaves
the matrimonial home without a lawful cause or denies her husband access to
the home which she owns without first requesting him to accommodate her
elsewhere"^ is disobedient.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 is not clear in this matter. It
declares in article 37: "the husband is required to: support the wife to the best
of his abilities unless it is established that she has abandoned the matrimonial
domicile..." This is from the French version of this article. The Arabic
version is: "unless it is established that she is disobedient". If the French
version is taken into consideration there will be only one case in which the wife
will be considered disobedient: it is when she abandons the matrimonial
43 Abd-El-Fattah El-Sayed Bey, De 1* Etendue des Droits de la Femme dans le Mariage 
Musulman et Particulierement en Egypt, thesis, Dijon, 1922, p. 128.
44 Haidar Ajlany, op. cit. p. 340.
45 Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 97.
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domicile. Whereas if the Arabic version is taken into account there will be
several such c a s e s . 4 6
This uncertainty of the law may result in some contradictions in court
decisions.
2 -After cessation of life in common:
The husband in some legal systems, and both spouses in others are under 
the duty to aliment each other as long as they are living together. However, it 
could happen that one spouse is absent, disappears or dies, or in some 
circumstances the marriage breaks down by divorce or nullity. In all these 
cases it is worthwhile to see how far the alimentary obligation will be affected? 
a -Absence or disappearance:
The absence or disappearance of the husband does not affect his duty to 
aliment his wife. If he does not provide enough money for her and her 
children's needs, the wife can be authorised by the court to dispose of the
means or the property of her h u s b a n d . 4 7  If there are no means, she may be 
authorised to bind his credit for necessities for her and her children, or to
incur debts and her husband must pay these debts.
According to Scots law and English law after seven years of the
husband's disappearance without any news, the wife can ask the court to
declare the presumption of death and the dissolution of marriage 48
According to the Maliki school the presumption of death of the
disappearing husband can be declared by the court after four years after
investigation. This view is adopted by the Algerian Family Code of 1984 art.
113. Moreover art. 53 gives the wife the right to request divorce in the case of
the husband's absence of more than one year without a valid excuse or
46 This is the case, at least, according to the Maliki school which mostly dominates in 
Algeria.
47 Saad Foudil, Algerian Family Law: Marriage and Divorce (in Arabic), (Algeria: Al- 
Muassassa Al-Wataniya Lil-Kitab,1986) pp. 190-191; Haidar Ajlani. op. cit. pp. 344-345.





In the case of separation de facto by mutual consent of both spouses the 
husband according to common law in both Scotland and England was not under
the duty to aliment his wife unless they agreed for him to do so.^0 However, 
legislative dispositions in both countries now give both spouses a claim for
financial provision.^ ^  In the case of judicial separation most of the legal 
systems which recognise this institution authorise the needy spouse to claim
maintenance. The Lousiana Civil Code for example provides that: "women
who lack sufficient income may receive alimony from their husbands pending
a suit for a judgement of separation from bed and board or for d i v o r c e . " ^  
According to French law the reciprocal duty of maintenance between spouses
continues even when one party is guilty and the other is innocent. The aliment
in this case " is awarded in the form of a p e n s i o n " . ^3 Both Scots law and 
English law give to both spouses the right to aliment or financial provision
after judicial separation, 
c- Divorce:
By divorce the legal relationship between husband and wife comes to 
end. In English common law the wife had no alimentary claim upon her 
husband after divorce, but the present law in both England and Scotland gives
the court the right to award financial provision after divorce.^
There are many arguments for the right of the wife to aliment after
divorce. These suggest that the principle of financial policy on divorce is for
49 Separation as in western laws does not exist in Algerian law.
50 Clive E.. Husband and Wife, p. 191.
51 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 S. 2 (a).
52 Reid D.E., "Alimony and Equal Protection: A Search for Rational Relationships", 22 
Lovola Law Review fLousianal (1976) 1036-1060, at p. 1036.
53 Lawson et Al.. op. cit. p. 85.
54 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 S. 8 ; Clive E., L'Obligation Alimentaire. 462.
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the protection of the mother since in the great majority of cases the wife is the
custodial parent:^ Moreover the mother is entitled to maintenance because 
of her children's care, and in case her aliment should be abolished, the
children's aliment should be increased.56 However, in general there are 
many arguments against the wife's right to aliment after divorce. In line with
the principle of woman’s independence and equality between both sexes, Ruth
Deech comments that in the 'eyes of the law' women (the wife and the mistress)
are seen 'as parasites' who: "by the fact of marriage or regular sexual
intercourse, have acquired identical rights to be kept as dependents, valued not
by their contributions to a productive society but by their adherence to
particular man and his fortunes".^ in Katherine O' Donovan's 'good society' 
all maintenance, even during marriage, should be abolished according to the
provision: "that certain material preconditions are a b o l i s h e d " ^ ,  to further 
full independence of women. Some others think that the primary
responsibility for one parent families should fall on the s ta te d
Algerian law declares in art. 61 that the divorced wife has the right to
aliment during her 'Idda' (waiting period). The Idda for a woman who is not
pregnant is three months, calculated from the declaration of divorce (art. 58);
and that of the widow is four months and ten days (art. 59). The Idda for a
pregnant woman shall be observed until the delivery of the baby, and the
maximum term for pregnancy is ten months calculated from the date of
divorce or the death of the husband (art. 60).60
55 Metcalf J.C., "Divorce and the Right to Life-Long Maintenance", 131 New Law 
Journal (1981) 669-671, at p. 670.
56 O'Donovan Katherine, "The Principles of Maintenance: An Alternative View", 8 
Family Law (19781 180-184. at p. 184.
57 Deech Ruth, "The Principles of Maintenance", 7 Family Law (1977) 229-233, at p. 
232.
58 O’Donovan Katherine, Should all Maintenance.... p.433.
59 O'Donovan Katherine, id; Times, September 9, 1981.
60 These rules are declared by the Holy Quran , and they are now established by most 
of the Muslim family laws.
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There are suggestions that the wife's aliment should cease. Some claim 
the period to be limited to until the children first go to school at the age of five; 
others to the age of sixteen when most children leave school, but Metcalf 
suggested that the maintenance of the mother " should extend as an absolute
right until the youngest child has reached the age of eleven".61 The Scottish 
Law Commission paper no. 67 has fixed this period to three years from the
date of divorce. This period has also been accepted by the Family Law
(Scotland) Act 1985 s. 9 (l)(d). However, discretion remains with the court to
award maintenance beyond this period: "a party who at the time of the divorce
seems likely to suffer serious financial hardship as a result of the divorce
should be awarded such financial provision as is reasonable to relieve him (or
her) of hardship over a reasonable p e r i o d .  "62 
d-Death and nullity of marriage:
While some legal systems such as the Scottish and the English give the 
widow and the woman whose marriage is null the right to aliment, others like 
the Algerian and many other Muslim ones do not allow her aliment. Under 
Scots law the court which grants a declarator of nullity of marriage has no 
power to order financial provision of any kind to either of the spouses. 
However, the Scottish Law Commission, in order to reach the same position as 
English law^3 and some States of the United States of America, and to avoid a 
distinction between void and voidable marriages, recommended that: "a court 
granting a decree of declarator of nullity of marriage should have the same 
powers in relation to financial provision as a court granting a decree of 
d i v o r c e . "64 In Scots law the alimentary obligation ceases on the death of 
either spouse, but the wife may claim aliment from the husband's succession.
61 Metcalf J.C., op. cit. p. 670.
62 The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 S.(l)(e).
63 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, part. II.
6  ^Scot. Law. Com. paper no: 67, 1981, pp. 151-152, para. 3.201-3; this rule has been 
adopted also by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, S. 17(1).
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The present law allows any alimentary creditor "who has not been properly 
provided for on the death of a liable relative may have an equitable claim to 
aliment out of the estate of that relative or against those who have benefited
from the succession."^
On the contrary Algerian law does not give the wife the right to aliment 
in either circumstance: death of her husband or nullity of marriage. The 
Family Law Code of 1984 allows both the divorced and the widowed wife to 
stay in the conjugal domicile during the Idda (art. 61), but in the same article, 
it declares that the divorced wife has the right to aliment during her Idda, but 
no statement has been made about the widow's aliment. Saad comments on this 
article by stating that Algerian law has followed the consensus of the Muslim 
jurists on no aliment being given to the widow.^6 It is not reasonable to draw 
a distinction between the widow and the divorced wife in aliment, especially in 
her Idda. Since one of the important reasons for the widow's Idda, as Shalabi 
says, is to give her an opportunity "to show the effect of her loss of her 
husband by abstaining from adornment"^, so it is unfair to deprive her from 
aliment. A question may arise in this matter: why is the widow not entitled to 
aliment where she has no fault in the marriage breakdown, whereas the 
divorced wife is usually entitled to aliment where it may be that by her fault the 
marriage has been broken down ?
It would be more satisfactory if the Algerian law were to give the widow 
the right to aliment during her Idda. This would not be contrary to the 
consensus of the Muslim jurists since there are some classic and modem 
Muslim jurists who state that the widow can take her aliment from the 
succession of her husband^.
Concerning the wife who is separated from her husband because of the
65 Scot. Law. Com., ibid. p. 65; Family Law(Financial Provision)(Scotland) Bill 1981 
clausel(3); Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 S.l (4).
66 Saad Foudil, op. cit. p. 361.
67 Shalabi Mustapha, op. cit. p. 651.
68 Essabouni Abderrahman. The Syrian Law of Personal Status, (in Arabic) vol.2, 
(Damascus: Damascus Un.,1973), p. 147.
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. nullity of marriage, many Muslim jurists do not give her the right to aliment 
on the basis that the null marriage has no effect between the spouses, except in a 
few cases concerning their children. It is not clear in Algerian law whether this 
wife is considered as a divorcee and accordingly has the right to aliment, or is 
considered as a party to a null marriage and therefore has no right to aliment 
Even though in practice there are not many cases of nullity of marriage, it 
would be better if the law were to give her clearly the right to aliment during 
her Idda, at least when the nullity of marriage is not through her fault, or when 
she is ignorant of the irregularity of the union.
nI- Tlhe ©bjsctt ©f aMmooittary
A-The content of the aliment:
In Islamic law as in English common law^^, the husband is under the 
duty to provide his wife with suitable accommodation, enough food and 
clothes, medical and dental attention, and anything else she reasonably 
requires.
- Food: there is no minimum or maximum limit to provide food. This 
depends on the economic an social position of the spouses.
- Clothes: there are different opinions expressed by the classic Muslim 
jurist on the minimum clothes that a husband must provide for his wife in a 
year. While a few suggest that he should provide her with clothes for the 
Summer and the Winter once a year, the majority adopt the rule that he should 
provide her twice a year, clothes for the Summer and others for the 
W inter.^
Clothes include everything necessary for the wife's beauty such as comb 
and powder. 7 1 Even though the perfume and paint are not necessary they
69 Hogget and Pearl, op. cit. p. 86.
70 Ibn-qudama, op. cit. p. 572; De Bellfonds. op. cit. p. 259.
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must be provided according to some j u r i s t s ^ .
-Accommodation: under classic and modem Islamic law as well as under 
the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 art. 78 it is the husband's duty to 
provide a suitable domicile for his wife. The suitable house must be separated 
from the house of his larger family if he is able to do that, or a separate 
apartment within the house of the husband's family if he is unable to do the 
form er^. This house must be solely for the use of the spouses, and he may 
not accommodate his relatives there without her consent, except his minor 
children according to the Hanafi view.74 It has been seen in Chapter One that 
the Algerian family is large so as a result many cases brought before the courts 
by wives are related to claims to have separate houses from their husbands' 
family houses. This problem was discussed in a seminar of the judges of Easter 
Algeria from 2-5 June 1980, and the conclusion was that the wife had the right 
to a separate house ; but there is no rule in the Family Law Code of 1984 that 
the judge can apply, and the jurisprudence has not yet considered the 
accommodation crisis as a cause for d i v o r c e ^ .  The suitable house must also 
contain all the necessary equipments and facilities such as a kitchen, furniture 
and everything that the wife and the children require. Finally, the house must
be in a suitable place in a good neighborhood where the wife and her property
are safe^6.
-Medical expenses: it is significant in the recent Muslim family laws that 
the husband is responsible for the jnedical expenses as part of the maintenance 
of his wife and the children. Algerian law in art. 78 declares a general mle that
Mahda M., The Basic Provisions of Personal Status, (in Arabic),( Algeria, Batna: 
Dar Ach-Chihab,1986), p. 154.
72 M.
73 Layish Aharon, Women and Islamic Law in a Non-Muslim State. (New York, 
Toronto, Jerusalem: John Wiley, Israel Universities Press, 1975), p. 93.
74 Shalabi M., op. cit. p. 456.
75 Mahda M., op. cit. p. 157.
76 De Bellfonds, op. cit. p. 260; Shalabi, op. cit. p. 456; Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 100.
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the wife has the right to medical expenses from her husband without giving any 
further details. The Jordanian law of 1951 art. 65 explicitly provides that:
"(a) the fee of a midwife or doctor who is summoned for a wife’s 
confinement is the absolute responsibility of the husband, whether the 
marriage is still subsisting or not; (b) if a wife or minor child who is entitled 
to maintenance falls ill in such a way as to require a doctor or a treatment, 
then the fee of the doctor or the cost of the treatment is the responsibility of 
the husband or father, on a par with maintenance, and shall be calculated by 
reference to his circumstances, be he rich o r  p o o r "  .77
These are the main basic contents of the obligatory aliment which lies 
upon the husband towards his wife. Some legal systems add other items of 
maintenance. According to classic Islamic law if the wife is not used to serving 
for herself and her husband is affluent, he must provide her with a servant. 
Furthermore the maintenance of her servant is also upon her husband, and if 
he refuses to maintain her servant she can make a claim to the judge who can 
award a sum for her servant.78 There is consensus among Muslim jurists on 
this rule. However, they disagree about the maintenance of more than one 
servant. Some like Hanafi state that one servant is enough, whereas some 
others such as Abou-Youcef stress that he should provide two servants or more 
and their support if able to do so and if his wife is used to being served by two 
or more servants.79
Some other legal systems, such as the South African, state that the 
aliment of the wife includes also the costs of legal proceeding taken by or 
against the wife. Besides that, there are views that it is " the husband's duty to 
pay a fine imposed on his wife for a criminal offence"^; but some others 
declare that he has to pay only the small fines such as traffic offences and he is 
not liable to pay a substantial fine for serious offences^ 1.
77 Anderson N., Law Reform.... p. 144.
78 Shalabi M., op. cit. p. 457.
79 Abou-Zahra, op. cit. pp. 257-258; Shalabi, op. cit. p. 407.
80 Hahlo H., op. cit. p. 113.
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It can be concluded from all these statements of the different legal 
systems on the contents of the maintenance, that it comprises all the necessities 
for maintaining the social life and dignity of the human being. It is not limited 
to a certain standard for all families in all societies, but it varies from one 
family to another according to the living standard and the economic position of 
the family and society. It can be argued, for example, that the costs for a 
holiday at the seaside would be considered as a necessity at a certain l e v e l .  ^  2
All these contents of alimentary obligation are provided for by the 
husband regularly as long as he and his wife are living together. It may happen, 
however, that the husband fails to support his wife at a reasonable minimum 
level, and the spouses disagree about the amount of support; in this situation, it 
is the court's duty to determine the amount of aliment. For this reason, it 
would be better to examine how the court fixes the amount and what are the 
factors that the court should taken into consideration in its quantum.
B-The quantum of the aliment:
It is important to state that there is no standard by which the amount of 
aliment can be determined. This depends of the circumstances of each case and 
the economic position of both parties. As a result most of the legal systems give 
the courts a certain discretion to award aliment. Under the title "powers of 
court in action for aliment" the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 declares in S. 
3(1): " the court may, if it thinks fit, grant decree in action for aliment..." 
Nichols comments on this section by stating that "the phrase 'if it thinks fit' in 
sub.(l) serves to emphasise the discretionary nature of an award of 
a l i m e n t " .  83 The same section gives the court the right to make periodical 
payments, to award a lump sums to cover special needs, to backdate an award, 
and " to award less than the amount claimed even if the claim is undisputed".
81 Id.
8  ^Mendes J., op. cit. p. 79.
83 Nichols D. I., op. cit. p. 37-7.
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The Algerian Family Code of 1984 also gives a wide discretion to the judge in 
assessment of maintenance, as is understood*^ from art. 79 : "in the case of 
evaluation of maintenance the judge takes into account the situation of spouses 
and the conditions of life..." Under French law maintenance can be evaluated 
by agreement between the creditor and debtor, and upon the failure of this 
agreement it will be determined by the judge.^
The factors which the court is required to take into account in making an 
award vary from one case to another and from one legal system to another. In 
classic Islamic law the jurists disagree about these factors; some hold that the 
standard of living of the debtor is the determining factor, others refer to that 
of the creditor, but the majority favour taking into consideration the standard 
of both parties.*^
According to some socialist legal systems the amount of aliment is 
determined by the law. Soviet law and Romanian law, for example, fix the 
aliment for one child at a quarter of the debtor’s salary, for two children at one 
third of the salary, and for three children and more half of the s a l a r y . * ^
The French Civil Code in art. 208 takes into account the needs of the 
creditor and the resources of the debtor as factors to evaluate the amount of 
aliment.
Algerian law refers to the circumstances of both parties and the 
condition of life (art. 79).
Scots law declares that:
"in determining the amount of aliment to award in an action for aliment,
84 Saad Abdelaziz, op. cit. p. 199.
85 Weil Alex, op. cit. p. 336.
86 Saad F., op. cit. pp. 182-3; Shalabi, op. cit. p. 451 et seq.; Abou-Zahra, op. cit. p. 
254 et seq.; Shafii, op. cit. p. 77; Milliot L., Introduction a 1* Etude du Droit Musulman. 
(Paris: Recueil Sirey,1953), pp. 334-5.
87 Masilko and Vanecek, "L'Objectivation du Montant de la Pension Alimentaire des 
Enfants Mineurs dans les Etats Socialistes d' Europe", 21 Revue International de Droit 
Compare (1969) 135-143, at p. 140.
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the court shall, subject to subsection (3) below, have regard-
(a) to the needs and resources of the parties;
(b) to the earning capacities of the parties;
(c) generally to all the circumstances of the c a s e . "88
The conclusion that can be drawn from looking at all these statements of 
the different legal systems, is that the factors which shall be taken into account 
by the court in evaluating the aliment are:
- needs and resources of both parties;
- and all the circumstances of the case.
Needs of the parties comprise all that which have been discussed under 
the previous point, the content of the aliment. The needs of the party does not 
only mean what is necessary but what is reasonably required by the party. If 
the wife, for instance, needs aliment for her subsistence and at the same time 
she has the custody of the children, this will not be considered as her needs and 
consequently her own aliment will not be increased, but a separate aliment will 
be considered for the c h i l d r e n . 89 Moreover the aliment of the children shall 
cover the needs of their education and their formation.
The resources of the parties mean present and foreceeable resources.90 
If the husband who is the debtor of the aliment to his wife, has married another 
woman, the support to the second wife will be taken into account when the 
court evaluates his resources.91 However, the support of a man to another 
cohabiting woman will not be taken into consideration by the court in 
calculating his resources and awarding aliment to his wife; it is said that this is 
not a legal o b l i g a t i o n 9 2 ;  but the Family ( Scotland ) Act 1985 states in s. 4
88 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 S. 4 (1).
89 Clive E., L'Obligation Alimentaire. p. 479.
90 Macdonald, op. cit. p. 24.
91 Levasseur and Glendon, op. cit. p. 259.
92 Hope v. Hope (1956) Sh. Ct. Rep. 244; McCarrol v. Me Carrol. 1966 S.L.T. (Sh. 
Ct) 45; Hawthorne v. Hawthorne. 1966 S.L.T (Sh. Ct.) 47; McAulev v. McAulev. 1968 
S.L.T (Sh. Ct.) 81, Clive, Husband and Wife. 1982, p. 194.
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(3)(a) that the court:" may, if it thinks fit, take account of any support, 
financial or otherwise, given by the defender to any person whom he maintains 
as a dependant in his household, whether or not the defender owes an 
obligation of aliment to that person..."
In determining the amount of aliment the court shall regard not only the 
needs and resources of the parties but also other factors which differ from one 
legal system to another and from one case to another: the age and health of the 
parties, retirement pension, the contribution of the party to the family 
expenses and the conjugal services, economic standard of living of the family 
and society, the length of the marriage, conduct of the parties, voluntary 
inactivity...
Under the influence of equality between men and women, in many 
western legal systems, both husband and wife are obliged to contribute to the 
family expenses, and the voluntary inactivity of one of them will be taken into 
consideration in awarding aliment to her or him. It is stated in the case of Craig 
v. Craig that: "even now the wife is still a comparatively young woman and it 
seems to me that it is quite probable that she will obtain more remunerative 
employment than her present employment."^ In Algerian law and in Islamic 
law in general the wife is not under the duty to contribute to the family
expenses and even if she voluntarily leaves her employment, this will not be
considered as a reason to reduce her award of aliment.
It has been said that a recent trend in many legal systems such as English 
and Scottish is that the conduct of either party will not deprive him or her from 
the right to aliment. However, there are some cases and even statutes in Scots 
law and English law that allow the court to take into account, in awarding 
aliment, the conduct of the party if it is obvious and gross^. In the case of 
McKay v. McKay it is declared that: "the parties equally responsible for the 
break-up of the marriage and this must be reflected in financial
93 Craig v. Craig. 1978, S.L.T. (Notes) 62.
94 Clive E., ^Obligation Alimentaire.pp. 481, 482.
1 16
settlem ent."95 However, "in order to prevent lengthy and distasteful 
enquiries into the whole history of the parties' r e l a t i o n s h i p " ^  the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 1985 s. 4 (3)(b) prevents the court from taking into 
account "any conduct of a party unless it would be manifestly inequitable to 
leave it out of account." According to Islamic law, as already seen, the wife 
has the right of aliment during her Idda unless it is declared that she is 
disobedient.
The court has not only the right to determine the amount of maintenance 
but also, according to most legal systems, has the power to modify this amount 
if the circumstances change. Any change of the previous factors , change in the 
resources, needs, conduct or other circumstances of the case will give the 
opportunity to either party to ask the court to modify the amount by 
backdating, reducing or increasing it. The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 s. 
5(1) allows the court for such variation or modification " if since the date of 
the decree there has been a material change of circumstances." Under the same 
circumstances in Algerian law the court has the power to modify the amount
of aliment. 97
It is not clear in Scots law if the word "material change" includes or 
excludes immaterial factors such as conduct. For example, if the court has 
awarded an amount of aliment to the wife taking into account that the marriage 
has been broken by the husband's adultery and it has been subsequently 
discovered that the wife has also committed adultery, can the court then vary 
the amount taking into consideration the equal responsibility of both spouses in 
breaking up the marriage ?
In general, modification of the previous order of aliment will take place 
when there is a change in the circumstances in such a way that it would be 
unfair that the order should stand in its original form.
95 McKav v. McKav. 1978, S. L. T. (Notes) 36.
96 Nichols D .I., op. cit. p. 37-9.
97 Benmalha G.. op. cit. p. 823.
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IV- The execimtaom off the nMmeimt:
As has been said that the court has the power to modify and vary the 
amount of the aliment, it has also the right to decide the relevant form in which 
the aliment should be awarded. Generally the court prefers to award the 
aliment to the creditor in the form of periodical payments. This way of 
payment permits the court to maintain its control on the execution of the 
alimentary obligation, and makes it easy for the court to modify it if any 
change of circumstances occurs. The general execution of the alimentary 
obligation is voluntary, but if the debtor refuses to comply voluntarily, he 
should be forced to execute it by civil or penal methods of execution.
A-Voluntary execution:
The debtor of an aliment in this situation provides regularly to the 
creditor all that is reasonably needed. The husband, for instance, provides 
food, clothes, accommodation and medical treatment for his wife and children 
when they live together. In the case of living separately, he may provide these 
alimentary contents in kind, or he may provide instead, money; for example, if 
he cannot provide a house, he must give the amount of money for the rent of a 
house.
The voluntary execution of an alimentary obligation does not give rise 
to difficulties since both the debtor and the creditor agree on it. However, the 
difficulty is when the debtor refuses to fulfill his duty.
B- Execution by civil enforcement:
The creditor can ask the court’ s executor to seize the means of the 
debtor, if, after having obtained a decree from the court ordering the debtor to 
pay the alimentary amount, he refuses to do so. After collecting the means and 
selling them in the manner described by law, the creditor takes the amount due 
from the revenue of that sale. This way of recovering the aliment, besides the 
long procedure and cost, is not certain since the debtor may consume or
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conceal his means, especially his personal estate which is the object of the
execution.98
It may be for these reasons that this method is rarely used in English
law, as Bromley says: "distress is little used in practice."^ Instead another
civil method is employed by most legal systems, that is the attachment of
earnings order. The court may make this order authorising the employer of
the debtor to make on behalf of the latter any payments required to be made in
terms of a maintenance order, from the debtor's salary, wages or any other
form of remuneration or allowance. According to English law the court must
specify in its order two rates: the protected earnings rate which is allowed for
the debtor's own needs or for the needs of another person who is reasonably to
be provided^00; and the normal deducation rate "which is the amount which
the court thinks is reasonable to secure the payment of sums falling due under
the order in the future together with arrears already accrued." 101
The court must be satisfied that the debtor is able to pay and has wilfully
refused to do so. A defence may be raised if the debtor proves that failure to
pay was due to lack of means and that lack of means was not due to
unwillingness to work. For example, in one English case no payment has been
enforced because the debtor, without his own fault, was unable to earn more
than the protected earnings rate. 10^
In Scots law also arrestment of wages is subject to some statutory
restrictions. It is declared that some part of the debtor's wage should be left
for his subsistence. The Wages Arrestment Limitation (Scotland) Act 1870
exempts from arrestment part of the wages of "labourers, farm servants,
manufacturers and workpeople." 103 The Wages Arrestment Limitation
As it is declared in the Algerian Civil Procedure Code of 1966, articles 369-378.
99 Bromlev. op. cit. 1981. p. 512.
100 Brown Neville, "Attachment of Earnings Orders in Practice", 24 Modern Law 
Review (1961) 486-487.
101 Bromlev. op. cit. p. 512.
102 Brown N., op. cit. p. 487.
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(Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1966 provides that1 only half of a person's wage
above £4 per week could be a r r e s t e d . " T h e r e  are some discussions for the 
increase of this figure and about whether the whole of the husband's wages can
be arrested or not.
The main differences between English law and Scots law in the matter of
attachment of earnings have been drawn by McCreadie: "in the former the
decision whether and how much to attach is in the hands of the court; and that
the attachment order, when made, continues to operate on future payments of
wages until the debt is cleared." 106
In English law the officer of the court after collecting the money must
pay it to the wife or the person to whom the money is ordered. In Scots law
there is no collecting officer of the court, but suggestions have been made by
various reports to introduce the system of collecting aliment through court
officers. 1 ^
The distinction between the protected earnings rate and the normal 
deduction rate, which exists in English law, does not exist in Algerian law, 
neither is it clear there if the court in its order takes into account this 
distinction or not. It would be more satisfactory if Algerian law makes this 
distinction clear and orders the court to take into consideration the normal 
earnings rate which covers the reasonable needs of the debtor and the 
reasonable needs of the children, especially if these are under the custody of 
the debtor.
The court has a general power, as has been seen, in the modification of 
an aliment to order the variation or discharge of an attachment of earnings
103 Cited by Clive E., Husband and Wife, p. 204.
104 McCreadie Robert, ’’Arresting Wages", SCOLAG Bull., no. 9, March-April 1977, 
44-47, at p. 45.
105 id; Clive E.. op. cit. p. 204.
106 McCreadie Robert.op. cit. p. 47; Clive E., l'obligation alimentaire. op. cit. p. 525.
107 Bromley, o p . cit. pp. 513-514; and Clive, Husband and Wife, pp. 206-207, 
footnote no. 15, respectively.
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order; all these depend on the changed circumstances of each case.
If this civil method is insufficient to enforce the debtor to provide the 
amount of aliment that is ordered by the court a penal enforcement may then 
be used.
C- Execution by penal enforcement:
A party in whose favour a maintenance order has been granted may tell 
the court that the debtor has refused to provide the prescribed amount. There 
are available criminal sanctions, but in general their purpose is enforcement 
not punishment. The court after being satisfied and having taken into account 
all of the circumstances of the case, may commit the debtor to prison for a 
certain period. Before doing so, the court must be sure that certain reasonable 
and legal conditions are present in the case :
1 -there is a valid order of maintenance;
2- the order has come to the knowledge of the debtor;
3 -the debtor has disobeyed the order;
4- the disobedience of the order has been wilful and without a reasonable 
cause; and
5- according to Algerian law, a period of two months must have elapsed 
since the debtor disobeyed the maintenance order. 108
The period of imprisonment in general does not exceed six weeks or is 
until the payment of the sum of aliment in both English law and Scots l a w  109. 
This imprisonment of the debtor in English law and Scots law is not considered 
as a penal imprisonment but as a civil one. Neither is the failure to provide 
aliment is considered as an offence of "abandon de famille", as in Algerian law, 
except in the case of the custody of a child under the age of 16 as it is described 
by l a w . HO jn Algerian Penal Code, wilful failure of the husband to provide
108 See art. 331 of the Algerian Penal Code of 1966 as modified and completed by the 
Ordonnances 69-74, 73-48, 75-47, 78-03, 82-04.
109 Bromley, op. cit. p. 514; the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s. 76(2)(3),93(7); Clive, 
Husband and Wife, p. 205; the Imprisonment (Scotland) Act 1882, s. 4.
110 See Clive, L'Obligation Alimentaire. p.528.
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aliment for his wife for a period of two months after the court alimentary 
order, is a penal offence. Under the title "abandon de famille" article 331 lays 
down a punishment of imprisonment from six months to three years and a fine 
from 500 to 5000 D.A., for any person who has wilfully refused for two 
months to pay the sums of aliment for which a decree has been pronounced 
against him to his wife, to his ascendents or to his descendants. —
There are some criticisms of the system of enforcement of aliment by 
imprisonment. On the one hand the imprisonment of the debtor may be 
effective in some cases as it is stated in the Morris’s sample that 28. 6 per cent 
of the prisoners said that they intended to pay maintenance in the future, 
compared with 21 per cent who said no .!!! On the other hand, it is declared 
that " quite apart from the space they take up in overcrowded prisons, and the 
inordinate time they occupy in being processed in and out for very short 
periods, they are a heavy burden on the taxpayer who has to keep both the man 
in prison and his family outside."!!2 por these and other reasons many 
objections have been raised against civil imprisonment.! !3
D- Dissolution of marriage by failure to provide maintenance:
According to Islamic law the wife has the right to divorce if the husband 
fails to provide her with aliment. This is the view of the majority of Muslim 
jurists except the Hanafi school.! ^  The jurists who support the wife’s right to 
aliment, disagree on the distinction made between two situations:
1- When the husband wilfully fails to provide inspite of the fact that he 
has the means, the Hanbali jurists authorise the judge to pronounce divorce,
H I Morris Pauline, Prisoners and their Families. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 
242.
112 Ibid, p. 246.
11  ^ See McCregor et al., Separated Spouses. (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1970), pp. 
200-207; the Report of the Committee on One Parent Families, 1974, cmnd 5629, paras. 
4.162- 4.172.
1*4 Shalabi M., op. cit. pp. 460-461.
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whereas the Maliki jurists give the judge a discretion to allow the husband a 
chance to pay for a certain period before pronouncing divorce.
2- In the case when the husband fails to provide because of lack of 
means, the Shafii and Hanbali jurists allow the wife to divorce, and though the 
Maliki jurists agree, they distinguish in the case where she knew the indigence
of her husband before the marriage.*
Most of the recent Muslim family laws have adopted the view of the 
majority of Muslim jurists, even in countries where the Hanafi school prevails, 
and rejected the Hanafi view.! 1^
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 adopts the Maliki view by 
granting the wife the right to divorce in article 53/1 in the case of "default of 
payment of maintenance pronounced by a judgment, unless the wife knew the 
indigency of her husband at the time of the marriage."! ^  "
Conclusion:
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the main 
difference between western legal systems and Muslim family laws lies in the 
fact that there is a recent trend among the former to establish a reciprocal duty 
between the spouses to maintain each other, and abolish the unilateral duty of 
the husband to maintain his wife.!!^ Whereas the recent Muslim family laws 
still adopt the classic rule which leaves the alimentary obligation on the 
husband.
It is also significant that western systems such as the English and the
115 De Bellefonds L., op. cit. pp. 282-283; Bencheikh H., La Condition Juridique de la 
Femme Mariee au Maghreb, thesis, Rennes, 1982, pp. 312-313.
116 Ibid. pp. 283-284; and pp. 313-314, respectively.
117 See default of maintenance as a ground of divorce in section one, chapter four.
H8 Labrusse-Riou C., "Securite d1 Existence et Solidarite Familiale en Droit Prive: 
Etude Comparative du Droit des Pays Europeens Continentaux", 38 Revue International de 
Droit Compare (1986) 829-865, at p. 845.
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Scottish try to narrow the subjects of alimentary obligation to one between the 
spouses and their children; and this reflects the nuclear character of the 
modem western family. Muslim laws, as has been seen, enlarge this obligation 
to encompass not only parents and children but all collateral relatives up to the 
prohibited degree of relationship in some laws, and to the degree of 
inheritance in others; and this reflects the extended character of the Muslim 
family.
It would be more satisfactory if Algerian law extends the right to 
aliment to encompass the widow during her Idda, and also to the woman whose 




I- The legal toackgr^ iuiM:
In most societies when people marry some means or properties pass 
from one side to the other. These properties are referred to as the bride-price, 
bride-wealth, dower, marriage gift or dowry according to custom.
In Islamic law this is called "Mahr" or "Sadaq" which means a sum of 
money or any valued property which should be paid by a husband to his wife.
"According to the customary law prevailing before Islam, marriage was 
the sale of a woman in return for whom her father or guardian received a 
dower. Mohammad changed the wife from a mere object of sale into a party to 
the marriage contract, enabled her to own property and prescribed that dower 
should be given to h e r . . ."119 in pre-Islamic times "Mahr" meant a sum of 
money or property paid by the husband to the father or nearest kinsman of the 
119 Layish Aharon, op. cit. p.40.
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woman he wished to marry, and the "sadaq" meant a sum paid by the husband 
to the woman herself. When Islam came both terms were changed to mean one
and the same thing and were to be paid to the wife only. *20
Some writers!21 translate "Mahr" as dowry but this may not be an 
appropriate term for the "Mahr", since the majority of writers, Muslim and 
western,refer to it as "dower", and because dowry means the bride-price and 
"contrary to a widely held misconception in the west, dower is not a bride-
price" 122
The Pakistan Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act 1976 defines the 
dowry and bridal gift as follows:
"(a) 'Bridal gift1 means any property given as a gift before, at or 
after the marriage either directly or indirectly, by the bridegroom or his 
parents to the bride in connection with the marriage but does not include 
Mahr (dower);
(b) 'dowry' means any property given before, at or after the 
marriage, either directly or indirectly, to the bride by her parents in 
connection with the marriage but it does not include property which the 
bride may inherent under the laws of inheritance and succession applicable 
to her."123
Esposito affirms that "dowry although not rooted in Islamic law, is a 
firmly established custom" whereas dower (Mahr) is one of the important 
institutions in Islamic law, and it is an obligation imposed by the law upon the 
husband as a mark of respect for the wife. It consists of a sum of money or 
other property,or services provided by the husband to his wife on the occasion 
of the marriage.
120 §ee Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam. (Cambridge: Cambridge U. 
Press,1957), p. 95.
121 Maudoodi Abu. A'Ala, The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Islam. (Translated by 
Fazl-Ahmed), (Kuwait: Islamic Book Publishers, 1983), p. 35.
122 Nasir Jamal, op. cit.p. 78.
123 As cited by Hodkinson Keith, Muslim Family Law. (London & Canberra: Croom 
Helm,1984), pp. 139-140.
124 Esposito.J.L, op. cit. p. 87.
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Dower has its origin in the Holy Quran, Prophetic tradition and modem 
legislation. The holy Quran says: "hand over to the women their dowers 
f r e e l y .  "125 There are many Prophetic traditions in which the Prophet stresses 
that women should be given their dowers in marriage. 126
Most of the modem Muslim laws adopt the classic view of dower. The 
Moroccan Personnel Status defines the dower in Art 16 as: "property given by 
the husband to indicate his willingness to contract marriage, to establish a 
family and to lay the foundations for affection and companionship."
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 defines the dower as: "whatever 
is given to the future wife, money or any other property which is lawful. It is 
her own property and she disposes it freely."
Some western jurists, especially during the French colonisation in 
Algeria, regarded the dower as a sale price for womenl27? and this lead to 
inaccurate and misleading ideas and the confusing of Islamic institutions with 
usages of people.
In fact the purpose of dower in the marriage contract is as one of the 
Hanafi jurists said: "to underline the prestige of the marriage contract and to 
stress its importance..."*28 Besides that, it is a kind of a matrimonial 
recompense, it is not only a guarantee for marriage stability and limitation of 
familial desertion, but it fulfills also a social and matrimonial aim by 
contributing to the initial needs of establishing the new family and providing a
divorced wife with a reasonable standard of life. *29
All the above stress that there is an obligation upon the husband to pay a 
dower to his wife. According to Islamic law this should be specified in the 
marriage contract. If not, the equivalent dower should be paid to the wife after 
the consummation of the marriage.
The classic Muslim jurists disagree on whether the dower is a pre-
1^5 Sura iv, verse 5, and also verses 20, 24, 25.
126 Al-Bukhari, op. cit. pp. 58-61.
127 See Belhadj Larbi. op. cit. P. 78.
128 Nasir.J, op. cit. p. 78.
129 Belhadj.L, op. cit. p. 653.
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requisite for the validity of marriage or an effect of marriage, so that the 
marriage is valid even if the parties agree that no dower shall be paid or even 
when no agreement is reached. The Maliki view is that the dower is an 
essential condition for the validity of a marriage contract, therefore, the 
marriage will be declared null before the consummation if no dower is 
mentioned, and if the marriage is consummated, the equivalent dower should 
be paid to the wife. 130 The Hanafi, Hanbali and Shafii are of the view that the 
dower does not constitute a condition for the marriage contract, but is a mere 
effect. Nevertheless, this distinction has no great importance since the jurists 
agree that if no dower has been mentioned in the marriage contract, the 
equivalent dower should be paid, and any condition introduced by the parties 
to release the husband from paying the dower shall be void and the marriage 
contract remains valid. 1^1
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 adopts the Maliki view, and 
declares in Art 9 under the title "conditions of marriage", that the marriage 
contract shall be concluded with the consent of the two spouses, in the presence 
of the wife's guardian and two witnesses, and on an agreed dower. Article 33 
states that if the marriage is contracted without the presence of a matrimonial 
guardian, two witnesses or a dower, it will be declared null before the 
consummation and gives no right to dower. After the consummation the 
marriage will be confirmed with the right to an equivalent dower if one of its 
conditions have been vitiated.
Moroccan law states clearly in its Art 5/2 that a dower to the wife must 
be specified and any agreement to waive it is prohibited.
130 Ibn-Ruchd, op. cit. p. 11.
131 See further detail on this point in Belhadje L., these, op. cit. p. 645 et seq.; Abou- 
Zahra. op. cit. p. 178 et seq.; Filali Abdel-Aziz, Condition Juridique de la Femme dans le 
Mariage au Maroc. thesis, Crenoble, 1951, p. 34 et seq.
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HI- Tk<e ©Tbjsctt of D o w e r :
A- The quality of dower:
According to Islamic law the dower may consist of anything that can be 
valued in money. It may be a real or personal property. It is usually paid in 
money. In the countryside it may take the form of a plot of land, an olive 
grove, or a vegetable garden, a house or livestock. Sometimes the wife or her 
guardian inserts in the marriage contract stipulations to the effect that the 
husband must give her various household articles, such as furniture and 
bedding or jewelery and ornaments, a room of a house, livestock and the like.
The object of dower must be valued and lawful. Algerian law declares in 
article 14 that the dower may be money or any other goods or objects that are 
lawful. Moroccan law states in article 17 that "anything that can be lawfully an 
object of an obligation is a valid dower". For instance,the giving of wine and 
pigs are prohibited by Islamic law. What is the state of a marriage in which 
these prohibited things have been given as the dower?
According to the Hanafi view the marriage is valid and the equivalent 
dower must be given to the wife instead of the prohibited things if the parties 
disagree about any lawful thing to be given as a dower.132
If the object presented as the dower is stolen, the Maliki view
distinguishes between two situations : 133
(i) if both parties know that the object is unlawful, the marriage contract 
will be declared null before the consummation; but after the consummation it 
will be valid and the husband must give an equivalent dower.
(ii) if the wife is ignorant of the unlawful dower, the marriage will be 
valid both before and after consummation, and she has the right to an 
equivalent dower.
The dower may also consist of services performed by the husband to the 
wife. This statement has its origin in the story of "Shoiib" who married one of
132. Shalabi.M, op. cit. P. 373.
133 Belhadj Larbi, thesis, op. cit. p. 658.
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his daughters to Moses on the condition that he serve him for eight years (the 
Holy Quran, xxvii, 27), and also in the Prophetic tradition that a woman may 
marry a man for what he knows of the Q u r a n .  134
However, nowadays the object of the dower is generally material such as 
money, gold or clothes, and it is usually paid in money.
B-The quantity of dower:
The amount of dower is subject to agreement between the husband and 
the wife. In general, it is fixed by them on the basis of their position and the 
living standard of society.
Most of the classic Muslim jurists insist that there is no maximum limit 
to the dower which the husband may provide to his wife. In the Shii law there 
is also no maximum dower if the amount is to be specified in the marriage 
contract. But if the dower is not specified in the marriage contract, the 
equivalent dower should not exceed five hundreds d i r h e m s .  135
The classic jurists disagree on the minimum dower. While the Shafii 
jurists know of no minimum dower, the Maliki set a legal minimum at three 
dirhems, and the Hanafi at ten dirhems which equalled two shillings, and six 
shillings and eight pence respectively as Vesey said. 136
The importance of these limits is that if the dower is fixed at less than the 
minimum limit it will be null and the equivalent dower must be paid to the 
wife.
Many jurists prefer a smaller dower based on the assumption that the 
dowers given by the prophet to his wives and that stipulated for his daughters 
were all of them small. On the other hand there are sentiments in some 
countries in favour of a high dower, since the dower given to the grand­
daughter of Abu Bakr, the great companion of the prophet, is said to have been
134 Al-Bukhari. o p . cit.Vol.7. Chapter 51, p. 59.
135 See,Mahmood Tahir, Muslim Personal Law. Role of the State in the Subcontinent. 
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977), p. 72.
136 gee, v e s e y  Fitzgerald S., op. cit. p. 63.
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half a million dirhems. * 37 The amount of the dower was always on the 
increase even in the earlier Muslim society. When Umar, the second Caliph 
tried to limit excessive dowers, a woman stood up and stopped him by quoting 
one of the Quranic verses as evidence of her argument:
"If you desire to take a wife in place of another and you have given 
one of them a treasure, take not back aught therefrom. Will you take it by 
calumny and manifest sin ? How can you take it when you have consorted 
together and they have taken from you a strong convenant ?"(iv, 20,21).
The Caliph then said to the people that the woman was correct and he 
was mistaken. This statement strengthened the sentiment in favour of no 
maximum limit to the dower.
Most of the recent Muslim family laws adopt the classic rules of no 
maximum limit to dower. There is no explicit rule in Algerian law which 
shows the maximum or the minimum limits of dower which is derived from 
the Maliki school that prevails in the North African countries. For example, 
Moroccan law in its art 17 declares explicitly that: "the dower comprises 
neither a minimum nor a maximum limit." The same rule is stated by 
Tunisian law in art 12: "the dower should not be insignificant. It does not 
comprise a legal maximum."
In fact the amount of dower depends on the respective conditions of the 
spouses, particularly the financial circumstances of the husband. It varies from 
one region to another according to social classes and the economic position of 
societies.
Some writers hold that the majority of people in the North African 
countries, especially in the cities, do not give any importance, nowadays, to the 
dower, but in order to respect Islamic law, they enclose in the marriage 
contract a symbolic a m o u n t . I t  may be so in some regions, but the reality is 
that both in cities and the countryside the amount always increases by the
137 Id.
*38 Ghariani, Moulay Rachid, Bousser and others cited by Belhadj L., thesis, op. cit. p. 
6 6 9 .
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intention of the families who play a great role in negotiating and determing the 
amount of the d o w e r .^  jn Algeria for example, some cities such as Tlemcen 
and Constantine are renown for the high amounts of the dower given in 
marriages. The amount of dower is still on the increase at present in the Arab 
and Islamic societies.
Some problems arise owing to the increasing of the dower. The National 
Union of Algerian W o m e n *  41 has criticized this increase by stating that the 
abuse of this situation has made the woman a chattel. Moreover, the dower in 
its present form constitutes an obstacle in marriage for men who want to 
establish a family and who have a lower income. For these reasons the 
National Union of Algerian Women has recommended that the amount of 
dower should not exceed 500 Dinars.
Besides these criticisms of the increasing dower, it is necessary to draw 
attention to a further important one. Dower is an obstacle or limitation on 
choice of partner in marriage, since families, as already seen, in most cases 
interfere in negotiating and deciding the amount of the dower. To accept less 
than the amount asked by a family for their daughter would bring a certain 
shame to that family and for this reason in many cases the family gives the 
daughter to the man who can afford more.
However, it is worthwhile to stress that the spirit of Islamic law in 
establishing the institution of dower is not to be a weapon in the hands of the 
family to increase it by looking for the man who can afford more; this is totally 
contrary to what Islam wants from this institution. Most Muslim jurists 
prefer, as did the Prophet, the marriage whose dower is lower.
139 Fluehr-Lobban. op. cit. p. 110.
*40 s ee Kamal Masora, The Problem of Divorce In Algerian Society (in Arabic), 
(Algeria: O.P.U.,1986) pp. 130; Good William, op. cit, p. 96;Fluehr-Lobban, op. cit. p. 
110.
141 See Allag, "La Famille et le Droit en Alerie dans le Contexte Maghrebin, 
Communication de lf UNFA a propos du code de la famille", 11 Revue Algerienne des 
Sciences Juridiques Economiques et Politiques (1974) 157-160, at pp. 158-9.
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C-The classification of dower:
According to Islamic law it is left to the parties to specify the amount of 
dower (specified dower). If the dower is not specified in the marriage contract 
the equivalent or proper dower should be paid after the consummation if no 
agreement between the parties has been reached. The dower may also be paid 
in full and at once during the marriage contract (prompt dower), or later after 
the marriage (deferred dower). To clarify these types of dower, it is better to 
look at them under two headings:
1 -Specified and equivalent dower.
2- Prompt and deferred dower.
1-The specified and the equivalent dower:
Dower is usually fixed at the time of marriage by an agreement between 
the spouses. Where the dower has not been fixed, an agreement may be reached 
later after the marriage. If the object of the dower is not money, it is necessary 
that the object given as a dower must be sufficiently determined. 142 Islamic 
law also permits the specification of the dower by a person other than the 
spouses with the condition that this person is chosen by the common accord of
both spouses. 143
According to the Maliki view the specified dower is the original dower 
and the equivalent dower is given only when there is no specified dower. 
Whereas the Hanafi view is to the contrary: the equivalent dower is the original 
dower which must be given to the woman since it reflects the circumstances of 
the woman and her family.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 in article 15 adopts the Maliki 
view by declaring that the dower must be specified in the marriage contract. 
Moroccan law also states in Art 5 that" fixing a dower in the profit of the wife
142 See Ibn-Qudama, op. cit.vol.6. p. 691, De Bellefonds, op. cit. p. 208.
143 Belhadj L., these, op. cit. p. 685.
is necessary".
The specified dower may be increased or decreased under certain 
conditions. Muslim jurists allow the husband to increase the dower on the 
authority of the Holy Quran (iv, 24), so he is allowed to add whatever he wants 
to his wife's dower. This addition will be the right of his wife, and she can 
claim it with the basic dower if the following conditions are present:
1-The addition must be definite; if the husband for instance says "to his 
wife 'I have added to your dower', without further specification no addition
shall be valid." 144
2-The addition must occur while the marriage still subsists;no addition 
can be claimed after divorce.
3-This addition must be accepted by the wife or her guardian, if she 
lacks the legal capacity to accept.
On the other hand, the wife has full legal capacity to discharge her 
husband of all or any part of her specified dower. This discharge is valid if it is 
after the marriage contract and accepted by the husband. Unlike the increase of 
dower in which the father, grandfather or guardian of the husband, if he lacks 
capacity, can add to the specified dower; nobody except the wife has the power
to reduce her specified dower. 145
It is worthwhile to draw a distinction between the pre-nuptial agreement 
between the spouses to release the husband from his obligation to provide a 
dower to his wife and the discharge of all or part of the dower which can be 
made only by the wife after the marriage contract. The former agreement is 
void according to Islamic law, whereas the second is valid since the wife by her 
free consent releases her husband from it; and this discharge in this context is 
equivalent to a gift since the wife is the owner of the dower and she can do with 
it whatever she likes.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 has no rule on the increase and 
reduction of the specified dower. Therefore, the general rules of Islamic law
144 Nasir J., op. cit. p. 82.
145 Ibid, pp. 82-83.
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should be applied in this matter. These general rules are included in Jordanian 
law Art 63 :" The husband may increase the dower after the contract and the 
wife may reduce it provided that they possess full legal capacity of disposition. 
This shall be attached to the original contract if it is accepted by the other party 
at the sitting where the increase or reduction has been offered".
To prevent duress which may make either spouse accept any increase or 
discharge of the specified dower during marital life, the Syrian law of 1975 
states: "No increase or reduction of the dower nor any discharge thereof 
during the state of matrimony or Idda or divorce shall be considered, and it 
shall be deemed void unless it is made before the judge. Any such disposition 
made before the judge shall be attached to the original contract if it is accepted 
by the other party."
In the case where there is no specified dower, the equivalent dower must 
be given to the wife. If the dower is omitted, irregular or if there is an invalid 
condition in the marriage contract that no dower should be paid, then the 
equivalent dower must be paid. This kind of dower should be equivalent to the 
dower paid to a woman of a similar social status to that of the wife. This is 
usually one of the other female members of the wife's family, such as paternal 
females: her sisters or her paternal aunts who are considered to be her equal.
Most Muslim jurists agree that if there is no female equal to the wife 
among her agnate relations, the equal woman is a woman belonging to a family 
equivalent to her father's family and not to her mother's family.
Only the Shafii jurists stress that "in the absence of an agnate, the equal 
shall be a consanguine relative, otherwise the nearest woman in terms of age, 
education, wealth, beauty, pedigree and virginity or previous marriage."*46
The main cases where the equivalent dower should be paid are: *47
1- Where there is no specified dower; for instance if the marriage has 
taken place without any dower.
2- If there is a pre-nuptial agreement between the spouses to contract a
*46 Shafii, op. cit. Vol.5, p. 64 as cited by Nasir J., op. cit. P. 82. See also Fyzee A., 
op. cit. p. 116; Vesey F., op. cit. p. 66.
147 See Shalabi M., op. cit. pp. 372-373.
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marriage without any dower; this condition is void and the marriage is valid 
with equivalent dower.
3- If the specified dower is invalid; for example, if its object is unlawful.
4- If there is a disagreement between the spouses about the specified 
dower and neither of them can prove what he or she alleges. This is when the 
wife alleges more than the equivalent dower or the husband alleges less than it.
However, if the wife alleges less than the equivalent dower, the court 
should decide what she alleges and what the husband alleges if it is more than 
the equivalent dower.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 does not contain any details 
about the equivalent dower, except for a general rule in article 33 to the effect 
that if the marriage is contracted without a matrimonial guardian, two 
witnesses and a dower, it will be declared null before consummation without 
any dower, it will be validated after consummation with the payment of the 
equivalent dower in case of the defect of one of its conditions, it will be 
declared null if more then one condition is absent.
2-The prompt and deferred dower:
The dower is usually divided into two parts: prompt and deferred. The 
prompt dower is always payable on the occasion of the marriage contract, 
sometimes during the engagement, or in some cases immediately after the 
marriage.Whereas the deferred dower is always payable later after the 
marriage on a date agreed upon, or after the dissolution of the marriage by 
divorce or death, or when a specified event occurs.
Most of the Muslim family laws allow the dower to be paid as prompt or
deferred-^
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 declares in Art 15 that: "the 
dower must be determined in the marriage contract, whether it is prompt or 
deferred".
^  Syrian law Art. 55; Jordanian law art. 45; Iraqi law art. 20, Moroccan law art. 20.
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The general rule is that the dower shall be paid prompt as soon as the 
marriage has been consummated,except in the case where the spouses agree on 
a date upon which it will be paid. If no agreement has been reached then the 
prevailing custom should be followed, since in Islamic law "a matter 
recognised by custom is regarded as though it was a contractual
obligation." 149
If the spouses fix a date upon which the deferred dower will be paid, the 
wife is not entitled to claim it before the agreed date even in the event of 
divorce. However, this date will be disregarded in the event of the husband's 
death.(Jordanian law Art 46). Moreover, Jordanian law requires that the 
agreement to defer the whole dower or part of it must be recorded in writing. 
Upon the failure of this, the whole dower must be deemed prompt.
Under Islamic law the wife has the right to refuse any conjugal duty 
until her prompt dower has been paid to her. Refusal to have sexual 
intercourse or any conjugal duty under this circumstance does not constitute 
disobedience. Furthermore, the husband remains under the duty to continue to 
provide her with maintenance. This is the view of most of the Muslim jurists 
before the consummation of the marriage. However, a disagreement arises 
where the marriage has been consummated. Does the wife have the right to 
refuse any sexual intercourse until her prompt dower is paid?
Abu Hanifa declares that the wife has always the right to refuse until her 
prompt dower is paid. Whereas Abu Yusuf and Shaybani argue that if she 
accepts the consummation of marriage she has no right to refuse sexual 
intercourse, and if she refuses sexual intercourse she would be considered 
disobedient and consequently she would lose her right to maintenance.^^ The 
first view is adopted in the Indian case of Anis Begum v.Muhammad. where it 
was said:
"I do not find any principle of justice or reason by which the right of 
149 Nasir J.. op. cit. P. 81.
1^9 This is also the view of the Maliki and the Shafii jurists, see Shalabi M., op. cit. pp. 
387-388.
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the wife to refuse the performance of marital obligations on account of non­
payment of prompt dower may come to an end by her once surrendering 
herself. I would hold that even after consummation the wife retains the right 
to refuse the performance of marital obligations till the prompt dower is 
paid."151
The second view is adopted in another case where the husband brought 
an action for restitution of conjugal rights and the wife defended it on the 
ground that the husband had been guilty of cruelty and had not paid the prompt 
dower. On appeal the judge said:
"To allow to the wife the right of refusing to live with her husband, 
even after consummation, so long as any part of the prompt dower remains 
unpaid would, in many cases, where the husband and wife quarrel,amount 
to an absolute option to the wife to refuse to live with her husband and yet 
demand a maintenance allowance. This would dislocate domestic life."*52 
The husband owes a debt to the wife whose dower has not been paid. 
This could be especially important in the case of the deferred part. In the event 
of his death, she is entitled to retain possession of her husband's estate until the 
debt is paid. However, this right does not make her the owner of this property, 
but it puts her in the same situation as other creditors of the estate. This view 
has been adopted in an Indian case where the widow assumed that the property 
of her husband had been gifted to her and she was entitled to remain in 
possession of it until the dower has been paid, and then she transferred the 
possession of the property to a third party. The juridical Committee of the 
Privy Council, before which the case was heard, advised that: "although the 
widow had a right to remain in possession of her former husband's property 
until the dower debt had been paid, she had no absolute right in the
property. "1^3
It is important to stress that the dower is only an unsecured debt, but the 
wife can ask her husband to lawfully secure her during his lifetime by a
*51 See Anis Begum v.Muhammad as cited by Pearl D., op. cit. p. 68.
152 peari pp. cit. p. 67.
153 Ibid, p. 66.
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mortgage or other charge on specific property.
III-TIh® wife’s ejnttMemeiM to A© dtowor:
It has already been seen that the dower is an exclusive right of the wife. 
She is entitled to it as soon as the marriage has been contracted.
However, according to Islamic law, due to some circumstances the wife 
may be entitled to the whole dower, to half of it, or she may have no dower at 
all. The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 states in article 16 that: "the wife 
is entitled to the whole dower in the event of the consummation of the marriage 
and the death of the husband. She is entitled to half of it in the event of divorce 
before consummation."
The loss by the wife of the whole dower is encountered in a few cases 
which are rare in practice; and maybe for this reason Algerian law in the above 
article has not mentioned this kind of loss. The loss of the whole dower occurs 
where the marriage has been dissolved by an act by the wife, or where it has 
been dissolved by the husband before consummation through exercising his 
option of puberty or recovery from insanity.
The above are the main circumstances of loss of the whole dower. 
Moroccan law adds yet another circumstance in which the wife is deprived of 
the whole dower: it is where the marriage contract is annulled before 
consummation, by the husband on grounds of defect of the wife or by the wife 
on the grounds of the husband's defect.
Since the loss by the wife of the whole dower is rare in practice, it is 
better to discuss the other two cases.
A- The wife's entitlement to the whole dower.
B- The wife's entitlement to half of the dower.
A- The wife’s entitlement to the whole dower:
According to Islamic law the wife is entitled to the whole dower in two 
circumstances:
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1- The actual consummation of marriage.
2- The death of either spouse.
Muslim jurists agree on these two circumstances. If the wife dies before 
her husband her dower will be shared by her heirs including her husband. 
According to the Hanafi view, the wife is entitled to the whole dower even if 
she kills her husband. Whereas, the Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali jurists argue 
that the wife who kills her husband before consummation should not have the 
right to any dower. Their argument is based on an analogy with the right to 
inheritance: since the killer is deprived of the inheritance, so must she be also 
deprived of her right to dower. The Hanafi view is based on the idea that the 
crime of killing her husband has a separate sanction, and depriving her of her 
right to dower is an additional sanction which is not stated by Islamic law. 154
In the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 16 the second 
circumstance has been altered to read "the death of the husband."
Since all jurists agree that the wife is entitled to the whole dower in the 
event of the death of her husband or her own death, it is not clear why the 
Algerian Family Law Code in the above article 16 refers only to "the death of 
the husband". Does this mean that she is not or her heirs are not entitled to the 
whole of the dower? It may be that Algerian Family Law has taken into 
account the general rule of the Civil Code that in the event of her death her 
estate is shared between her heirs including her husband. This is the fact, but 
Family Law should also state how much the wife is entitled to in the event of 
her death. Therefore, it would be better if article 16 read as: "the wife is 
entitled to the whole dower in the event of the consummation of the marriage 
and of the death of either spouse."
To these two circumstances in which the wife is entitled to the whole 
dower, the Hanafi jurists add a third, Khalwat (valid retirement) which mean 
in general "Period or privacy as between members of the opposite s e x . "  155
154 s ee Shalabi M., op. cit. pp. 392-393; Saad.F. op. cit. p. 105.
155 Pearl P.. op. cit. P. 273, appendix iv.
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But in this context it means that the husband and the wife were together in a 
private place, and the circumstances of their meeting were such that there was 
no possible impediment to the performance of the sexual act. According to the 
Hanafi view this valid retirement is treated as equivalent to the consummation 
of marriage in creating many of the effects of the valid marriage: 1^6
1-Establishment of parentage.
2-Establishment of the wife's right to all kind of maintenance.
3- Establishment of temporary prohibited degree.
4- The wife must observe the Idda after separation.
In spite of these similarities between valid retirement and consummation 
of marriage, there are some differences between them:
1- Valid retirement does not establish a prohibited degree between the 
husband and any descendent of the wife as it appears from the Holy Quran iv, 
24: "forbidden to you (for marriage) are: your mother... your step-daughters 
under your guadianship, bom of your wives with whom you have consorted, 
but if you have consorted not with them, it will be no sin upon you..." Whereas 
it is clear that the consummation of marriage establishes the prohibited degree 
between the husband and any descendant of the wife.
2- After valid retirement, divorce can be only irrevocable, but after the 
consummation of marriage, it can be revocable or irrevocable.
3- There will be no mutual inheritance between the spouses who are 
separated after valid retirement if either dies during the Idda. Whereas, there 
will be mutual inheritance between them if a revocable divorce occurs after the 
consummation and either of them dies during the Idda.
4- The man who has divorced his wife three times, is permitted to 
remarry her if there was a real consummation between her and her second 
husband, from whom she is later lawfully separated through divorce or death. 
By contrast, valid retirement between her and her second husband "shall not be
gee Nasir J.. pp. cit. p. 86; Saad F., op. cit. pp. 104-105.
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enough to make it lawful for her after separation to remarry her first
husband." 157
B-The wife's entitlement to half of the dower:
All Muslim jurists agree that the wife is entitled only to half of the 
dower if the marriage is dissolved by the husband before consummation. The 
origin of this statement is verse 238 of sura ii of the Holy Quran: "If you 
divorce them before you have touched them, but you have fixed a dower for 
them, then make over to them half of that which you have fixed..." From this 
text, the jurists deduce four conditions in order to entitle the wife to half of the
dower: 158
1-that the marriage contract must be valid;
2- that the dower must be specified in the marriage contract;
3- that the marriage is dissolved by an act of the husband;
4- that the dissolution occurs before the consummation.
Similar to the above verse article 16 of the Algerian Family Law Code 
of 1984 declares that the wife is entitled to half of the dower in the event of 
divorce before consummation.
In the case where no dower has been specified in the marriage contract, 
the wife is entitled to the Mutfa.l59 instead of half of the dower if she is 
divorced by her husband before the consummation. This statement is based on 
verse 236 of sura ii of the Holy Quran:
"It will be no sin for you, if need arises, to divorce women whom
you have not even touched, or for whom no definite dower has been fixed.
In such case, make provision for them - the rich man according to his means
and the poor man according to his means - a provision in a becoming
157 Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 87.
*58 Shalabi M., op. cit. p. 407; Nasir. op. cit. p. 87.




According to the Maliki view the husband is not under an obligation to 
provide Mut'a in this case, he can refuse to pay it, but it is better if he provides 
it. Whereas the majority of jurists hold that this is an obligation and he should 
provide it. 160
In evaluating the amount of the Mut’a jurists disagree on which factors 
should be taken into consideration. Some regard the circumstances of the 
husband because it is he who is responsible to provide the Mut'a. Others stress 
that it is the wife's circumstances, since the Mut'a is provided instead of the 
equivalent dower and the equivalent dower is definitely evaluated according to 
the wife’s circumstances. However, many jurists agree that the circumstances 
of both the husband and the wife must be taken into account. 161
There is no article in the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 about the 
Mut'a, but according to its article 222 where there is no rule in this Code, the 
Sharia principles should be applied. Therefore, if he divorces her before the 
consummation the husband must provide his wife with her Mut'a which is 
equal approximately to half of the equivalent dower. One Algerian jurist,
Saadi62 , mentions two Algerian judgments related to Mut'a, both judgments 
being given in 1983. The amount of each Mut'a in these cases was 10.000 AD, 
and Saad says that this amount is half of the equivalent dower which had not 
exceeded the amount of 20.000 AD at that time.
IV- Baspuaites mm  tihe dower:
To avoid any problems that may arise between the spouses about the 
amount and the payment of the dower, many recent Muslim family laws, 
'including Algerian, require the dower to be specified in the marriage contract.
In spite of this requirement, disputes may arise between the spouses over
*60 Abou-Zahra, op. cit. p. 211.
161 Ibid, P. 211-212.
162 Saad F.. op. cit. p. 98.
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the stipulation of the dower, over the amount, or over the receipt of the dower.
A- Disputes over the stipulations of the dower:
If the spouses disagree about the stipulations of the dower in a way that 
one of the spouses claims that the dower is specified in the marriage contract 
and the other spouse denies that specification, the solution according to Islamic 
law is that the judge should order the specified amount to be paid, if the 
claimant proves it with evidence. If no evidence has been found the judge 
treats the marriage as without a specified dower and consequently he orders 
the equivalent dower to be paid. 163 This solution is the same whether during 
the lifetime of the spouses or after the death of either of them.
It must be stressed that the equivalent dower ordered by the judge should 
not exceed the specified amount claimed by the wife and not be less than that 
claimed by the husband.
These rules apply in the case where the wife is entitled to the whole 
dower. However, if the disputes arise where the wife is entitled to half of it, 
the judge should order half of the specified dower if it is proved by the 
claimant. Upon failure to prove stipulation the judge would order Mut'a. 164
B-Disputes over the amount of the dower:
It may happen that the spouses differ on the amount of the dower. The 
wife claims a higher amount and the husband a lower one. The judge, in this 
case will order the amount claimed by the person who provides evidence. In 
the absence of this evidence, the other party should have to take an oath; then 
the judge orders the equivalent dower, if the amount claimed by the husband is 
less than it.
If the specified amount of the dower is less than the minimum required
*63 Abou-Zahra. op. cit. p. 231.
164 s ee Nasir, op. cit. P. 91.
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dower, one of the Hanafi jurists Zuffer considers this specification null and 
treats the marriage as if it were contracted without specified dower and 
consequently the equivalent dower should be provided. Whereas the majority 
of the Hanafi jurists regard that specification as valid, and the inferior dower 
should be increased to the minimum required d o w e r .  165
In the case where the spouses die and the disputes arise between their 
heirs, most jurists state that the heirs of the wife have the right to the equivalent 
dower from the husband's estate; the same as if the spouses were still alive.
Abu Hanifa prefers not to give them the equivalent dower after the 
wife’s death. In one Sudanese e a s e l 66 the amount of dower that had been 
agreed upon between the husband and the wife's father was 51 Sudanese 
pounds (£S), but they had requested the person who performed the marriage 
contract to announce that the dower was £S60 (£S30 prompt, £S30 deferred). 
What made the father agree on a simulated dower was to save him from saying 
that he married his daughter without an adequate dower. This kind of 
stipulation about two dowers: the lower one which is private, agreed upon to 
be paid, and the higher one, public, only to convince people that this woman or 
daughter has been married for a higher dower, creats disputes between the 
spouses and their families as has been seen from the above case. To avoid this 
Jordanian law states that: "no suit in respect of a dispute between the spouses 
over the dower of the contract shall be heard if it differs from the recognized 
contract document, unless written proof is available of their agreement at the 
time of marriage on a dower other than stated in the document." 167
C- Disputes over the payment of the dower:
Dispute may arise between the spouses over the payment of the whole or 
part of the dower. The husband affirms that he has paid it, but the wife denies
165 See Belahdi. op. cit. pp. 690-691.
*66 See Fluehr-Lobban, op. cit. p. 111.
16  ^As cited by Nasir, op. cit. P. 91.
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that.
With reference to the Maliki view if the dispute occurs before 
consummation of the marriage, the onus of proof of payment should be on the 
husband, on the presumption that the dower is a debt on him since the marriage 
has been contracted. Whereas if the dispute arises after the consummation the 
onus of proof should be on the wife, since it is customary that the dower or at 
least part of it (prompt) is usually paid before consummation. The same mles 
apply if disputes occur between the heirs of the spouses.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 adopts the Maliki view by 
declaring in article 17 that: "in the case of dispute over the dower between the 
spouses or their heirs when neither of them has evidence, the claim of the wife 
or her heirs should prevail after taking the oath, this is if the dispute occurs 
before the consummation. If it arises after the consummation, the claim of the 
husband or his heirs should prevail after taking the oath."
It must be remembered that Algerian law has only the above article 
concerning the disputes over the dower; and it applies to all disputes whether 
over stipulations, over the amount or over the payment; and whether the 
disputes are between the spouses themselves or between their heirs.
Conclusion:
As has already been seen the dower is a very worthy institution 
introduced by Islamic law. It guarantees to a certain extent the social and 
economic position of the wife. For her it is an instrument of financial security. 
It is supposed to prevent the arbitrary use of the right of divorce by the 
husband. In addition, if the divorce occurs, this money is to provide the 
woman financial support. However, the institution has been badly misused 
through social customs. The problem of excessive dower is the most serious 
one facing a Muslim youth on reaching maturity. Young men often complain 
that they have incurred heavy debts or worked very hard for many years to
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save up money for the dower, the gift for the bride and her family and the 
wedding festivities. "Many young men are forced to delay contracting 
marriage out of practical considerations; bride prices have soared to a level 
where only the most affluent can pay them without many years of work and 
saving. "168 Also the unusually heavy dower becomes a millstone round the 
woman's neck. Due to the inability of the men to pay huge dowers, many 
women remain unmarried. A haron-^  says that marriage rate in Muslim 
societies has been on the decline. One of the causes of this, is the enormous 
increase in the dower.
There are movements to combat excessive dower by asking for the 
introduction of prohibitive or restrictive legislation. One of these, the 
National Union of Algerian Women has attempted the task but without any
success. 170
If the problem of excessive dower cannot be solved, if no legislative 
limit or restriction can be introduced, those usages and customs will not 
change. This could be done by the intervention of the judges and the Imams 
who are always respected and followed by people. They could persuade people 
to see the real aim of the dower.
168 Mayer Ann, "Developments in the Law of Marriage and Divorce in Libya since the 
1969 Revolution", 22 Journal of African Law (UIO (1978) 30-49, at p. 32, footnote no: 1.
169 Layish Aharon, op. cit. p. 56.
170 See Allag, op. cit. pp. 158-159.
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SECTION THMEE 
NON=FHNANCIAL MMCTS ANID .BUTTES
Some of the financial rights and duties have been mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter such as nursing the children and respecting the 
husband's parents and relatives. The rest of these non-finaneial rights and 
duties will be discussed here under the following headings:
I- Fidelity.
II- Cohabitation.
HI- Obedience and head of the family.
IV- Justice to all wives.
I- FMelitty:
It is the mutual duty between the spouses to treat each other faithfully in 
having sexual relationship only with each other. In fact fidelity is the other side 
of the duty of cohabitation. In the latter the spouses are obliged to have sexual 
intercourse with each other, but in the former they are under the legal duty not 
to have any sexual relationship with anyone else. Although marriage 
encourages sexual relations between the couples it opposes their sexual liberty 
to have relations with others. Breach of this duty entitles the other spouse to 
divorce or seek separation on the ground of adultery. In the pre-Islamic 
period, according to customary Arab mles, a married woman who had sexual 
relations with a man who was not her husband committed a grave offence, 
whereas this prohibition did not apply to a married man who had intercourse 
with another woman who was not his wife. According to Islamic law any 
sexual relationship between the opposite sexes outside marriage is prohibited 
and consists an offence which is defined as adultery whether the persons are 
married or single.
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The modem trend in contemporary legal systems is to treat the spouses 
with equality regarding adultery. In the past there was a distinction between 
the husband and wife in relation to adultery. In France the Penal Code made a 
difference between adultery caused by the husband and that caused by the wife. 
The wife was punished whether the offence of adultery was committed inside 
the conjugal home or outside it. Whereas adultery caused by the husband was 
not considered as an offence unless it was committed in the conjugal home.l^l 
Moreover, the wife committing adultery was punished by imprisonment from 
two months to two years while the husband was punished only by a fine of 
from 12000 to 13000 FF(old). Some improvements were introduced to punish 
the wife by a fine only. Before 1884 the husband had the right to divorce his 
wife on the ground of adultery wherever it was committed. The wife had no 
right to claim divorce unless adultery was committed by the husband with his 
mistress in the conjugal home. After 1884 the law gave both spouses equal 
right to divorce without any distinction between them concerning adultery. 
The crime of adultery was abolished by art. 17, law of 11 July 1975.172
In English law adultery was not considered as a criminal offence*^, in 
spite of that, there was a distinction between the spouses in relation to adultery 
as a ground for divorce. Until 1923 the husband had the right to divorce his 
wife for a single act of adultery only. Whereas the wife had not that right 
unless that adultery committed by the husband was connected with an 
aggravating circumstances, such as incest, homosexuality, cruelty or desertion. 
Since 1923 the wife has been treated equally with the husband as regards 
divorce on the ground of adultery. 174
171 Zanati M., "Rights and Duties of the Spouses in the Past and Present" (in Arabic), 
Revue Al-Ulum Wal-Iqtisad. (Revue de Droit. Econ. Pol.). (1960) 447-519, at p. 489.
172 See Glendon. op. cit. pp. 87, 89, 107.
173 in Israeli law as well as in English law adultery is not a criminal offence and " a man 
may abandon his wife and go to live with another woman without committing a crime". 
Shifman P., "The English Law of Bigamy in a Multi-Confessional Society : The Israel 
Experience", 26 American Journal of Comparative Law (1978) 79-89, at p. 81.
174 Zanati M., op. cit. p. 489.
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In Scots law "adultery is no longer a crime and presumably the civil 
courts would not interdict a spouse from committing adultery"! 75 # The other 
spouse may be entitled to divorce or separation on the ground of adultery if the 
obligation of fidelity has been broken.
Talking about fidelity, in Islamic law some writers !77, in comparing it 
with the French system, doubt whether the duty of fidelity exists in Islamic law 
since Islam allows the husband under some conditions and circumstances to 
marry up to four wives. To prove that Islamic law does establish the 
obligation of fidelity it is useful to compare it with the French system in order 
to show how each of them treats infidelity.
Firstly, before 1975 the obligation of fidelity was more stringhtned on 
the wife than on the husband, so that the penal sanctions of adultery differed 
from the husband to the wife. The French Penal Code in article 337 stated that 
the wife guilty of adultery was to be punished by imprisonment from three 
months to two years, whereas the husband guilty of adultery was punished only 
by a fine of between 360 F and 7200 F. In Islamic law there is no distinction 
between the husband and the wife in this respect. The general mle is that "flog 
the adulteress and the adulterer, each one of them, with a hundred stripes" 
(xxiv, 2). This sanction applies to man and woman who are not yet married 
and are guilty of adultery. The sanction for those adulterous married man and 
woman is stoning until death.
Reasons were given to justify the distinction of the French Penal Code in 
sanctioning the wife more than the husband-^:
1- It is compatible with the current ideas that men are not held by 
fidelity as strictly as women.
2- Adultery by the wife puts the family at risk by creating the possibility
175 Clive E.. Husband and Wife, p. 175.
176 por further details about adultery in other legal systems see Zanati M., op. cit. pp. 
489 et seq.
177 Milliot, op. cit. pp. 327, 328, 339; DeBellefonds, op. cit. pp. 301-302.
178 See Weill Alex, o p . cit. p. 198; Marty and Ravnaud. op. cit. p. 212.
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of introducing a child of another man into the family, and the husband will be 
presumed to be the father.
Secondly, according to French law the wife guilty of adultery was 
punished in all circumstances, whereas the husband was punished only if he 
kept a mistress at the matrimonial home. By contrast in Islamic law both 
spouses are punished equally and in all circumstances, whether adultery is 
committed in the conjugal home or outside it.
Thirdly, in French law the accessory to the wife's adultry was punished, 
but the accessory to the husband's adultery was not punished. However, 
according to Islamic law there is no distinction between the husband and the 
wife and their accessories in adultery. Any person committing adultery will be 
punished whether he or she is a marriage partner or accessory.
Fourthly, in French law the wife's adultery constituted a reason for an 
excuse for the crime committed by the husband, for example if he killed his 
wife and her accessory when he found them committing the act in the conjugal 
home; but if the husband was found committing the act the wife did not profit 
from this excuse if, for example, she killed her husband. In Islamic law neither 
the husband nor the wife profit from this excuse.
Finally, adultery as a crime was abolished by the French law of 11 July 
1975; whereas it is still a crime in Islamic law as well as in Algerian law.
From the above there is no doubt that a legal system such as the Islamic, 
which strongly forbids adultery and severely punishes the marriage partner 
who commits it, establishes the obligation of fidelity in marriage.
It is worthwhile to note that while Islamic law allows the husband to take 
a second wife under certain conditions, it does not allow him to have any sexual 
relations with her until the marriage has become valid and everyone including 
his first wife know that the second woman is his wife. Thus, Islamic law 
permits polygamy but forbids any sexual relations without marriage. 179
179 See Shifman Pinhas, ’’Marriage and Cohabitation in Israeli Law”, 16 Israeli Law 
Review (1981) 439-460, at p. 449.
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The matter of fidelity and polygamy is clearly distinguished by Clive:
"It is probably better in this context to fall back on the basic idea of 
the obligation of fidelity imposed by the law at the time of the marriage.
Adultery is a voluntary breach of that obligation. Thus, if a couple go 
through a potentially polygamous marriage which leaves the husband free to 
take subsequent wives his wife could not claim that sexual intercourse with 
a validly married subsequent wife constituted adultery. That would not be a 
breach of the obligation of relative fidelity imposed on the husband."
It often happens in Islamic and Arab societies, as was the case in pre- 
Islamic times, that some people, for reasons such as the intention of the wife to 
be divorced, accuse her of committing adultery. Islamic law protects her from 
such accusation without sufficient evidence. If the person who alleges the 
wife's adultery cannot prove this with four witnesses, all of whom attended and 
saw the act, he or she will be punished by eighty stripes and his or her evidence 
will be rejected for ever after.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 does not mention expressly 
adultery as a ground for divorce, but it is mentioned implicitly in article 53/7 
which gives the wife the right to divorce on the ground of the husband's 
"committing a flagrant immoral outrage". The Algerian Penal Code amended 
by the law no. 82- 04 inl982 punishes "the wife who commits adultery by 
imprisonment from one year to two years. The same sanction applies to the 
man who commits adultery with a woman knowing that she is married. The 
adulterous husband is also punished by imprisonment from one year to two 
years, and the same sanction applies to his mistress. The prosecution will not be 
exercised unless by a complaint of the aggrieved spouse". It is obvious that the 
position of Algerian Penal Code is not like Islamic law, but the same as that of 
the French Penal Code before 1975. The only difference is that in Algerian 
law there is no distinction between the wife and the husband and their 
accessories in the sanction of adultery. Neither is the actual sanction the same
180 Clive E., Husband and Wife. 1982, p. 444.
181 The Holy Quran, Sura xxiv, verse 4.
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in both laws. In Algerian law imprisonment from one year to two years is the 
only sanction for all parties of adultery; whereas in French law the sanction 
differed from the husband, which was a fine from 360 F to 7200 F only, to the 
wife, which was imprisonment from three months to two years, and to that of 
the wife's accessory, which was imprisonment from three months to two years 
and a fine from 360 F to 7200 F.
It is not clear why the French Penal Code punished the accessory of the 
wife's adultery by a double sanction. The accessory's sanction seemed unfair 
especially if he did not know that the woman was married, or in the case where 
the accessory was a young single man. By contrast the Algerian Penal Code 
seems more fair when it requires in sanctioning the accessory of the wife’ s 
adultery, that he knew that she is married.
It is not also clear why the French Penal Code punished the accessory of 
the wife's adultery and did not punish the accessory of the husband's adultery.
In French law the aggrieved spouse could have claimed from the other 
spouse and from the accessory, recovery of damages. Similarly, in Scots law 
the husband had the right to recover damages from the person having sexual 
intercourse with his wife, but this right was abolished by the Divorce ( 
Scotland) Act 1976 s. 10.182
II- CotaMttaHiomt:
One of the main obligations between the spouses is the duty of 
cohabitation. The spouses are obliged by the marriage contract to adhere to 
each other and live in the same matrimonial home. Moreover the duty of 
cohabitation involves also the mutual obligation to have sexual intercourse. If 
the law does not mention explicitly the duty of cohabitation this does not mean 
that it is not considered as an obligation between the spouses. The reason may 
be that this duty is implicitly understood from the marriage, or may be it is not
1^2 See Clive . op. cit. p. 175.
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easy to determine it by rules.




C-Rape of the wife by her husband.
A-Adherence:
"It is the duty of the spouses to live together, or, as it is expressed in 
Scotland, to adhere to each other until the marriage tie is severed by 
death." 183 The main thrust of this obligation means sharing the common 
matrimonial home. However, the disagreement which may arise between the 
spouses about the matrimonial home and who has the right to decide where it is 
to be, will be discussed later in the next subsection of obedience and head of the 
family. If one of the spouses refuses to live with the other without any lawful 
excuse, the other spouse may have the right to an action for divorce or 
seoaration on the ground of desertion. At one time 184 in Scots law as well as 
in English law, the husband had the right to compel his wife to return to his 
house when she had abandoned it even if she refused to r e t u r n .  185 The law 
then changed to declare that the husband cannot force his wife to cohabit with 
him and the remedy for him was refusal of maintenance and divorce bn the 
ground of desertion at the end of four years. 186
Under the Act of the Scottish Parliament of 1573 the deserted spouse
183 Walton F.. op. cit. p. 134.
184 Fraser states that: "Stair and Erskine appear to have been of opinion that the husband 
has such an interest in the person of his wife, that he, as her governor, could compel her to 
return to his house when she has abandoned it, and that, too, even against her own 




was required to raise an action of adherence as a preliminary step of procedure 
before an action of divorce on the ground of desertion. In 1861 the 
preliminary steps of procedure were abolished 187 but the action of adherence 
remained competent until the Scottish Law Commission recommended 
abolition of this action and this abolition was affirmed by the Law Reform 
(Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984 s. 2: "no spouse shall be entitled to 
apply for a decree from any court in Scotland ordaining the other spouse to 
adhere." 188 The reason of abolishing this action is that it has outlived its 
usefulness as an action for restitution of conjugal rights. The corresponding 
action in English law was also abolished by the Matrimonial Proceedings and 
Property Act 1970 s. 20.189 Abolition of these actions does not mean abolition 
of the duty to adhere. Refusal to adhere by one of the spouses without 
reasonable cause is regarded as being desertion on which the other spouse can 
claim divorce. 190
The obligation of the husband to adhere is to allow his wife to live in the 
same house with him. He should not leave her alone and go away for a long 
period. According to Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 53/5 the fifth 
ground on which the wife can claim divorce is the husband's absence of more 
than one year without a valid excuse or maintenance. Many legal systems 
which establish the mutual duty of adherence between the spouses, may allow 
either of them to take a separate domicile for certain justifiable reasons. For 
instance, moving to join a spouse may expose the other to moral or material 
risks. This exemption in the past was always given to the wife, since it was she 
who was required to follow her husband and join him in his house. However, 
in modem legal systems and as a result of recognition of equal rights for both
187 By the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861, s. 11.
. 188 Scot. Law. Com. no: 76. op. cit. pp. 6-8; see also the Finer Committee on One 
Parent Families (1974) Cmnd. 5629, vol. 2, pp. 160-3, (App. 6), paras. 18-20.
189 See Scot. Law. Com. no: 76. op. cit. p.7.
190 For Scots law see Thomson, op. cit. p. 39; and for English law see Bromley, op* 
cit. pp. 226-227.
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spouses in deciding the matrimonial home, the husband may benefit from that
exemption. ^ 91
According to Islamic law and most of the contemporary Muslim family 
laws the wife is also lawfully entitled to refuse any adherence to her husband
until her prompt dower has been provided. 192
It is important to remember that the obligation of the spouse to live 
together in the same matrimonial home does not necessarily mean that they 
should stay together all the time. It is possible for them to cohabit from time to 
time, as for example if, for reasons of business or as a member of the armed 
forces, the husband spends long period away from home. 193 The duty of 
adherence still continues and the spouses are considered cohabiting so long as 
both of them retain the intention of cohabiting whenever the circumstances 
permit them to do so. This duty comes to an end if at any time, they agree to 
live apart, or one of them at least loses the intention to cohabit or regard the 
marriage as being at an end. 194
B-Sexual relations:
The duty of cohabitation does not only mean living together in the same 
matrimonial home but also it means that the spouses are under the duty to have 
sexual relations. Since marriage opposes the sexual liberty of the couple to 
have relations with others, it encourages the sexual relationships between the 
spouses. If the duty of sexual relations between the spouses is recognised by 
law it is because it is Ma normal and important concomitant of marriage. "195 
Sexual intercourse is necessary to consummate the marriage. "A marriage is 
said to be consummated as soon as the parties have sexual intercourse after the
191 Zanati M.. op. cit. p. 497.
192 See Nasir J.. op. cit. p. 91; see also the section of dower.
193 Bromley, op. cit. p. 112.
194 ibid, p. H2, 226.
195 Clive E., Husband and Wife, p. 174.
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so lem n iza tio n ."196 Sexual intercourse before the solemnization of the 
marriage is not consummation, and pre-marital intercourse is not a reason for 
the marriage to be regarded as consummated. Once the couple have had 
intercourse after solemnization, the marriage is considered consummated even 
if one or both of them are sterile. The marriage will be voidable if there is a 
wilful refusal to consummate the marriage by one of the spouses, as it is stated 
in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s. 12 (b). This is the position of English 
law. According to Scots law, wilful refusal to consummate the marriage is not 
a ground of nullity. 197 But it may amount to unreasonable behaviour which is 
a ground to divorce as will be seen in the last chapter. It is also the position in 
Islamic law that wilful refusal to consummate the marriage is a ground for 
divorce. 198 The mutual duty of the spouses to have sexual relations does not 
only mean consummation of the marriage, but also to have sexual intercourse 
after consummation and so long as the marriage exists. There is disagreement 
between the Muslim jurists about wilful refusal on the part of the husband to 
have sexual intercourse with his wife. According to the Hanafi and the Shafii 
jurists, the husband is recommended to have sexual relations, but it is only a 
recommendation without any civil or penal sanctions. Whereas, the Maliki and 
the Hanbali jurists are of the view that if the sexual intercourse is a right of the 
husband, it is also a duty on him towards his wife, and wilful refusal to 
accomplish his duty will entitle the wife to divorce. 199 Concerning the period 
that the wife should wait before claiming divorce, the Maliki jurists fix no 
period for that; as long as the wife can prove a prejudice from that refusal the 
judge may pronounce divorce. However, the judge may, regarding the 
circumstances of the case, fix a period after which the divorce will be 
pronounced. The Hanbali jurists require, besides the wilful refusal and the
^96 Bromlev. op. cit. p. 84.
197 Clive, op. cit. p. 111.
198 s ee Benmalha Ghaouti, Elements du Droit Algerien.... p. 107; Milliot L., op. cit. p. 
325;
199 De Bellefonds Linant, op. cit. p. 298.
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proof of the prejudice, the expiration of four months after which a normal 
wife cannot bear the absence of her husband or his refusal to have sexual 
intercourse. In fact, the wilful refusal of the husband to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife is regarded in Islamic law as a kind of cruelty. The 
intention that can be derived from this act is depriving the wife of sex, not on 
the grounds of health, but just to punish or torment her. The maximum period 
allowed by Islamic law for such punishment is four months. Before the expiry 
of this period the husband should resume sexual relations, otherwise divorce 
will take place.200 There is no disagreement among Muslim jurists that if the 
wife refuses sexual intercourse without justifiable cause she will lose her right 
to maintenance and may be divorced on the ground of disobedience.
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 applies the Hanbali view in its 
article 53/3 and entitles the wife to obtain divorce on the ground of "refusal of 
the husband to share the bed with the wife for more than four months."
In Scots law as well as in English law, unjustified wilful refusal to have 
sexual intercourse entitles the other spouse to claim divorce on the ground of 
unreasonable behaviour according to section 1 (2)(b) of the Divorce (Scotland) 
Act 1976 and the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s. 1 (2) (b) 
respectively.201
It is also important to mention that failure to have sexual intercourse due 
to impotence may entitle the other party to nullity of marriage or divorce. 
Both in English law and Scots law impotence is a ground of nullity. The 
knowledge of impotence of the other spouse before marriage is not necessarily 
a bar to the petition according to English law.202 Whereas in Scots law if 
impotence supervenes after the date of the marriage it is not a ground of 
nullity.203
Similarly some of the contemporary Muslim family laws take into
200 See the Holy Quran, ii, 226, 227.
201 See Thomson, op. cit. p. 100; Bromley, op. cit. pp. 202, 203.
202 Bromley, op. cit. p. 86.
203ciive. op. cit. 112.
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consideration the knowledge of impotence before the marriage contract such 
as Egyptian law; and some others do not make any difference between 
knowledge of impotence whether before or after the marriage contract, as it is 
in Algerian and Jordanian laws. Impotence will be discussed later in chapter 
four under the title of infirmity or disease as a ground for divorce.
C- Rape of the wife by her husband:
The assumption that may be made from the context of the mutual duties 
of the spouses to have sexual intercourse with each other, the wife's 
surrendering herself to her husband, and the notion of obedience and the head 
of the family, is that the husband can force his wife to have sexual intercourse 
with him if she refuses. This is called rape in marriage. The question which can 
be asked, is this rape a conjugal right or a criminal wrong?
According to English criminal law, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1976, s. 1 (1) the crime of rape has the following constituted elements:
1- sexual intercourse, 2- which is unlawful, 3- with a woman,
4- without her consent, 5- knowingly or recklessly.204 
Unlawful sexual intercourse is the central element in this matter, since 
this is the heading under which marital rape is usually discussed. Unlawful 
intercourse means under criminal law, intercourse outside the bonds of 
marriage.205 T h e  marital rape exemption has its origin in Hale1 s statement: 
"the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife has given 
up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."206
204 See Temkin Jennifer, Rape and the Legal Process. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell,1987), p. 25.
205 Chapman [1959] 1 Q. B. 100; Jones [1973] Crim. L. R. , 710; Smith & Hogan, 
Criminal Law. 5th ed., (London: Butterworths,1983), p. 405.
206 i p c . 629 as cited by Temkin J., op. cit. p. 45; and Smith & Hogan, op. cit, p. 
405.
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This marital exemption has been extended by some laws to certain 
relationships outside marraige. For instance, legislation has been introduced 
in some states of the United States to extend it in order to cover in some cases 
"men cohabiting with women, men who have had a previous sexual 
relationship with women, and even in west Virginia, men who have been the ' 
voluntary social companions of women'."207 Furthermore, this marital 
exemption now applies even to sexual assaults in some of these States. 
Comparing this legislation to that of England, Temkin says that: "legislation of 
this type is regressive even by the standards of seventeenth century
England. "^08
There are some modem arguments for the retention of the exemption 
and some counter-argumbnts, which can be summarised as follows
1- Criminal law is not the best instrument for dealing with family law 
matters. If the wife reported the case to the police her children "might resent 
what she had done to their father. Her husband would have to face questioning 
which would be 'greatly resented' by him. In the contortion of such reasoning 
it is to lose sight of who has done what to whom and who in fact is the guilty 
p a r t y .  10 ft can be argued that the criminal law of rape applies also to 
unmarried couples who also have families.
2- It is said that prosecution for rape would hinder the possibility of 
reconciliation between spouses. This argument has been opposed by Glasgow' 
Jan: "chances for reconciliation are usually quite slim when the marital 
relationship has deteriorated to the point of forced sexual attack by the
207 Temkin J.. op. cit. p. 53.
208 id.
209 s ee the Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Working Paper (1980) paras: 33-36; 
Temkin J., "Towards a Modem Law of Rape", 45 Modem Law Review (1982) 339-419, at 
pp. 408-409; Kaganas and Murry, "Rape in Marriage - Conjugal Right or Criminal Wrong 
?", Acta Juridica (S. Afr.l (1984) 125-143, at pp. 128-129; "To Have and to Hold: The 
Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment", 99 Harvard Law Review (1986) 
1255-1273, at pp.1268-1269.
210 Temkin. op. cit. p. 409.
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husband. Furthermore, denying the wife legal recourse seems to be a dubious 
method of effecting reconciliation."^ 1 '
3- The offence would be difficult to prove. It is argued that if there are 
difficulties to prove the crime of rape, this does not mean that marital rape 
should not be a crime, since many crimes are particularly difficult to prove but 
they remain crimes. Moreover, "if difficulty of proof is to be accepted as 
ground for the disqualification of a crime, all crimes should be open to 
disqualification in this way."212
Abolition of this marital rape exemption has already taken place in many 
legal systems in the world, in some states of United States, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, for example. There is no exemption in the U. S. S. R., Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Sweedan and N o r w a y . 3 Furthermore, the Israeli 
Supreme Court in 1980 held that the husband can be convicted for raping his 
wife, and that the English common law rule which states that the wife should 
submit herself entirely to her husband, is inapplicable to Jewish residents in 
Israel. The Court refers to this statement of submission as "an outrage to 
human conscience and reason in an enlightened country in our times."214
According to some English cases the husband could be liable for rape in 
some circumstances: (i) if the wife had obtained a separation order containing 
a non-cohabitation clause from the court^^; (ii) if he had raped her following 
an undertaking to the court not to molest her, or following an agreement 
between them containing clearly that the "wife's consent to sexual intercourse
211 Glasgow Jan, "The Marital Rape Exemption : Legal Sanction of Spousal Abuse", 18 
Journal of Family Law (1979-80) 565, at p. 573.
212 Kaganas and Murry, op. cit. p. 128; see also Freeman M. D. A., " But if you can't 
Rape your Wife, Who can you Rape? the Marital Rape Exemption Re-Examined", 15 Family 
Law Quarterly (198111-21. at pp. 17-21.
213 See Temkin, Towards a Modem Law of Rape, p. 410, footnote 65; Temkin , Rape 
and the Legal Process, pp. 57-58.
214 See further detail about this case in "A Wife's Right to Say 'No"', 55 Australian Law 
Journal (19811 59-60.
215_R. y. Clarke [1949] 2 All E. R. 448; 33 Cr. App. Rep. 216.
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with her husband ... no longer exists" as it was declared in the case of R. v. 
Steele^ (iii) after the court's pronouncement of a decree nisi of divorce 
which revokes "a wife's implied consent to marital i n t e r c o u r s e . " ^ ^
In Scots law, in the case of H. M. Advocate v. Duffv. Lord Robertson 
refers to Baron Hume’ s statement that the husband cannot himself 'commit a 
rape on his own wife, who has surrendered her person to him' and declares 
that:
"In modem times it was quite illogical and unrasonable to treat the 
question of rape as if it was in some way different from assault. A man 
could be guilty of any assault on his wife, and there was no logical reason 
for making a differentiation between this and rape. Hume must have been 
dealing with the situation where husband and wife were living together, not 
the situation here where they were living apart. It could not be said today 
that in no circumstances could a man be guilty of raping his w i f e .
In another recent case H. M. Advocate v. Paxton it is held that:
"A man cannot be guilty of raping his wife 'who has surrendered 
her person to him in that sort' but where it is admitted that the parties are de 
facto separated, not living at bed and board and the wife has withdrawn 
herself from the society of her husband ( which is an issue of fact) then she 
could not be said to have ' surrendered her person ' and the ordinary law of 
rape would apply.
216 R, y. Stede (1976) 65 Cr. App. Rep. 22, (1977) Crim. L. R. 290.
217 v> O'Brien (1974) 3 All. E. R. 663, 664. For further discussion, see English
Peter, "The Husband Who Rapes His Wife", 126 New Law Journal (1976) 1223-25;
Freeman M. D., "Rape by a Husband ?", 129 New Law Journal (1979) 332-333; Matthews 
Paul, "Marital Rape", 10 Family Law (1980) 221-224; Williams J., "Marital Rape- Time for 
Reform". 134 New Law Journal (T9841 26.
218 H. M. Advocate v. Puffy 1983 S. L. T. 7.
219 H. M. Advocate v. Paxton 1985 S. L. T. 96. See for even a more favourable 
position for the woman: S. v. H. M. Advocate, 1989 S. L. T. 469, where a husband was 
charged with rape of his cohabiting spouse; and see also Timothy Jones, "Marital Rape" 
Scottish Law Times (1989) 279-282.
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According to Islamic law if the wife's refusal to submit to sexual 
intercourse is unjustified she could be declared a rebellious wife, and 
consequently she may lose her right to maintenance, or may be divorced. 
There seems be no principle in Islamic law that the husband has the right to 
force his wife to have sexual intercourse with him. According to the Shafii, 
Maliki and Hanbali jurists the wife1 s wilful refusal to have sexual intercourse 
with her husband leads to her losing her right to maintenance even if she has 
not abandoned the matrimonial home, whereas in the Hanafi view her refusal 
to have sexual intercourse with her husband does not release him from 
maintaining her as long as she has not abandoned the matrimonial home, and 
the only remedy for him is d i v o r c e . ^ 2 0
Since there is a difference between spouses who are living together and 
those who are separated, many western legal systems mentioned above 
distinguish between the two situations regarding the marital rape; where the 
wife is assumed to surrender her person to her husband, and where she has not 
surrendered her person to her husband.
It seems logically acceptable that many of the above legal systems 
abolished the exemption of marital rape in the second situation where the wife 
has not surrendered herself to her husband. Therefore, it would be better for 
Algerian law and recent Muslim family laws to take this distinction into 
consideration.
H I- Otedlemc© sumd head o f the fam ily:
Just as the mutual duty of fidelity and cohabitation is seen as an 
important concomitant of marriage and necessary for the continuing of the 
relationship between the spouses, so is the concept of head of the family said to 
be necessary for the control and guidance of the family. The rule of head of 
the family existed in most legal systems until recent times, for instance in 
France till 1970 when this rule was abolished. Most of the contemporary 
220 De Bellefonds, op. cit. pp. 289-290.
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Muslim family laws and other legal systems still provide that the husband is the 
head of the family. Whereas in some western countries where the idea of the 
equality between men and women is widespread the rule has been abolished. 
Throughout history the rule of head of the family has been connected with the 
duty of the wife to obey her husband, the husband's authority over the person 
of the wife, and his authority to decide matrimonial matters and where the 
matrimonial home has to be. These aspects resulting from the concept of head 
of the family have had a useful function in the past, but now are inconsistent 
with the social changes in many legal systems even though they still exist in 
some systems. Therefore, it is worthwhile to see how these aspects have been 
changed or abolished in the former systems such as the French and the Scottish; 
and why they still exist in the latter such as Islamic law and Algerian law. In 
order to clarify these aspects it is better to look at them in French law, in Scots 
law, and then in Islamic and Algerian law.
A-French law:
1- The concept of head of the family:
It was stated in the early customary law that the husband had full powers 
over the family. He had the right of correction, he could punish his wife and 
his children, and nobody was able to prevent him. Bissaud states that: "the old 
traditions agree in authorising him to sell them in case of necessity."221 
Furthermore, the Edict of Rotharis declared that: "the husband cannot kill his 
wife 'ad libitum', but only if there is a valid motive ('rationabiliter'), this is to 
recognize the 'Jus Vitae necisque', and leads us to believe that in the past his 
right was almost absolute."222 Under the influence of Napoleon it was 
inserted into the Civil Code that: "the husband owes protection to his wife, the 
wife obedience to her h u s b a n d .  "223 The law of 23 July 1942 article 213
221 Brissaud Jean, op. cit. p. 146.
222 Id.
223 Glendon M., op. cit. p. 116, footnote no: 7.
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declared expressly that: "the husband is the head of the family." There was an 
attempt in 1 9 6 5  to change this notion of head of the family, but it was 
successfully defeated. A draft was prepared by the Commission for the reform 
of the Civil Code in which the concept of head of the family was deposed, but 
the Commission retained this concept because there was great opposition to this 
change. Finally, after some attempts to change this position, the law of 4 June 
1 9 7 0  succeeded in abolishing the statement that the husband is the head of the 
family, and consequently article 2 1 3  of the Civil Code now reads: "the spouses 
together assure the material and moral guidance of the family. They provide 
for the education of the children and prepare their future."
2 -The wife’s capacity:
According to early customary law the husband had power and authority 
over his wife including at the same time both her person and her estates. She 
could not possess anything of her own, everything she acquired went to her 
husband. Her submission to her husband was limited only by her duties 
towards God. She owed to him obedience since he was considered the sole 
judge of her relations and her acts. The position was in general, as Bonapart 
said to the Council of State: "nature has made of our wives our slaves. The 
husband has right to say to his wife: ’Madame, you shall not go out! Madame, 
you shall not go to the theatre! Madame, you shall not see such and such a 
person! - which is as much as to say, Madame, you belong to me, body and 
s o u l !  "'224 Under the influence of Bonapart the Civil Code evolved the marital 
power and forbade the spouses to act contrary, through a marriage contract, to 
the rights resulting from the marital p o w e r . ^ 2 5  jhQ incapacity of wife was 
generally established under the Civil Code; she could not accomplish any 
judicial or extrajudicial act without her husband's authorisation. Concerning 
judicial acts she could not operate in the court without the previous 
authorisation of her husband except in the case where she was defending
224 Brissaud Jean, op. cit. p. 146, footnote no: 5.
225 Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 221.
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herself in a penal action raised' against her, or if she raised an action against her 
husband for divorce or separation. With regard to extrajudicial acts such as 
sale, mortgage and gifts, the wife was forbidden to exercise them without her 
husband’ s permission, except for acts for the needs of the household. In the 
event of absence or illness of the husband the wife could act instead of her 
husband, but only after obtaining a legal authorisation. In the case of 
extrajudicial acts the court might supervise the deeds of the wife and become 
her guardian.
This incapacity of the wife was abolished through three stages:
(1)- The law of 18 february 1938 amending article 215 of the Civil Code 
said: "the married woman fully exercises her civil capacity. Restrictions of this 
principle can result only from legal limitations or from the matrimonial 
regime which has been adopted." One of the important restrictions concerning 
capacity was article 4 of the Commercial Code which required always the 
consent of the husband before the wife exercised any commercial activity. 
Under the matrimonial regime the wife had to obtain her husband's 
authorisation in order to sell her properties.
(2)- The law of 22 September 1942 reduced the number of restrictions 
related to the w ife 's capacity. It abolished the marital authorisation for 
commercial activities. In case of the wife exercing a commercial act or any 
other profession, the new article 4 of the Commercial Code granted to the 
husband only the right to oppose this under judicial control.
(3)- The law of 13 july 1965 underlined equality between the spouses in 
article 216 of the Civil Code: "each spouse has the full capacity to rights, but 
these rights and powers can be limited by the effect of the matrimonial regime 
and the dispositions of the present chapter." This law abolished the husband's 
authority over his wife's capacity, and his control over her professional
activities. ^ 26
226 por au these statements and further details see Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. pp. 221- 
230; Weill Alex, op. cit. pp. 201, 202; Madkour Kamal S., Comparison entre le Droit de la
Famille en France et en Egvpte. thesis, Poitiers, 1956, pp. 67-70.
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3- The husband's authority to choose the matrimonial home:
Since the husband was considered the head of the family he had the right 
to choose the matrimonial home. The old article 215 of the Civil Code stated 
that: "the choice of the family residence belongs to the husband; the wife is 
obliged to live with him, and he is bound to receive her." The law of 1942 
gave the wife the right to make a claim to the court if the residence chosen by 
the husband presented to the family physical or moral dangers. Then the law 
of 1970 affirmed that the residence of the family was at the place which was 
chosen by common accord of the spouses; if this could not be reached, it was 
the place that was chosen by the husband. Finally, the law of 1975 has given 
the spouses the equal right to choose the matrimonial residence. Article 215 
now reads: "the residence of the family is at the place which they choose of 
common accord."
B- Scots law:
1-The concept of head of the family:
The concept of head of the family and obedience of the wife to her 
husband was quite similar to that of French law. It was declared that: "the 
husband is lord, head and ruler of the wife by the express ordinance of 
God."227 Under the title 'the wife must obey the husband' Fraser states that: 
"the husband is the dignior persona,- the ruler and governor of his wife; and it 
is her duty, which the law will enforce, in all things lawful to obey him."228 
He says again that:
"the husband has the right, and it is therefore not cruelty in the eye
227 Clive. Husband and Wife. 1982, p. 175, referring to Stair I. 4. 9, referring to 
Genesis, chapter El, verse 16 : "Where the Lord says to Eve,'thy desire shall be towards thy 
husband, and he shall rule over thee'."
228 Fraser P., op. cit. vol.l, p. 509.
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of law, for him absolutely to forbid the wife's friends from visiting her in 
his house... The husband may also confine her to the house, or at least 
direct her movements in such a manner as to prevent her going to places, 
and engaging in pursuits, of which he d i s a p p r o v e s .  "^9 "He may prohibit
her nereast relations from visiting in his family."230
The husband's position as head of the household was considered as a duty 
which was imposed on him "and any agreement to transfer this duty to the wife 
would be void."231 According to the old law the husband was entitled to 
chastise his wife by corporal punishment. Moreover it was stated in the latest 
edition of Walton's book on Husband and Wife published in 1 9 5 1 ,  that: "the 
principle that a husband has the right moderately to chastise a recalcitrant wife 
no doubt still stands part of our law." Even though it was declared in the same 
edition, following this statement that: "there have been no recent cases in 
Scotland where the husband has found his defence to a charge of cmelty on this 
g r o u n d .  " 2 3  2  This last statement was supported by the case of Meacher v. 
M 233 in which the wife refused to obey her husband's orders not to visit her 
sister. For this reason she was assaulted by her husband on several occasions. 
The court granted decree of divorce and held that those orders, given by the 
husband to prevent his wife from visiting her sister, were unreasonable. In the 
case of Gordon v. G o r d o n 2 3 4  husband defended his action by the fact that 
his act was justified to chastise his wife because she disobeyed him by refusing 
to light a fire. This defence was not regarded as'a good one. In the case of 
Forbes v. F o r b e s 2 3 5  the court granted a decree of divorce for cruelty, to the 
wife who was assaulted by her husband after forbidding her to train as a
229 Ibid, vol.2, pp. 896-897.
230 Clive, op. cit. p. 175, footnote no: 74 referring to the case of Ladv Cadboll v. Her 
Husband (1758) 5 supp. 475.
231 Frase. op. cit. vol.l. p. 511.
232 Walton F. P., op. cit. p. 101.
233 Meacher v. (1946) P. (C. A.) 216.
234 Gordon v. Gordon (19471 64 Sh. Ct. Rep. 53.
235 Forbes v. Forbes. 1965 S. L. T. 109.
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fashion model. Regarding the above rules which were applied in Scots law and 
in which the husband might chastise his wife for her disobedience, Clive says 
that these "statements no longer represent the law of S c o t l a n d . " ^ 3 ^
The present situation in Scots law on the notion of the head of the family 
and the wife's obedience is that it no longer exists, and the personal 
relationship between husband and wife is sharing equal rights and duties; "the 
governing principle of the present law on the personal relations between the 
spouses is not that the wife must obey the husband but that the spouses must 
behave tolerably towards each other."237
2 -The wife's capacity:
The wife's capacity in early Scots law was as described by Erskine:
"The husband acquires by the marriage a power over both the 
person and estate of the wife. Her person is in some sort sunk by the 
marriage, so that she cannot act by or for herself. And as for her estate, she 
has nothing that can be truly called her own where matters are left to the 
disposition of the law; for not only her persona ,but the rents of her 
heritable estate and the interest of her bonds become the property of the 
husband. In consequence of this power, the husband can recover the person 
of his wife from all who shall withhold or withdraw it from him. Nay, her 
person while she is vestita viro, is free from all execution upon debts 
contracted by herself, which by her converture she becomes disabled to 
pay."23**
Under the title of "A wife has no person in law" in Fraser's book, it was 
stated that a married woman could no more enter into contracts, be liable for 
debts, or be a curator than could a minor. "The general rule of law is, that a 
married woman can grant no personal obligation. Such obligation is null and
23  ^Clive. Husband and Wife. 1982. p. 176.
237 Ibid, p. 177.
238 As cited by Walton F., op. cit. 190.
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void, because in law a wife has no p e r s o n . " 2 3 9 P q  t h e  case 0f Stoddart v. 
R u t h e r f o r d 2 ^  it was stated that according to the law of that time, the married 
woman had no person, and all the acts or deeds done by her without the 
husband's consent were null and void. Furthermore, even if she undertook 
any personal obligations with her husband's consent, these were regarded as 
null.241 Since the husband was the wife's curator she could not sue or be sued 
without his concurrence.
The status of the wife was altered by the Married Women's Property 
(Scotland) Act 1920. This act changed radically the position of married 
women by introducing the following important points:
(1)- The wife was given the same powers as the husband to dispose of 
her heritable and moveable estates, and the right of her husband to 
administrate her properties was totally abolished.
(2)- The husband's curatory of his wife was abolished except in the case 
where she was in minority.
(3)- The wife was given the capability to entering into contracts, 
incurring obligations, and suing and being sued as if she were not married; and 
the husband's liability for her contracts and obligations was also a b o l i s h e d . 2 ^ 2
It was commonly accepted that, at common law, the spouses could not 
sue each other in delict. This mle was abolished by s. 2 of the Law Reform 
(Husband and Wife) Act 1962 which has given each of the spouses the right to 
, sue the other spouse in respect of a delict, as if they were not married. In 1983 
the Scottish Law Commission in paper no: 76 discussed some rules connected 
to the relationship of the husband and wife which existed in Scots law and were 
now regarded as against equality between men and women. The main rules 
that the committee recommended abolishing in this matter were:
i- The husband's curatory of his wife during her minority.
239 Fraser, op. cit. vol.l, p. 508.
240 Stoddart v. Rutherford. 30 June 1812, F. C.
241 See Fraser, op. cit. p. 508.
242 s ee Walton, op. cit. pp. 192, 195.
169
ii- The husband's right to choose the place of the matrimonial home.
iii- The husband's liability for his wife's antenuptial debets.
iv- The presumption that the wife is the husband's domestic manager, 
and his liability for her contracts as his domestic manager.
v- The husband’s liability for the expenses of litigation by the wife 
against a third party if he participates in this litigation.
These rules and others have been seen by the Commission as possibly 
having "a useful function in the middle of the nineteenth century but which are 
inconsistent with the legal and social position of married women t o d a y .  "243 
Therefore, these rules have been abolished by the Law Reform (Husband and 
Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984.
3- The husband's authority to choose the matrimonial home:
The traditional rule was that it is the husband's right to decide on the 
matrimonial home. It was held in the case of Colquhoun v. C., in 1804 that: "a 
wife could not compel a husband to maintain her in his house. If he turned or 
assigned her another residence apart from him, she had no recourse except to 
claim aliment"244, or sue for divorce according to the grounds of divorce 
provided at that time. The only restriction of this rule was that the husband's 
choice had to be genuine and reasonable. The wife was considered in desertion 
if she refused to live with her h u s b a n d . 2 4 5  Referring to t h i s  rule Clive says 
that: "it is doubtful, however, whether this rule now has any real m e a n i n g .  " 2 4 6  
The dependency domicile of the wife was abolished by the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 s. 1, and as a result the wife can acquire an 
independent domicile.
Finally, the husband's right to choose the matrimonial home has been
243 s col  Law. Com. no: 76, o p . cit. p. 1.
244 Walton, op. cit. p. 190.
245 See Stewart v. Stewart 1959 S. L. T. (Notes) 70.
246 Clive, op. cit. 1982, pp. 173-174.
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criticized by the Scottish Law Commission paper no: 76 as mentioned above, 
and then abolished by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife)(Scotland) Act 
1984 S. 4.247
C- Islamic law:
1-The concept of head of the family:
In Islamic law the husband is considered as the head of the family. This 
concept is derived by Muslim jurists from the Holy Quran and Prophetic 
traditions. It is stated in the Holy Quran that: "men are appointed guardians 
over women, because of that in respect of which Allah has made some of them 
excel others, and because the men spend of their wealth." (iv, 34). Ali Yusuf 
comments on this verse by saying that: "the difference in economic position 
between the sexes makes the man's rights and liabilities a little greater than the 
woman's. Q. iv. 34 refers to the duty of the man to maintain the woman, and to 
a certain difference in law, and in certain matters the weaker sex is entitled to
special protection."248
The obedience of the wife to her husband is to be exercised within the 
limits of Islamic law. She obeys him only in lawful matters. Aisha Lemu in 
her book "Women in Islam" describes the way in which the wife obeys her 
husband according to Islamic marriage:
"The wife herself is responsible for the care of her home and the 
welfare of her family. She may express her view and make her suggestions 
concerning all matters, but the best role she can play in keeping the marital 
tie intact and strong, is to recognize her husband as the person responsible 
for the running of the affairs of the family, and thus to obey him even if his 
judgment is not acceptable to her, in a particular matter, provided he does
247 s ee further detail by Clive, op. cit. p. 173 et Seq.; Thomson, op. cit. p. 39; Scot. 
Law. Com. no: 76, op. cit. pp. 11, 12.
248 See the Holy Quran, Translation and Commentary by Ali Yusuf, 1983, p. 90, sura 
ii, verse 228, footnote no: 255.
not go beyond the limits of Islam. This is the meaning of obedience in the 
context of marriage in Islam. It is a recognition of the role of the husband as 
the head of the family unit and the loyalty of both husband and wife to a 
higher law, the s h a r i ’a . " ^ 9
The Prophet stated some matters in which the wife should obey her 
husband, and described the measure which can be taken to deal with the 
disobedient wife:
"They should not let your beds be trampled by others than you, 
should not allow those to enter your houses whom you do not like without 
your authorization, and should not commit turpitude. If they do commit 
that, then God has given you permission to reprimand them, to separate 
yourself from them in beds, and to strike them but not hard. If they abstain 
and obey you, then it is incumbent upon you to provide their food and dress 
in accordance with good custom. And I command you to treat women 
well..."250
In the light of this Prophetic tradition and others, Muslim jurists discuss 
the cases in which the wife is considered to obey her husband, under the 
following headings:
a- The husband's right to have sexual intercourse with his wife;251 
b-The husband's control of his wife's visits; 
c-The husband's correction of his wife; 
d-The wife's right to work outside the home.
Now these aspects will be looked at except the first one which has 
already been discussed.
249 Lemu Aisha and Heeren Fatima, Women in Islam. (England: The Islamic 
Foundation, 1978), p. 18.
25® As cited by Mary Darlene, "Women in Islam: Yesterday and Today", in Pullapilly C. 
(ed.), Islam in the Contemporary World. (Indiana: Cross Roads Books,1980) 370-401, at p. 
381.
251 This has been discussed previously under the subsection cohabitation: sexual 
relations, rape of the wife by her husband.
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a- The husband’s control of his wife’s visits:
According to Islamic law the wife should not leave her matrimonial 
home without her husband1 s consent. She cannot go visiting or be visited by 
anybody whom her husband dislikes, except her parents and her close 
relatives. There is disagreement among jurists about this matter. Some 
prescribe the persons and the periods in which the wife can visit or be visited 
by. Others leave the matter to usage and custom and to court's d i s c r e t i o n . 2 5 2  
It was decided in older interpretation according to Egyptian law that the wife 
has the right to visit her parents once a week, and the other close relatives once 
a y e a r . 2 5 3  Many recent Muslim family laws keep silent on this matter. The 
Algerian Family Law Code of 1 9 8 4  declares in article 3 8 / 1  that the wife has 
the right to "visit her close relatives and to receive them according to usage and 
custom." Moroccan law also allows the wife to visit her family within the 
limits of convenience.(art. 3 5 / 3 )
It is important to note that in cases of necessity the wife is entitled to visit 
or to be visited without the consent of her husband; for example, as is declared 
in Egyptian law, if the wife1 s father, even if non-Muslim, is suffering from a 
long illness, and has no person to take care of him, the wife is allowed to visit 
him, even without the husband's consent, and stay to provide him care.
b- The husband’s correction of his wife:
According to the prophetic tradition cited above, Islamic law has given 
the husband the permission to correct his wife in the case of her recalcitrance. 
There are four methods by which the husband treats his recalcitrant wife. The 
first is to counsel or admonish her; if this verbal advice is not sufficient the 
second step is suspending any sexual intercourse with his wife as a punishment. 
But this kind of punishment, as has already been seen, should not be extended 
beyond the natural limit of four months, the period which seems enough to 
reform a person. If this punishment is not sufficient the third method is
252 s ee further details by Haidar Ajlany, op. cit. thesis, 1949, pp. 158-163.
253 Ibid. p. 160; Anderson. Islamic Family Law, p. 68, para. 143.
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personal chastisement. The husband may find that by some slight physical 
correction his wife will be reformed. This kind of chastisement is permitted 
by Islamic law under the following conditions:
i- it is permitted only in very serious case where the lawful right of the 
husband has been violated;
ii-the beating should not be severe.
If all these methods fail, to resort to the family council is recommended 
by the Holy Quran sura iv, verse 35. This family council which consists of 
arbiters, one from the wife’s family and the other from the husband's family, 
may help the spouses to an effective reconciliation.
It must be stressed that the above methods described by the Holy Quran 
and the Prophetic tradition should be followed in the same order as prescribed. 
If the husband has overstepped the limits, it will be considered as cruelty, 
which gives the wife the right to claim divorce or reparation of injuries; and if 
he causes such injuries to his wife the husband may be prosecuted by criminal 
law, according to articles 2 6 4  et Seq. of the Algerian Penal C o d e . 2 5 4
It is worthwhile to stress that beating seems incompatible with modem 
life. Even in Islamic law it seems that there is no evidence which shows that the 
Prophet or even his companions have beaten their wives. When Islamic law 
permitted the husband to correct his wife, it did not recommend beating. But 
relying on this and some bad customs, many bmtal husbands beat their wives in 
a cmel manner.
c- The wife's right to work outside the home:
This right has connections with other aspects of family ties such as 
maintenance and the wife's matrimonial duties. So long as the husband is 
financially responsible for the support of his wife, she has no absolute right to
254 For all these points see De Bellefonds, op. cit. pp. 294-295; Saad F., op. cit. pp. 
199-201; Chehata Ch., "La Famille en Islam, Problemes dActualite", 28 Revue Juridique et 
Politique Independance et Cooperation (1974) 663-672; Bencheikh H., tehsis. op. cit. pp.
258 et seq.; Abou-Zahra M., op. cit. pp. 170-171.
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go out to work. The absolute right to work is given to the wife who has no 
husband or parents who can maintain her. This right is also connected to the 
custody of children. According to some Muslim jurists the wife has the right of 
custody until a boy reaches seven and a girl nine. This is the Hanafi view, 
whereas most of the Muslim jurists set the age limits higher, but all agree that 
the wife should devote herself to the care of the children at this time. Failing to 
do so she loses her right to custody. In the interest of the children and the 
marital union, Islamic law requires the consent of the husband for the wife's 
right to go out to work. The wife is permitted to work out if she can maintain a 
balance between her job and her marital duties, or if her husband agrees to her 
working out.
The Algerian law Family Law Code of 1984 keeps silent on this matter. 
Algerian writers on Algerian family law have not clarified the point. Saad 
Abdel-Aziz states that modem Muslim jurists are of the view that the husband 
cannot prevent his wife from participating in the development of the country 
and the s o c i e t y . 2 5 5  But this does not seem a sound arguement since i t  may said 
that the wife's bringing up and caring for her children is also participation in 
the development of her society. In talking about maintenance and disobedience 
Saad Foudil^^states that if the husband opposes his wife's going out for work 
but she refuses to conform, she will be considered disobedient, and 
consequently lose her right to maintenance. This is the general mle in most of 
the contemporary Muslim family laws, "no maintenance is due the wife who 
goes out to work without the consent of her h u s b a n d .  "^57
There is a remedy for this matter in Islamic law which can be applied in 
Algerian law; this is that the wife can insert a clause into the marriage contract 
that she will work or continue working after the marriage. By this clause the
255 gee s aa(i Abdel-Aziz. op. cit. pp. 175-176.
256 Saad Foudil, op. cit. pp. 189-190.
257 Welchman Lynn, "The Development of Islamic Family Law in the Legal System of 
Jordan”, 37 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1988) 868-886, at pp. 875-877; 
see also Madkour Kamal Sallam, thesis, op. cit. pp. 74-75.
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husband cannot oppose her afterwards. If he does oppose her she can rely on 
the contract before a court. In fact there are many married women working in 
Algerian society in different jobs, and Islamic law does not prevent them from 
working as long as they take care of their children and their marital duties. 
Taking into consideration this fact and the demands of contemporary society, 
many Muslim jurists are "equally vocal in their insistence that women have the 
right to vote, to hold public office, and to be professionals, although not at the 
cost of sacrificing their home life or neglecting their familial
responsibilities. "258
2 -The wife's capacity:
Since the beginning of Islam women have had the full capacity; and the 
marriage has no effect on this capacity. Any thing a wife earns is her own to 
dispose of, to use it herself or to contribute it to the family expenses if she 
wishes. Whatever she possesses of property and fortune is for herself, and she 
is not responsible for the support of the family. The husband is the only one 
responsible for the maintenance of his wife and their children. Moreover he is 
also under the duty to provide a dower to his wife. If the wife is a wage- 
eamer her earnings belong to her absolutely without the smallest right on the 
part of the husband. This absolute right of the wife to her property is affirmed 
by all Muslim jurists except the Maliki who allow the husband certain rights 
over his wife’s property:
- he has the right to live in his wife's house ;
- alienation of property exceeding one third of her estate is invalid 
without his c o n s e n t . 2 5 9
This view has lost its importance in modem societies and the wife has
258 Smith Jane I., "Women in Islam: Equity, Equality, and the Search for the Natural 
Order", Journal of the American Academy of Religion. XLVII, 517-537, at p. 525 and 
footnote no: 32.
259 Vesey-Fitzgerald, op. cit. pp. 43-44.
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acquired the complete freedom to dispose of her p r o p e r t y . 260
3- The husband's authority to choose the matrimonial home:
In Islamic law the matrimonial home and the maintenance are closely 
related. Since the husband is under the duty to maintain his wife, he is also 
under the obligation to provide a suitable home for them to live in. Therefore, 
it is the husband's right to decide where the matrimonial home will be. But this 
not an absolute right: Islamic law requires some conditions to be followed 
when the husband chooses the matrimonial home. These conditions have been 
discussed under the section of maintenance. If the husband provides the 
matrimonial home and the wife refuses to live with him there, she will be 
considered disobedient and consequently she will lose her right to 
maintenance. If the home chosen by the husband is not suitable for her, she has 
the right to refuse to move there, and she has the right to maintenance.
It must be stressed that according to Islamic law the husband cannot 
compel his wife to live with him in his house. It may happen, as Anderson 
says, that in some Muslim countries the police escorts and forces her back to 
the matrimonial home.261 This kind of compulsion, as Haider Ajlany says, is 
not a consequence of Islamic law, but an evolution of jurisprudence related to 
article 214 of the Napoleon's C o d e . 262 The wife has also the right to refuse to 
move to her husband1 s home if she has not yet received her proper dower.
It is worthwhile to note that according to the Hanbali view the wife can
insert a clause in the marriage contract to reserve for herself the right to
choose the matrimonial h o m e . 2 6 3  The wife is not bound to move or follow
260 por further details on this point see Bencheikh H., thesis, op. cit. pp. 317- 322; 
McC. Pastner C., "Access to Property and the Status of Women in Islam", in Smith J.(ed.) 
Women in Contemporary Muslim Societies. (London: Associated University Presses, 1980), 
146-175.
261 Anderson N., Islamic Family Law, p. 68.
262 gee Haidar Ajlany, thesis, op. cit. p. 147; Shalabi, op. cit. p. 456.
263 §ee Bencheikh H., thesis, op. cit. p. 242.
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her husband to another place or city, if she fears a danger, or has any legal 
excuse. Moreover, the spouses can make an agreement between themselves, 
either at the time of the marriage or subsequent to it, deciding where their
matrimonial home should be.^64
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 has not mentioned who has the 
right to choose the matrimonial home, but it may be implicitly understood 
from article 39/1 which states the obedience of the wife to her husband and 
grant him due respect in his capacity as the head of the family, or it may be 
because it is customary in Algerian society that the matrimonial home is the 
husband's home or his parents' home.
It is important to note that in the present situation in Algerian society it 
seems very difficult for either of the spouses to choose the matrimonial home 
because of the accommodation crisis which has resulted in many social 
problems. Many couples have been engaged for two or three years and are still 
waiting for an accommodation in order to marry; and many others live with 
the husband's family. How can it be realistically claimed under these 
circumstances that the spouses should choose the matrimonial home of 
common accord, or the husband should provide a suitable home?
Conclusion:
Concerning the capacity of the wife Islamic law is fairer and more 
moderate than the former laws of France and Scotland, since from the first 
Islamic law declares that the wife has full and separate capacity from her 
husband's to dispose her estates and enter into contracts, and incur debts 
without authorisation from her husband. In French and Scottish laws the wife 
had no personality in law, she was under the absolute authority of her husband 
who was her curator, and any act done by her without his permission was null
264 s ee further detail, Haidar, op. cit. pp. 136-152; Shalabi. op. cit. pp. 455-456; Nasir 
J., o p . cit. p. 100; Benmalha G., Elements du droit Algerien.... pp. 109-110.
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and void until this century (1920 for Scots law and 1938 for the French) when 
the wife was entitled to her full capacity. Furthermore, it was only in 1965 
that the French wife obtained the right to exercise any commercial activity 
without her husband's permission.
With regard to the authority to decide upon the matrimonial home, it 
was given as a right to the husband in both French and Scottish laws until 
recently (1975 and 1984 respectively) when this right was abolished. Now the 
decision is reached by the common accord of the spouses. This change has 
occurred not only because of the establishment of the equal rights between men 
and women but because the matrimonial home is closely related to maintenance 
as Glendon says: "where choice of residence is concerned, since the husband 
was typically the spouse primarily responsible for the support of the family, 
the final word was traditionally h i s . "265 Since in both laws, the French and the 
Scottish, both spouses are under equal duty to maintain each other, logically 
they have to have the same right to choose the matrimonial home. Whereas in 
Islamic law since the husband is primarily responsible for maintaining the wife 
and providing the suitable home, it is also logical that the husband has the right 
to choose the matrimonial home. But this right is not absolute, the wife can, as 
has already been seen, insert a clause in the marriage contract to reserve to 
herself the right to choose the matrimonial home.
Regarding the right of the husband as head of the family and the wife's 
duty to obey him, Islamic law is not very different from the position that 
existed in both the French and the Scottish laws. The husband's authority to 
limit her visits, to correct her and to oppose her to work outside the home 
without his consent, all these are quite similar to those that existed in French 
law and Scots law. Because of the modem trend that exists in western countries 
towards full equality between men and women, all these aspects have been 
abolished in Scots law and French law; whereas they still exist in contemporary 
Muslim family laws. The arguments that were given in French and Scottish 
laws to maintain the husband's authority as the head of the family and the
265 Glendon M. A., op. cit. p. 124.
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wife's duty to obey him, still exist in Muslim family laws today. It was said in 
Scots law that: '"to allow a partition of power between the husband and the 
wife, and a liberty of resistance of the latter to the will of the former in the 
regulation of the household would introduce perpetual discord, and prove 
destructive of domestic happiness...'"266 was argued in French law that 
"'every human society must have a head', 'the elimination of the head of the 
family will hasten the dissolution of the family'"'.267 All these arguments 
which existed in the French and Scottish laws and other western laws, and have 
been rejected now, still support the husband's authority as a head of the family. 
A non-Muslim may think that Islamic law is outdated with regard to this 
matter; but it can be said that even in Scotland these arguments "may have had a 
useful function in the middle of the nineteenth century" as the Scottish Law 
C om m ission^^ says, referring to those "Outdated Rules in the Law of 
Husband and Wife". As change has occurred in those societies towards the 
absolute equality between men and women, any rule which makes even a small 
difference between the husband and wife have been removed whether the mle 
is a religious one or not. According to Muslims however, the husband's 
authority as the head of the family is a religious principle which cannot be 
removed since as has already been seen, there are many verses in the Holy 
Quran and the Prophetic traditions which affirm this principle. In Islamic law 
there are very few mles which make a difference between men and women and 
between husband and wife, such as in the inheritance proportions and the 
husband's right to take more than one wife in some circumstances. Since these 
rules are affirmed by God and his Prophet to govern the relationships of 
Muslims, they are, according to their belief, useful and necessary.
A moderate Muslim may say that there are abuses and 
misunderstandings by many husbands of their authorities as head of the family, 
but abusing the mle or the authority does not necessarily mean that this mle is
266 Colquhoun v._C., 1804, Mor. App. 1, as cited by Walton F., op. cit. p. 190.
267 As cited by Glendon M. A., op. cit. pp. 117-118.
268 s cot. Law. Com. no: 76, op. cit. p. 1.
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bad or outdated. The husband should act in the interests of his wife and their 
children and for this, authority has been given to him. He should clearly keep 
in mind that this authority is advisory and not despotic, so that he should 
consult his wife and negotiate with her every matter concerning the family 
before taking any decisions.
Therefore, it would be better if Algerian law mentioned clearly in 
article 39 besides the obedience of the wife to her husband as head of the 
family, the wife's right to bring a claim to the court in cases where she can 
show that her husband has acted against the interest of the family. This 
suggestion seems logical and in line with the spirit of Islamic law, and under 
the court's control may prevent any abuses of the husband.
It must be stressed that the law is not precise in the above matters related 
to obedience and the head of the family , nor are the courts decisions published 
or available, and this makes the study of this topic very difficult.
IV- Jmisttk© to wives:
Islamic law permits polygamy in some circumstances under some 
conditions. The most important of these conditions is that justice should be 
done to all wives. The Holy Quran says in Sura.iv verse.4:
"Should you apprehend that you will not be fair in dealing with 
orphans if you marry more than one of them, then marry of other women as 
may be agreeable to you, two or three, or four, but if you feel you will not 
deal justly between them, then marry only one, or, out of those over whom 
you have authority. That is the best way for you to obviate injustice."
It is clear from this verse that the person who fears that he is not able to 
be ju st, should not marry more than one.
This institution has been criticised by many western observers, Muslim 
writers and women's organisations. Consequently most Muslim family laws 
have recently introduced reforms to restrict it, and a few have abolished it 
(Tunisia and Turkey^^).
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In order to throw light upon the matters related to this institution the 
following points will be discussed:
A- The conditions required in Islamic law for polygamy.
B- Polygamy in the contemporary Muslim family laws.
C- Is polygamy a social problem?.
A-The conditions required in Islamic law for polygamy:
According to the above verse, polygamy is permitted with the following 
conditions:
1 -It is limited to four wives.
2 -Justice must be done to all wives.
3- The husband must have the financial capacity to support them.
1- It is limited to four wives:
This limitation cannot be understood or reasonably viewed without 
understanding the situation as it existed before Islam. The limitation to four 
wives is a great improvement over the unlimited number possible before 
Islam. Even in early Islamic times, some companions of the Prophet had more 
than four wives. When the Prophet received the above verse, he asked them to 
keep up to four wives and release the rest of them. The question is often asked 
why the Prophet on limiting the number of wives to four, himself married 
more than that number. The answer is firstly, the Prophet received a special 
revelation permitting him to marry such and such a woman for such and such 
reasons. This can be understood from Sura, xxxiii verse.39: "there could be 
no hindrance for the Prophet with regard to that which Allah has made 
incumbent upon him." Secondly, all Muslim jurists agree that there are some 
cases which are special to the Prophet such as this case, fasting for a long 
period, and praying extensively every night; even the Prophet himself asked 
his followers not follow him in these special cases. Thirdly, the Prophet was a 
monogamist for the greater part of his married life, from the age of twenty
269 Turkey has became a secular state since 1924 and received the Swiss Civil Code.
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five when he married his first wife Khadidja, until he was fifty when she died. 
One of the reasons supporting the assumption that the Prophet's later 
marriages were commended by God is that he lived in a society where customs 
forced plurality of wives and inspite of that he remained monogamist until the 
last years of his life and then married a number of women most of them old 
and in very low economic and social conditions. Had he not been commended 
by God he might not have married again or if it were in his nature he might 
have practised plurality of wives younger and might have chosen not old 
women of low economic position but young and wealthy ones. Fourthly, one 
of the purposes for the Prophet taking a number of wives was to educate his 
own wives so as to help the spread of Islamic education among women in the 
community. For instance, Aisha his youngest wife was the greatest teacher of 
the prophetic traditions, not only for women but for men also. Moreover such 
marriages enabled him to contract beneficial liaisons and thus aid the spread of 
Islam.270
The number of wives which is permitted by Islamic law is up to four; 
this is stressed by the Holy Quran, the Prophetic traditions, and consensus of 
the classic and modem Muslim jurists.271 The only exception is some Shii 
jurists who allow up to nine wives.
2-Justice must be done to all wives:
This is the important condition which must be upheld in the case of 
marriage with more than one wife. The requirement of justice to all wives, 
according to the Prophetic tradition and Muslim jurists, is material justice such 
as living expenses, social contact and sexual relations, and not the affection and 
emotional ties. Material justice means every material aspect even sexual
270 For Further details about the reasons of the Prophet's marriage, see Shalabi M., oil 
cit. pp. 264-268, the Holy Quran, Commentaries by Ali Yusuf, 1983, footnotes. 3706, p. 
1113, 3723 p. 1117, and 3671 p. 1103.
271 See Hachem Etemad-Sarabi, La Condition Juridique de la Femme selon les Textes 
Coraniques. thesis, Paris, 1975, classic commentaries pp. 108-113, modem commentaries 
pp. 114-117, European commentaries pp. 117-120.
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intercourse; for example, the husband must divide his nights equally between 
his wives. Emotional tie means love, in which justice is not required because it 
is beyond the man's capacity to practise, and because this emotional equality is 
impossible to reach as it is stated by the Holy Quran Sura.iv verse. 130: "you 
cannot keep perfect balance emotionally between your wives, however much 
you may desire it, but incline not wholly towards one, leaving the other in 
suspense." Some modem writers oppose polygamy on the basis of this verse 
that since equality between wives is impossible according to this verse, the 
intention of God is to abolish polygamy; but this assumption is rejected firstly 
by the verse itself "but incline not wholly towards one, leaving the other in 
suspense." Secondly, it is impossible that God requires a condition of equality 
which is impossible to fulfill. Thirdly, if it is supposed that polygamy is not 
permitted is it possible that the Prophet and his companions performed this 
forbidden deed. Finally, if the intention of God is to abolish it why did he not 
state it clearly as he did for other prohibited acts.^72 The Quran uses the 
suitable word "fear" in the verse above as it is in the Arabic text and Ah Yusuf 
translation: "if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with them". This 
word is directed to the believers, who fear God, and consequently will not 
enter into these unions if they fear that they cannot deal justly with their wives.
3-The husband must have the financial capacity to support them:
Marriage with more than one wife is not permitted to the husband who is 
not able to support his wives. As has been seen in the section on maintenance, it 
is the husband's duty to provide all kinds of maintenance to his wives in equal 
proportion; each wife should have a separate house. If the husband has not 
enough money to provide sufficient support or a separate house, if the wives 
disagree to live together in the same house, or if one of them claim that she is 
not properly or kindly treated, he is not permitted to take more than one wife.
It is also important to remember that according to the Hanbali view if
272 s ee for further details, Shalabi M., op. cit. pp. 256-259; Maudoodi A., op. cit. p.
22.
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the spouses stipulate in their marriage contract that the husband should not 
marry another woman, the wife has the right to claim divorce if he breaches 
this stipulation.
From what has been said above and a reading of the preceding verse, it 
will be obvious that this verse has not come to allow forthright polygamy, but 
aims to restrict it by limiting the number of wives and requiring the capacity of 
justice to wives and ability to provide sufficient financial support to all of 
them. This verse in fact intends to give a solution to the problem which was 
raised in early Muslim times when the Muslim community was left with many 
widows and orphans, homeless and without support. Their only remedy was 
marriage or prostitution, for this reason the above verse permitted men to 
marry them on the preceding conditions. Muslim jurists agree that this verse 
applies not only to orphans but also to persons in similar circumstances. Ali 
Yusuf comments on the verse which follows this one by saying that :"this 
applies to orphans, but the wording is perfectly general, and defines principles 
like those of Chancery in English law and Court of Wards in Indian law".273
Therefore, polygamy is permitted on the above conditions as a solution 
to certain social problems which can be summarised as follows:
1- The most obvious problem is, as is noted above, when large numbers 
of widows and young women are left homeless without husbands and support 
which occurs particularly after wars. One can recall the figures of the first 
and second world wars to be aware of millions of widows and young women 
who lost their husbands and fiances. If it is maintained that a man can marry 
only one woman, what is the solution to the problem of those millions of 
women who have no opportunities of getting a husband?. Do they agree to 
remain unmarried, childless or be mistresses, unofficial second wives with no 
legal rights, or to become prostitutes?. Most, if not all, of these women do not 
accept any of these solutions, since the natural relationship that unifies man and 
woman is marriage; especially in societies where unmarried partnerships and 
prostitution are prohibited.
273 xhe Holy Quran, Translation and Commentary, by Ali Yusuf, p. 179, footnote. 510.
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2- The second circumstance is when evidence shows that the wife is 
sterile and the husband very much wants children. What would be the position 
if sterility were not a ground for nullity or divorce, or if the spouses did not 
want to separate but at the same time the husband insisted on children. Is it 
better for this wife to divorce with very little chance to remarry especially in 
societies where sterile women are not accepted, to share her husband with a 
mistress with whom he will beget children creating a further problem in 
society of illegitimate children, or to share a husband with another woman 
with all equal legal rights (maintenance, sexual relations etc.).
3- In the same situation as the sterile wife is the chronically sick or 
disabled wife.
4- There are many cases where the husband loves another woman but he 
still respects his wife and does not want to divorce her for her sake and their 
children, and sometimes even the second woman does not want to break the 
first family, nor does the first wife because of her children.
These are the main circumstances in which polygamy is permitted. 
There are other economic circumstances, for instance in agricultural societies 
where the husband needs more than one wife and many children to manage the 
farm.274 in these and other circumstances polygamy may be a suitable 
solution to some social problems; and for these reasons Islamic law has 
permitted.
The conclusion therefore, that can be drawn from what has been said is 
that "monogamy is the general rule, while polygamy is a sort of 'remedial law'
to be used only when necessary".275
2^4 for further details about these circumstances, see Fillali Abdel-Aziz, op. cit. pp. 89- 
92: Shalabi M.. op. cit. pp. 259-261.
275 Saleh Saneya, "Women in Islam: Their Status in Religious and Traditional Culture", 
International Journal of Sociology of the Familv.(T972L March, 35-42, at p. 39; see also 
Bencheikh Hadjira, "A Propos du Droit de la Famille: La Polygamie dans la Legislation 
Algerienne",(in Arabic) 25 Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiques et 
Potitiques (1987) 499-512.
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However, it has happened in fact that this institution and the preceding 
conditions have been distorted and flouted by customs and extra-Islamic 
culture in many Muslim countries. This has lead to reforms in most Muslim 
countries in order to stop and restrict those distortions and misuses.
B. Polygamy in the contemporary Muslim family laws:
The first step to restrict polygamy was in Egypt by the famous 
modernist reformer Mohammed Abduh in 1 8 9 7  when he suggested to the 
ministry of justice that polygamy should be under the control of the court, and 
a man who had already one wife should not be allowed to marry another 
without the consent of the court, and this should not be given to a man who was 
incapable of treating more than one wife with equal justice or providing 
sufficient support. This suggestion was followed by a draft which was 
accepted by the Egyptian Cabinet in 1 9 2 6  but it was rejected by the King of 
Egypt of the t i m e . 2 7 6
In Turkey polygamy was abolished with the reception of the Swiss Civil 
Code in 1926.277
The Jordanian Law of Family Rights of 1951, amended by the Jordanian 
Law of Personal Status of 1976, gives the wife the right to stipulate in the 
marriage contract that she shall have the power to ask for divorce herself if her 
husband marries another woman without her consent, and that if her husband 
marries another, she shall have the right to divorce.
The Syrian Law of Personal Status of 1953 amended in 1967 declares in 
art. 17 that no marriage with a second wife is allowed without the consent of the 
judge who must be sure of the husband's capacity to provide support. Upon the 
failure of this the judge can prevent the marriage.
The Tunisian Law of Personal Status of 1956 in art. 18 declares that
276 s ee Abdellah Badria, "La position de la Femme Arabe dans les Lois sur les Statuts 
Personnels" (in Arabic) 25 Revue Algerienne des Sciences Juridiques Economiaues et 
Politiques (1987) 457-472, at pp. 466-467; Anderson N., Islamic Family Law, p. 64.
277 See Orucu Esin, op. cit. p. 222.
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polygamy is prohibited, and any person who has already one wife and marries 
another before the first marriage is lawfully dissolved will be punished by 
imprisonment or a fine or both.
The Moroccan Code of Personal Status of 1958 states in art.30 that 
polygamy is not permitted if injustice to wives is feared, and the judge can 
consider whether the second marriage has caused any injury to the first wife. 
Article 31 declares that the wife has the right to stipulate in the marriage 
contract that her husband should not many another woman, and if the husband 
does not respect that stipulation she has the right to divorce.
The Iraqi Law of Personal Status of 1959 grants that polygamy is not 
permitted without court permission which will not be given except for the 
following conditions: (a) that the husband has enough money to support more 
than one wife; (b) that there is a lawful interest in that marriage; and (c) that if 
any injustice between wives is feared, polygamy is not permitted, and this last 
condition is left to the discretion of the court.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961), 
permits a man to lawfully contract a second marriage only with the prior 
permission of an 'Arbitration Council', composed of one representative of the 
man, one of the first wife and a Muslim official as a chairman. This Council 
may grant permission for more than one wife on any condition which it may 
deem fit, and if the second marriage is necessary and just.^78
The Iranian Family Law Act of 1967 also stresses the permission of the 
court for the marriage with another woman, and the court should satisfy itself 
of the husband's financial ability and his capacity to do justice.
The Indonesian Marriage Law of 1974 states in articles 4 and 5 that a 
man may receive permission from a court to take more than one wife if and 
only if:
"1) his wife cannot carry out her conjugal duties, or
2) his wife becomes crippled or terminally ill, or
3) his wife cannot give him children, and
278 s ee Mahmood T.. op. cit. pp. 184-185.
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4) his present wife or wives give him permission;
5) his ability to support all his wives and children is certain;
6) his ability to be fair toward all his wives and children is c e r t a i n .  "279
The Malaysian Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 states 
in section 23 (1) that: "no man, during the subsistence of a marriage, shall, 
except with the prior permission in writing of the Syar'iah judge, contract 
another marriage, nor shall another marriage contracted without such 
permission be registered under this Act".
In section 23 (4) it is stated that the court may grant the permission 
applied for if satisfied:
"(a) That the proposed marriage is just and necessary having regard to 
such circumstances as, among others, the following, that is to say, sterility, 
physical unfitness or conjugal relations, wilful avoidance of an order for 
restitution of conjugal rights, or insanity on the part of the existing wife or 
wives;"
(b) his ability to support his wives and his dependants "including persons 
who would be his dependants as a result of the proposed marriage";
(c) his ability to accord equal treatment to all his wives;
"(d) that the proposed marriage would not cause darar svarie (legal 
harm) to the existing wife or wives; and"
"(e) that the proposed marriage would not directly or indirectly lower 
the standard of living that the existing wife or wives and dependants had been 
enjoying and would reasonably expect to continue to enjoy were the marriage 
not to take place."280
The Algerian Family Code of 1984 states in article 8 that: "it is 
permitted to contract a marriage with more than one wife within the limits of
279 Katz j & Katz R., "The New Indonesian Marriage Law: A Mirror of Indonesia's 
Political, Cultural and Legal Systems", 23 American Journal of Comparative Law (1975) 
653-681, at p. 673.
280 The Malaysian Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984, in Annual Review 
of Population Law. Vol. 11, 1984, (published by U.N.F.P.A. and Harvard L.S.L., 1987).
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Islamic Shari'a if the legal reason is justified, the conditions and intention of 
justice are provided, and with the previous knowledge of the first and the 
second wives either of which has the right to bring a judicial action against the 
husband in case of fraud, and demand a divorce in case of the absence of 
consent11. From this article it is clear that marriage with more than one wife is 
permitted in Algerian law within the limits of the Shari'a if there is (a) a legal 
reason for the second marriage; (b) the conditions and intention of justice to 
wives; (c) the first and the second wives have been informed. Difficulties were 
encountered in the application of this article 8 that is why the Ministry of 
Justice has enacted a r e g u l a t i o n ^  1 showing how i t  should apply. It is stated in 
this regulation that the notary or the officer of Civil Status should be satisfied, 
before concluding marriage with a second wife, that the legal reason for this 
marriage exists which can only be proved by a medical certificate from a 
specialized doctor, proving the sterility of the first wife or her permanent 
illness. Upon the failure to prove this sterility or illness the officer should not 
contract the second marriage. If the officer is satisfied as to the existence of 
the legal reason of this marriage he should inform both the first and the second 
wives of the second marriage; and he should mention in the marriage contract 
the consent of both of them or the first wife's refusal. If the first wife is not 
present she should be warned in a reasonable time by the court's information 
service. If she is not present he mentions her absence and contracts the 
marriage.
The weighing of the evidence of the intention of justice, according to 
this regulation, falls within the competency of the court, and the onus to prove 
injustice is on the wife in order that the court can grant her the convenient 
compensation.
As has been seen in some preceding articles in the Algerian Family Law 
Code of 1984 there is a difference between the French and the Arabic versions. 
In this article 8 also a difference exists between the two. In the last sentence of
281 Enactment no: 102 /  84 of 23 December, 1984: Plurality of Wives, Application of 
Article 8 of the Family Law Code of 1984 (in Arabic).
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this article it is written in the French version tha t: "either of them (wives) has 
The right to bring a judicial action against the husband in case of fraud (ou) or 
demand a divorce in case of absence of consent". Whereas in the Arabic 
version instead of (or) the word (and) is written and the difference between 
(and) and (or) is obvious. As a result one may conclude reading the French 
version that the wife has to choose between the two; and from the Arabic 
version that she has the right to both of the actions at the same time. If the 
French version is taken into consideration by the court, the wife will have the 
right to one action only. The fact is that the reason of each action is different: 
the action for fraud is because the husband has not informed the first wife and 
the second wife of his second marriage as article 8 requires, so that the wife 
who was not informed has the right to claim compensation on the ground of 
fraud; whereas the action for divorce is because of the wife's refusal to share 
her husband with another woman. Surely the intention behind the law is that 
since the reasons of both actions are different the wife should be entitled to 
both of them. Some Algerian jurists such as Saad Abdel-Aziz^82 have gone 
beyond the explicit words of this article. According to Saad the wife has only 
one action to bring in the court, she has to claim only divorce on the ground of 
fraud if her husband has not informed her. But it is clear from the article that 
the wife has the right to two actions, one in the case of fraud and the other in 
the case of her refusal. Even though Saad's statement as the president of the 
court of Annaba is an authoritative interpretation of the law, it seems far from 
acceptable since the article is clear in mentioning explicitly two kinds of 
actions in two different cases: fraud and the wife's refusal.
Recent Muslim family laws shows that most have restricted the plurality 
of wives within the Islamic Shari’a limits, except Tunisian law which has 
totally abolished it and brought sanctions by imprisonment and fine to any 
person who contracts a second marriage. Besides the conditions of justice and 
support that are required by the Shari'a, most of the mentioned laws require 
two other important conditions:
282 Saad Abdel-Aziz. op. cit. pp. 124-125.
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 ^ - The permission of the court,
- and the informing of both the first and the second wives, v: r T
Concerning the first condition, some laws have put the permission to 
contract a second marriage under the authority of the court directly and 
explicitly, the court can prevent the subsequent marriage if not satisfied with 
the required conditions, as is in Syrian, Moroccan, Iraqi, Iranian, Indonesian 
and Malaysian laws. Some others have allowed it implicitly or indirectly, for 
instance, Algerian law prevents any officer from contracting a second 
marriage if the legal reason for the second one does not exist. It is also stated 
in the above mentioned regulation no: 102/84 that evaluation of the conditions 
and the intention of justice fall within the competence of the court, and it is for 
the wife to prove injustice.
Some others such as Pakistan and Bangladesh laws have given this 
authority not to the court but to an 'Arbitration Council' which may grant 
permission if the second marriage is necessary and just, and the conditions 
deemed fit.
With regard to the second condition most of the mentioned laws require 
the informing of both the first and second wives or the first wife's permission. 
This condition of considering the wife's attitude, especially that of the first 
wife, differs in its strength from one law to another. Jordanian and Moroccan 
laws give-the wife the right to stipulate in the marriage contract that her 
husband should not marry another woman without her consent. Algerian law 
regards the informing of both the first and the second wives as a prior 
condition before contracting the second marriage. Moreover Indonesian law 
sets out six conditions, after the permission of the court, for taking more than 
one wife and if and only i f ... his present wife or wives give him permission. A 
further restriction is declared by the Malaysian Islamic Family Law Act 1984 
which states in subsection (e) that "the proposed marriage would not directly 
or indirectly lower the standard of living that the existing wife or wives and 
dependants had been enjoying and would reasonably expect to continue to
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enjoy were the marriage not to take place”.
It is important to note that according to all the above laws the wife has 
the right to divorce if she opposes her husband taking another wife. t :
It is also worthwhile to stress that it is not clear in all the above 
mentioned laws whether the second marriage is or is not valid if the conditions 
required by law are violated or not respected?. This position is also doubtful 
even in the laws such as Tunisian where the second marriage is prohibited. 
However, Tunisian law in its amendment of 20 February 1964 283 provides 
that such a marriage is void. Nevertheless the question remains even in 
Tunisian law whether this invalidity is in the eyes of the secular law only.
C. Is polygamy a social problem?.
Evidence, data and statistics show that polygamy has declined in some 
Muslim c o u n t r i e s . 2 8 4  This has occurred since the second world war, as will 
be seen from the following table. For example in Algeria there were only 3% 
polygynous marriages in 1 9 4 8 ,  2 %  in 1 9 5 4 ,  and 1 . 8  % in 1 9 6 6 ;  and this inspite 
of the fact that there was no restriction or court control as there is now. 
Chamie provides this table showing the percentage of married Muslim men
polygynous in a number of Muslim Arab countries.285








283 gee Chahata Chafic, La Famille en Islam.... pp. 665-666.
284 s ee Fluehr-Lobban C.. op. cit. p. 87; Good William, op. cit. pp. 101-104.
285 Chamie J., "Polygyny among Arabs", 40 Population Studies (1986) 55-66, at p. 57.
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Jordan (East Bank only) 1979 3.8
Kuwait (nationals) r 1965 6.7
1970 : 8.8
1975 11.7












Table: Percentage of Married Muslim Men Polygynous by Country and Year.
It is clear form these statistics that in most of the countries covered 
polygynous marriages are under 5 %. Besides this low incidence of 
polygynous marriages the number of wives for each polygynous Muslim man 
is mostly two. Chamie provides another table showing the percentage 
distribution of polygynously married Muslim men by number of wives, by 
country and by year. The conclusion that is drawn from this last table is that: 
"90 per cent or more of such men have two wives, between five and seven per 
cent have three wives, and about one per cent have four."286
After discussing the findings of some of these tables on polygynous 
marriages, Chamie draws the following conclusion:
''contrary to popular belief, polygyny among Muslim Arabs is not
2g6 IbM, pp. 57-58.
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widespread and is, in fact, relatively low by world standards. No more 
" than 12 per cent of the marriages are polygynous and in most instances, the 
proportions are closer to five per cent. In addition, the overwhelming 
majority -90 per cent or more- of the polygynous Muslim Arab males have 
two wives. This, too, is different from other polygynous societies, such as 
exist in some Sub-Saharan African countries, where the proportion of 
married men with three or more wives is much higher, e.g. in Cameroun in 
1964 one-third of polygynous males had three or more wives."287 
From what has been said above, it is clear that polygamy can not be 
regarded as a serious problem since the conditions for taking an additional 
wife are not easy to fulfill. Besides these conditions, court control, the 
education and emancipation of women, developments which lead to very 
complicated lives and the economic difficulties which exist in most of the 
Muslim countries, all prevent the plurality of wives. In Algeria today, under 
the economic pressures and the accommodation crisis a man cannot find a 
simple house to marry even one woman; let alone take an additional wife.
Conclusion:
The conclusion that can be drawn as regards justice to all wives is that 
Algerian law in line with Islamic law requires that the wife be treated justly 
which is both for her benefit as well as for the benefit of the second wife. This 
requirement of justice between wives does not mean permitting polygamy 
without any limits. But as has already been seen polygamy must be within the 
Shari'a limits and conditions and under such circumstances as mentioned 
above.
Abolishing this institution totally, as has been done in Tunisia and 
Turkey by political leadership seems not to be a very good idea. On the one 
hand, it may give rise to the problems of clandestine marriages and illegitimate
287 Ibid, p. 64. •" o
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children, in the eyes of the secular law. On the other hand it deprives society as 
a whole, of a kind of solution and remedy to some social problems such as the 
position of the wife who is suffering from a chronic and infectious illness 
which is not curable, the sterile wife, the widow left with some young children. 
It must be remembered in this last case that it is customary in Arab and African 
societies that if the widow has been left with some children her husband's 
brother takes her as a second wife not because of romantic love but because it is 
a kind of responsibility towards her and his brother's children. Is there any 
other solution at present for these women especially in countries where women 
are not educated to take full part in social life and there are no social benefits 
or opportunities to work?.
It is worthwhile also to remember in this context, as Chamie points out, 
that: "women prefer the status of a sole wife to being an additional wife; but it 
also seems that for many women being an additional wife is preferable to 
remaining unmarried, widowed or d i v o r c e d .  "28 8
The attitude towards polygamy is very controversial among women as 
well as men, but the assumption that polygamy is most unpleasant and a 
degradation to humanity is not correct from a non-western point of view.
From a woman's point of view she, as the sole wife, feels she would not 
wish to be a second wife, but a woman as a second wife prefers it to not being 
married at all. From a man's point of view, he would not wish his daughter or 
sister to be married as a second wife, though he himself may take an additional 
wife.
Even from a western point of view there are some writers who are not 
against the position of taking an additional wife if it is a solution to some social 
problems. Dr. Billy Graham says:
"Islam has permitted polygamy as a solution to social ills and has 
allowed a certain degree of latitude to human nature but only within the 
strictly defined framework of the law. Christian countries make a great 
show of monogamy, but actually they practise polygamy. No one is
288.1bid. p 66.
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unaware of the part mistress play in western society. In this respect Islam is 
a fundamentally honest religion, and permits a Muslim to marry a second 
wife if he must be strictly forbidden all clandestine amatory associations in 
order to safeguard the moral polity of the community. "28?
...J.E. Me Farlane says:
"Whether the questions considered socially, ethically or religiously, 
It can be demonstrated that polygamy is not contrary to the highest 
standards of civilisation... The suggestion offers a practical remedy for the 
western problem of destitute females; the alternative is continued and 
increased prostitution, concubinage and distressing spinsterhood."^^
289 As cited by Nazhat Afza, "Woman in Islam", in Nazhat Afza and Khurshid Ahmed 
(ed.), The Position of Woman in Islam (A Comparative Study) (Two Articles), (Kuwait: 
Islamic Book Publishers, 1982), pp. 22-23.
290Ibid. pp. 22. ____
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CHAFFER FOTO 
TEE WOMAN ANB MVORCE'
Introduction:
" Divorce, since it disintegrates the family unity, is, of course, a social 
evil in itself, but it is a necessary evil. It is better to wreck the unity of the 
family than to wreck the future happiness of the parties by binding them to a 
companionship that has become odious."1 In order to prevent this odious 
companionship Islamic law permits the parties to separate from each other. It 
is in their interest as well as in the interest of society that when, all hope of love 
and compassion between the spouses is gone, their incompatibility of 
temperament has been established, or because of intolerable behaviour, one of 
them can no longer reasonably be expected to live with the other, separation of 
the spouses should be permitted.
Under these circumstances Algerian law, in line with Islamic law, 
allows three kinds of dissolution of marriage. According to article 48: 
"divorce is the dissolution of marriage. It can occur by the husband's will, by 
mutual consent, or by the petition of the wife subject to the limits provided in 
articles 53 and 54 of this Code." The positive role of the woman in divorce is 
in the last two kinds :
1 -Divorce by the wife's initiative.
2 -Divorce by mutual agreement.
Before discussing these two kinds of divorce in two separate sections, it 
is better to discuss briefly divorce by the husband's will and its position in the 
contemporary Muslim family laws.
Relying on the Holy Quran and Prophetic traditions Muslim jurists 
agree that repudiation is the right of the husband only. However, they disagree 
on the conditions of this repudiation. While the majority (the Maliki, Shafii,
1 Cheshire G. C., "The International Validity of Divorces", 61 Law Quarterly Revue 
(1945) 352-372, at p. 352.
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and Hanbali) hold that repudiation is not valid if the husband is insane or 
mentally deranged, or a person in a state of alcoholic intoxication; the Hanafi 
jurists allow repudiation by such husbands.
The majority of jurists also agree that when the husband pronounces 
repudiation three times on one and the same occasion, it is a major irrevocable 
repudiation and the husband cannot remarry his wife unless she has been 
married to another man, and then her second marriage has been duly 
dissolved.
Some Muslim jurists stress that the husband has the right to repudiate his 
wife whenever he so desires without assigning any cause.
Relying on the Prophetic tradition t h a t t h e r e  should be neither injury 
nor molestation" and to prevent abuses by husbands of their authorities and 
rights in this matter, many Muslim jurists and most of the contemporary 
Muslim family laws have introduced the following reforms :
1- Repudiation uttered under compulsion, intoxication, threat, 
ungovernable rage... should have no legal effect.
2- The triple repudiation if pronounced on one and the same occasion 
should be regarded as only a single and therefore a revocable divorce.
3- No repudiation should have effect if uttered outside the court.
4- There must be a conciliation by the court between the spouses before 
granting a divorce.
5- The wife should be compensated in the case of arbitrary repudiation 
by the husband.
With regard to compensation of the wife in the case of arbitrary 
repudiation by the husband, some recent Muslim family laws have introduced 
the following:
The Syrian Decree no: 59/ 1953 art. 117 as amended by the act no: 34/ 
1975 art. 16 states that:
"if a man repudiates his wife and the judge finds that the husband’s
pronouncement of repudiation has been arbitrary without any reasonable
cause and that the wife would suffer misery and hardship therefrom, the
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judge may order for her against her ex- husband in proportion with his 
means and his arbitrariness, a compensation not in excess of the amount of 
maintenance of her equals for three years, over and above the Idda 
maintenance. The judge may order that such a compensation shall be paid in 
a lump sum or by monthly instalments as warranted by the 
circumstances.
The same rule was adopted by article 134 of the Jordanian Provisional 
Law no: 61/ 1976, except that the amount of compensation shall not be in 
excess of the equivalent of the maintenance due to her for a year. Egyptian law 
also introduces this rule by Act no: 100/1985:
"The wife with whom consummation occurred under a valid 
marriage contract, if she is repudiated by her husband without her consent 
or for a cause proceeding from her, shall be entitled, over and above her 
Idda maintenance, to a Muta of no less than the maintenance of two years 
with due consideration given to the conditions of the repudiating husband in 
terms of affluence or destitution, the circumstances of the repudiation and 
the duration of matrimony, the repudiating husband may be allowed to pay 
such a Muta by installments. "3
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 states in article 52 tha t: "if the 
judge finds that the husband's pronouncement of repudiation has been 
arbitrary, he will order for the wife a compensation for the prejudice that 
occurs to her. If she is custodian and has no tutor who may agree to receive 
her, the judge guarantees to her her right to accommodation with her children 
according to the possibilities of the husband. The conjugal home is excluded 
from the decision of the judge if it is only one. However, the divorcee will lose 
her right to accommodation as soon as she gets married or when her moral 
perversity/deviation has been established."
Therefore, it is obvious from these rules that the wife must be
2 As cited by Nasir. op. cit. p. 130.
3 Ibid. p. 131.
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compensated in the case of arbitrary divorce pronounced by her husband.
In order to'make a balance with this husband's right, the wife, as will be 
seen under section two, should have the right to separate from her husband by 
compensating him in her arbitrary separation.^
SECTION ONE 
MVOECE BY THE WIEE0S MITIATIWE
As has already been said in most recent Muslim family laws now divorce 
can be obtained from the court, and no divorce is recognised outside the court. 
However, even though divorce should be granted by the court alone there is a 
difference between the right of the husband to divorce and the wife's right to 
it. The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984, following Islamic law, does not 
limit the grounds on which the husband may divorce his wife, except that in 
his arbitrary divorce the husband should compensate his wife as has been 
stated previously in article 52. Whereas the grounds on which the wife may 
claim divorce are in some ways limited by article 53 which reads: "the wife 
can request a divorce for any of the following reasons:
1- default of payment of maintenance pronounced by a judgment, unless 
the wife knew the indigency of her husband at the time of the marriage with 
regard to articles 78,79 and 8 of the present law;
2- infirmity/defect preventing the achievement of the aim envisaged by 
the marriage;
3- the refusal of the husband to share his bed with the wife for more 
than four months;
4- condemnation of the husband to an " infamous " punishment 
depriving him of liberty for more than one year, in the nature of dishonouring 
the family and rendering impossible a life together and resumption of conjugal
4 s ee section two of this chapter.
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life;
5- absence of more than one year without a valid excuse or provision of 
maintenance;
6- any damage legally recognized as such, particularly by violation of 
the provisions contained in articles 8 and 37;^
7- the committing of a flagrant immoral outrage.”
8- Apart from this article the wife has also the right to divorce 
according to article 8 if she disagrees when her husband takes a second 
wife. ^
In order to clarify these reasons on which the wife may obtain divorce, 
and to compare each of them with their equivalents in other legal systems, they 
will be looked at under the following headings :
A- Cruelty or unreasonable behavior, ( reasons 1, 3, 6, 8 ).
B- Desertion and imprisonment. ( reasons 5, 4).
C- Adultery and serious immoral act. ( reason 7 ).
D-Infirmity or disease. ( reason 2).
I- Cmellty or ureasonabte behavionjur:
According to Islamic law the general rule in the Maliki view is that the 
wife has the right to divorce if her husband subjects her to cruelty. The acts 
which constitute cruelty are not limited, but the Maliki jurists cite some 
examples such as beating, insulting, deserting her or forcing her to an outrage. 
The court orders divorce if such cruelty is proved and it is satisfied that the 
continuation of the marital life between the spouses is impossible.^
5 Article 8 is about her right to divorce in the case of her husband taking a second 
wife, and article 37 is about her right to maintenance and her right to justice in marriage with 
more than one wife.
6 See justice to all wives, in section three chapter three.
7 See Shalabi M.. op. cit. p. 601; Anderson N., Islamic Family Law, p. 70.
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A-In some modern laws:
1- English law:
According to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1 9 7 3 ,  s. 1  ( 2 )  (b) the marriage 
is irretrievably broken down if the pursuer proves that the defendant has 
behaved in such a way that the pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to live 
with him or her. This ground is frequently "unreasonable behaviour". This 
abbreviation has been regarded by Bromley as unfortunate since it "suggests 
that all one has to look at is the quality of the respondent's behaviour, whereas 
in fact what is important is the effect of that conduct upon the petitioner.
There have been some disagreements in English law about the definition 
of cruelty. Some cases made no distinction between cruelty in general and the 
legal cruelty as Shearman J. said in Hadden v. Hadden^ that: "I do not think 
there is such a thing as 'legal cruelty', as distinct from actual cruelty; cruelty 
means 'cruel conduct', whether in legal language or the vernacular." Whereas 
in the case of Jeapes v. Jeapes ^  Sir F. Jeune P. said that: "to leave a wife to 
starve is undoubtedly cruelty, but I was not certain it could be construed into 
legal cruelty". Rosen in his article^ refers to the statement of Shearman and 
declares that this is "exceptional and in general the courts do make a distinction 
between the two", and he states some cases to support his v ie w .  12 The court 
adopted the definition of cruelty laid down by Lopes and Lindly in the Court of 
Appeal in the case of Russell v. RusselK [ 1 8 9 7 ]  A. C. 3 9 5  at p. 3 9 9 )  :"that it 
must be conduct of such a character, as to have caused danger to life, limb or 
health (bodily or mentally) or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of 
such danger."
 ^Bromley, op. cit. p. 199.
9 Hadden v. Hadden. Times, December 5,1919.
10 Jeapes v. Jeapes (19031 28 L. T. 74.
11 Rosen Lionel, "Cruelty in Matrimonial Causes", 12 Modern Law Review (1949) 
324-346, at pp. 324-325.
12 Suggate v. Suggate (1859) 1 S. W. & Tr. 489; Russell v. Russell [1897] A. C., at 
p. 445; Jeapes v. Jeapes. op. cit: Evan v. Evan 1 Hagg. Con.:35: Lauder v. Lauder [1949] 1
All E. R. 76.
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It is clear from this statement that the rival theory was the doctrine of 
danger which meant that behaviour or conduct did not amount to cruelty unless 
this behaviour or conduct caused injury or the reasonable apprehension of it to 
the life or health of the other spouse.
This doctrine of testing the behaviour or conduct had lead to a particular 
difficulty in establishing evidence of "grave and weighty" injury. It was 
criticized by the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce in its report in 
1956:
"...It is said by those who wish to dispense with the test that it 
operates unfairly against the person who, being robust both in mind and 
body, is able to withstand ill-treatment, but nevertheless finds married life 
intolerable by reason of the pain and misery caused by the other spouse’s 
conduct...Cruel conduct, as we see it, must be judged with reference to the 
person affected by it. If, as an alternative, it were sought to fix some 
objective standard, such as that of conduct which no reasonable man should 
be expected to endure, injustice would be done where conduct did not 
measure up to the standard set and yet was serious enough to injure the 
health of a person of delicate physique or susceptible temperament."^
This doctrine of danger was followed by the doctrine of protection. The 
purpose was to safeguard the injured spouse from further injury. As long as 
there was no future danger of repetition of such behaviour there was no 
ground for a remedy. In the case of Meacher v. Meacher^  it was said that if 
there was no danger of ill-treatment after the spouses were separated, the wife 
was not entitled to any remedy for past cruelty. This statement was affirmed by 
section 1 (l)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 with the effect that the 
remedy might be when the defender "has since the celebration of the marriage 
treated the petitioner with cruelty." The same view was laid down in the case 
of Lissack v. L is s a c k ^  that "the court's duty to interfere is intended not to
1^  The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956) Report. Cmd. 9678, para. 
130.
14 Meacher v. Meacher T19461 p. 216.
13 Lissack v. Lissack IT951) p. 1.
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punish the husband for the past, but to protect the wife for the f u t u r e . " ^
As the law developed, both doctrines^ were applied to determine 
whether the conduct constituted a cruelty. In order to establish a charge of 
cruelty it is necessary to prove that the defendant had been guilty of 
"reprehensible conduct or departure from the normal standards of conjugal 
kindness" 18, which caused actual or apprehended injury to the petitioner's
heath. 19
Now, according to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s. 1 (2)(b) the 
marriage may be established as irretrievably broken down if the petitioner 
shows that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with him.
2-French law:
According to the French Civil Code in its old article 231, either of the 
spouses had the right to request divorce on the ground of excesses, 
maltreatment or grave injury (exces, sevices ou injures graves) caused by one 
against the other. There were different interpretations of these words (exces 
and sevices); while some jurists considered them as having two different 
meanings, others took them as having one m e a n in g . In ju ry  swallowed up
1  ^ For the above details see Rosen lionel, op. cit, pp. 324 et seq.; Allen C. K., 
"Matrimonial Cruelty-I", 73 Law Quarterly Review (19571 316-339; Allen C. K., 
"Matrimonial Cruelty-II", 73 Law Quarterly Review (1957) 512-533; Sarwat Habib, - 
"Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in English Law" (in Arabic) 36 Revue Al- Oanon Wal 
Iqtisad. (Revue de Droit Econ. PoLCairol (1966) 233-315.
17 Further detail about the meaning of cruelty and the theories of danger and protection, 
see Kahn-Freund O., "Mental Cruelty", 16 Modem Law Review (1953) 68-74 (both in 
English law and Scots law); Stone O. M., "Cruelty, Desertion and Just Cause in Matrimonial 
Suits", 16 Modern Law Review (19531 511-515; Bresher Fenton, "Divorce- Cruelty- 
Misdirection", 15 Modem Law Review (19521 494-497; Brown Nevill, "The Concept of 
Matrimonial Cruelty" 26 Modem Law Review (19631 733-734.
18 Pearce in Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A. C. 644, 695; [1963] All E. R. 966, 992, H.
L.
19 Russell v. Russell [1897] A. C. 395, H. L., see Bromlev. op. cit. p. 199.
20 See Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. p. 304; Gamil Al-Sharkawy, "The Dissolution of
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both the former terms, and it was taken to cover any conduct that would so 
seriously hurt the feelings of the other spouse as to make it unfair to expect him 
to continue the life in common. These terms had been interpreted in widely 
varying manner to cover abandoning of the conjugal d o m i c i l e ^ ,  misconduct 
even if adultery has not been c o n s u m m a t e d ^ 2  and unjustified abstention from 
the conjugal duty.2^
Due to this wide interpretation the rate of divorce increased, and as a 
result the law of 2 April 1941 was introduced to restrict this wide 
interpretation and laid down some criteria on which divorce could be accepted 
on the ground of grave injury. It was stated that in order to grant divorce 
those acts (exces, sevices ou injures graves) had to constitute a serious or 
repeated violation of the marital duties and render the continuation of life in 
common, intolerable. This was adopted on the assumption or the theory of 
both "divorce sanction” and "divorce faillite”. The former was adopted 
because divorce was regarded as a sanction for the breach of the duties 
imposed by the marriage ; and the latter was because the continuation of life in 
common became impossible.2^
The new divorce law which has been introduced by the Civil Code 
amended in 1975 takes the same previous criteria to grant divorce on the 
ground of grave injury. Article 242 states: "divorce may be petitioned by a 
spouse for facts imputable to the other when such facts constitute a grave or 
renewed violation of the duties and obligations of marriage and render 
intolerable the maintenance of community life."
Marriage During the Lifetime of the Spouses, and Its Causes in the European Legislations" 
(in Arabic) 28.Revue Al- Oanon Wal Iqtisad. (Revue de Droit Econ. Pol.. CairoY (1958) 
224-351, at pp. 261-262.
21 Civ. 8 avr. 1936, D. H. 1936, 314; 7 mars 1951, D. 1951. 331.
22 Req. 18 dec. 1894, D. P. 1895. 1. 260; 10 mai 1943, D. A. 1943. 50.
23 Req. 12 nov. 1900, D. P. 1901. 1. 21; Montpellier, 2 mars 1938, D. H. 1938. 312.
24 See Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. pp. 303-304; Rheinstein Max, Marriage Stability, 
Divorce, and the Law. (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 216 et 
seq.; Glendon M. A., op. cit. pp. 209- 211; Ecolivet- Herzog B., "The New French Divorce 
Law, 11 Intematinal Lawyer (TJ.S.A.l (1977V483-499. at pp. 485-486.............
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3 -Scots law:
The concept of cruelty is quite similar to that in English law 25 except 
for a few differences such as striking at the root of the matrimonial 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . ^  Therefore, there is no need to discuss again the definition of 
cruelty and the concepts of danger and protection. However, it is worthwhile 
to mention that the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 provides the same test as that 
in English law in granting divorce on the ground of cruelty. It states in s. 1 
(2)(b) that: "since the date of the marriage the defender has at any time 
behaved (whether or not as a result of mental abnormality and whether such 
behaviour has been active or passive) in such a way that the pursuer cannot 
reasonably be expected to cohabit with the defender."
B-How to test cruelty:
The above mentioned laws reflect the view that the defender’s behaviour 
has to be such that the pursuer cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with 
him. But it is not left to the pursuer to decide whether he or she can or not. It is 
for the court to decide whether the defender's behaviour is such that the 
pursuer can reasonably be expected to cohabit with him or her or not. The 
court should take into consideration the defender's conduct, the pursuer's 
reaction and the whole circumstances of the marriage. A good example of this 
test is that accepted in English law in the case of Livingstone-Stallard v. 
Livingstone-Stallard^  and adopted by the majority of the Court of Appeal in 
the case of O' Neill v. O' Neill 28: "would any right-thinking person come to 
the conclusion that this husband has behaved in such a way that this wife 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, taking into account the whole
25 See Clive, op. cit. 1st ed., 1974, p. 507, footnote no: 14.
26 See detail on this matter Duncan D. J., "The British Cruel Husband", Scottish Law 
Times (News) 1967, 73-76.
27 Livingstone- Stallard v. Livingstone- Stallard [1974] Fam. 47, 54, [1974] 2 All E. 
R. 766, 771; see also Ash v. Ash [1972] Fam. 135, 140, [1972] 1 All E. R. 582, 585.
28 O’Neill v. O'Neill [1975] 3 All E. R. 289, 295; see also Bergin v. Bergin [1983] 1 
All E. R. 905 at 908 and 909; see Bromley, op. cit. 7th ed. 1987, pp. 180, 181.
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of the circumstances and the characters and personalities of the parties?"
1- The defendant's conduct:
The pursuer, in order to obtain a decree of divorce, must prove that 
there has been some action or conduct by which he or she has been affected. A 
decree of divorce will not be refused because the defendant's behaviour 
resulted from mental illness or negative behaviour. Certain kinds of negative 
behaviour may gravely affect the pursuer's behaviour. A decree was granted 
to a wife in English law, in the case of Katz v. Katz 29 although her husband's 
behaviour resulted from a manic depressive illness, and it was granted also to a 
husband, although his wife's behaviour resulted from epilepsy.
The defendant's behaviour is something more than a mere state of 
affairs or of mind; it may take a form of one act of physical violence, or a 
course of conduct, it may be omission or mental cruelty.
a-One isolated act:
When there is physical violence by one spouse on the other, usually by 
the husband towards his wife, difficulty may arise in deciding whether one 
isolated act is sufficient to establish cmelty or there should be some subsequent 
acts. In old English cases a single act of gross insult or contempt such as 
spitting in a wife's face or treating her in public like a prostitute, might amount 
to cruelty even though no serious bodily harm was inflicted.^ The same 
view has been taken in modem English cases, for example, Edwards v.
29 Katz v. Katz [1975] 3 All E. R. 219, [1972] 1 W. L. R. 955.
* 30 See Thurlow v. Thurlow [1976] Fam. 32, [1975] 2 All E. R. 979; Passingham 
Bernard, Law and Practice in Matrimonial Causes. 3rd ed., (London: Butterworths,1979), p. 
24.
31 See for example. Clobom v. Clobom (1630) Het. 149; Saunders v. Saunders (1847)
1 Rob. Ecc. 549; Reeves v. Reeves (1862) 3 Sw. & T. 139; Milner v. Milner(1861) 4 Sw. 
& T. 240.
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Edwards and Barker v. Barker. ^ 2 xhe criterion used by the courts, in 
deciding whether one isolated act may be enough to establish cruelty, is as 
Rosen says that:
"regard must be had to the circumstances under which the isolated 
blow is given, and also to the character of the person giving it. If the 
violent act was committed during unusual excitement and without producing 
any considerable injury to the person it is not cruelty, but if the blow is a 
serious one and the court is of opinion that the injured spouse would be in 
danger of further-ill-usage, then it will be sufficient."33
The same view is in Scots law; a single act of cruelty if it is serious and 
aggravated may, in the circumstances of a particular case, amount to cmelty, 
"where there is evidence of a long history of smouldering resentment, a single 
blow will be enough."^
In French law before the amendment of 2 April 1941, the law was not 
clear on this matter since the wording of the old article 231 about grave injury 
was in the plural. Nevertheless the court held that an isolated act might be 
sufficient for obtaining divorce due to its a g g r a v a t i o n . ^  Moreover, i t  was 
held that repetition of an act, which when considered in isolation would not 
amount to cruelty, could amount to c r u e l t y . 3 6  The law of 2 april 1941 took 
into consideration this view in its article 232. Similarly the actual Civil Code 
reads in the singular form "...grave or renewed violation..."
The Algerian Code article 53/6 states a general mle and does not require 
the repetition of the cmel act. It seems that it adopts one of the Maliki views 
which does not require repetition. Therefore, it could be suggested, since no
32 Edwards v. Edwards [1948] 1 All. E. R. 159; Barker v. Barker [1949] 1 All E. R. 
248.
33 Rosen Lionel, op. cit. p. 330.
34 Clive, o p . cit. 1st ed., 1974, p. 513; see Steward v. Steward (1870) 8 M. 821; 
Wilson v. Wilson (1958) 74 Sh. Ct. Rep. 190; Dewar v. Dewar 1946 S. N. 130; Bovd v. 
Bovd 1968 S. L. T.(Sh. Ct.) 17 (two assaults); Forbes V. Forbes 1965 S. L. T. 109; 
Gordon v. Gordon (1948) 64 Sh. Ct. Rep. 53.
35 See Reg. 22 juin 1880, D. P. 1881. 1. 140; 7 febr. 1938, D. H. 1938. 198, See 
Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. p. 308.
36 Trib. Civ. Valence, 28 fevr. 1939, D. H. 1939. 334.
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cases are available that one isolated act may be sufficient if it is serious and 
renders the marital life intolerable.
b-Malignity and aim:
The other problem which is connected to the defender's conduct is 
whether it is an essential element in cmelty that the acts constituting cruelty be 
aimed at the other spouse specifically or not. In some English cases there was a 
tendency for a time to insist that "malignity" was an essential element in 
cruelty; for instance, in the case of Westall v. W e s t a l l ^  the word, "treated 
the petitioner with cruelty", of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1 9 5 0 ,  s. 1  (c) was 
understood to imply that acts of cruelty had to be "aimed at" the respondent. 
However, there were some other cases where cmelty was established and the 
conduct was not aimed at the other s p o u s e . 3 8  After he states some cases and 
some judges' opinions Rosen draws the conclusion that:" whereas intention to 
hurt may be an important element in cmelty cases, it is not essential to show 
that the conduct was 'aimed at' the other s p o u s e .  "3 9 This view is then 
affirmed in many cases.^0 Since this doctrine has a close connection with 
insanity there were also cases in English law where insanity was regarded as a 
good defence in actions of cmelty, since the defendant was out of his mind and 
did not know what he was doing.^l On the other hand there were cases where 
insanity was not a good defence and cmelty was established. Furthermore, the 
Royal Commission recommended in 1 9 5 6  that insanity should be no defence to
37 Westall v. Westall (1950) 66 (Pt. 1) T. L. R. 735.
38 Lissack v. Lissack [1950] 2 All E.R. 213; Winnan v. Winnan [1949] p. 174.
39 Rosen Lionel, "Cruelty and Constructive Desertion", 17 Modern Law Review 
(1954) 434-447, at pp. 441-444.
40 See Brown Neville, "Cruelty Without Culpability or Divorce Without Fault", 26 
Modem Law Review (1963) 625-651, at pp. 628- 633.
41 White v. White [1950] p. 39, C. A., of Bucknill, Asquith and Denning L. JJ.; Astle 
V. Astle [1939] p. 4,5, and other cases cited by Stone O. M., "Matrimonial Cruelty and 
Insanity", 17 Modem Law Review (1954) 76-79.
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a charge of cmelty.42 Therefore, it is not necessary to establish the intention 
or desire of the defender as long as his conduct is clearly cruel, and it does not 
matter whether the conduct springs from intention to hurt or from selfishness. 
Consequently selfish stupidity and insanity are not necessarily a defence to a 
charge of cmelty.'43
In French law the defender's acts must be voluntary or at least 
committed under a discernment in order to establish cruelty^. A wound 
inflicted involuntarily does not amount to cmelty; that would be a ground to 
divorce. Nor can conduct of one of the spouses acted under insanity, be a 
reason for d i v o r c e . ^  However, if either of the spouses involves himself by 
his fault in an unconscious state such as habitual drunkenness or abuse of drugs, 
he or she may be charged with any act then accomplished by him or her if it 
constitutes an injury.46
Similar to English law there were cases in Scots law requiring the 
defender's conduct to be aimed at the other spouse and striking at the root of 
the matrimonial relationship; and insanity might be regarded as a defence to 
cruelty.47 However, according to the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1 9 7 6  there is
42 The Royal Commission 1956 Cmd. 9678. For further details about insanity and 
cruelty, see Gower L. C., "Matrimonial Causes- Cruelty as Result of Insanity", 13 Modem 
Law Review (1950) 103-106; Potter D. C., "Insanity as a Defence to Cruelty", 14 Modern 
Law Review (1951) 86-88; Goodhart A. L., "Cruelty, Desertion and Insanity in Matrimonial 
Law", 79 Law Quarterly Review (19631 98-125; Burnett H. W., "Cruelty and Insanity in 
Divorce", 24 Modem Law Review (1961) 382-385, at p. 385; Brown N.. op. cit. pp. 628, 
638.
43 See Williams v. Williams [1963] 2 All E. R. 994, H. L., [1964] A. C. 698; Gollins 
v. Gollins [1963] 2 All E. R. 966, H. L.; [1964] A. C. 644; Cretnv. op. cit. 1974, p. 93; 
Bromley, on. cit. 5th ed., 1976, pp. 186, 187.
44 2 Set. Civ. de la chambre civile de la cour de cassation: 2 mai 1958, D. 1958. 509, 
note Roast, R. T. D. C., 1959. 75, Observ. Debois.
45 Reg. 5 aout 1890, D. P. 1891. 1. 365, S. 1894. 1. 15; 15 mai 1912, D. P. 1912. 1. 
303, S. 1912. 1. 360; Trib. Civ. Hazebrouck, 11. oct. 1950, D. 1950. 693; Rennes, 8 mars 
1944, D. A. 1944. 101, S. 1945. 2. 46; R. T. D. C. ,1944, P. 244 et les Observ. de M. 
Lagarde.
46 See Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. pp. 305, 306.
47 See Walton F. P.. op. cit. p. 108 et seq. and 112 et s.; Clive, o p . cit. 1st ed. 1974, 
pp. 509, 512; Duncan D. J., op. cit. p. 73.
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no requirement that the defender's conduct should be aimed at the pursuer or 
strike at the root of the matrimonial relationship. With regard to insanity this 
act makes clear by the words "whether or not as a result of mental 
abnormality" that insanity is not a defence.
In Algerian law there is no detail on this point. Therefore, the matter is 
under the court's discretion. It could be said that it is reasonable, as seen in the 
above laws, not to require the conduct to be aimed at the other or not to regard 
insanity as a defence to cruelty. If intention in conduct is required or insanity 
is accepted as a defence, many grave injustices will remain since the defender 
may allege not to have intended that act or that he was in a state that he did not 
know what he was doing.
According to the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 the defendant's 
conduct would have been so since the date of marriage in order to amount to 
cruelty. Inspite of this the court can establish cruelty if some acts have 
occurred before the marriage and appear after, and when the husband keeps a 
secret from his wife which amounts to fraud.^
The Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 requires in s. 1 (2)(b) that the 
behaviour has to be "since the date of the marriage". "The Act seems to be 
unnecessarily restrictive in requiring" this as Clive s a y s . ^ 9  By this 
requirement there may be some cases which will not be covered by the Act; 
such as the case where the wife after the marriage finds some repulsive 
behaviour in the past of her husband and because of that repulsive behaviour 
she finds it impossible to live with him.
There is no detail in Algerian law regarding this matter, so it is 
unnecessary to require that the behaviour has to be since the date of the 
marriage.
48 See Carpenter v. Carpenter (1955) 2 All E. R., 1955, p. 449.
49 Clive, Husband and Wife. 1982, p. 445.
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2- The pursuer's attitude:
In order to grant divorce the court should take into account the actual 
situation of both parties, it should consider the health, temperament and 
conduct of the pursuer, to satisfy itself whether this particular pursuer can 
endure the defender’s behaviour or not. For instance a pregnant wife or a wife 
in a poor state of health needs more considerate treatment from her 
husband.^ The phrase of 'cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
respondent' that now exists in both English law and Scots law, poses an 
objective test compared to the previous expression 'the petitioner finds it 
intolerable to live with the respondent'.^!
The test has been made clearly in the case of Ash v. Ash52 where Lord 
Bagnail J. says: "the general question may be expanded thus: can this petitioner 
with his or her character and personality, with his or her faults and other 
attributes, good and bad, and having regard to his or her behaviour during the 
marriage, reasonably be expected to live with this respondent?" His Lordship 
also adds:
"then, if I may give a few examples, it seems to me that a violent 
petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with a violent respondent; a 
petitioner who is addicted to drink can reasonably be expected to live with a 
respondent similarly addicted; a taciturn and morose spouse can reasonably 
be expected to live with a taciturn and morose partner; a flirtatious husband 
can reasonably be expected to live with a wife who is equally susceptible to 
the attractions of the opposite sex; and if each is equally bad, at any rate in 
similar respects, each can reasonably be expected to live with the other."
50 Lauder v. Lauder [1949] p. 277, [1949] All E. R. 76, C. A. (cruelty); see Bromley, 
op. cit. 7th ed., 1987, p. 186.
51 Passingham Bernard, op. cit. p. 27.
52 Ash v. Ash [1972] Fam 35 at 140; see also O'Neill v. O'Neill [1975] 1 W L R 1118 
at 1121, 1125.
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C-Particular types of cruelty:
Apart from physical violence there are many types of cruelty on which 
divorce may be granted. The following are the main examples of it.
1-Wilful refusal to provide maintenance:
It has already been said under the section on maintenance that the 
husband is under the duty to support his wife and provide her with all kinds of 
maintenance. Failure of the husband to do this, when he is able to do so, to the 
detriment of the health of his wife, will amount to cruelty and consequently 
give her the right to divorce. The necessities of life that the husband must 
provide to his wife, or one of the spouses to the other, depend on the 
circumstances of each case, the standard of living of the spouses and their 
available means.
There are some English and Scottish cases in which the husband has been 
considered guilty of cruelty because of his refusal to maintain his wife to the
detriment of her health.53
According to Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 53/1 the wife 
has the right to divorce if the husband fails to provide the maintenance 
pronounced by the judge unless she knew of the husband's indigency at the time 
of the marriage. This is the view of most of the Muslim jurists (the Maliki, 
Hanbali, and Shafii) and most of the contemporary Muslim family laws. It is 
clear from the above article that the wife is entitled to maintenance if the 
following conditions are satisfied:
1- that the husband refuses to provide maintenance which has been 
ordered by a judgment; and
2- that the wife did not know the indigency of her husband at the time of 
marriage. She is not entitled to this right if she knew the indigency of her
53 Dysart v. Dvsart (1844) 1 Rob. E. R. 106; Rose v. Rose. 1964 S. L. T. (Notes) 15; 
Kerr v. Kerr. 1967 S. L. T. (Notes) 77; A. v. B. (1931) 48 Sh. Ct. Rep. 9; Gollins v. 
Gollins [1964] A. C. 664, [1963] 2 All E. R. 966, H. L.; Carter-Fea v. Carter-Fea [1987] 
Fam. Law 131.
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husband at the time of marriage, as for example if she knew that he was 
unemployed and had not sufficient money to support her and in spite of that she 
married him. This article may be criticized firstly, because it does not make a 
distinction between two circumstances: where the husband's indigency results 
from his selfishness and laziness to get work and provide support, and when it 
results inspite of his subsequent efforts to get rid of it. Secondly, the 
distinction between default of maintenance due to the husband's deliberation 
not to provide it, and that due to his indigency, is not clear.
It is important to state that according to the Algerian Penal Code article 
331 any person deliberately refusing to provide the sum of money that is 
ordered by the court against him for his family support, or to provide all the 
amount of maintenance that is ordered against him for his wife, his parents or 
his descendents, for a period more than two months, will be punished by 
imprisonment from six months to three years and by a fine from 500 to 5000
D.A.
It is important to know whether the wife can claim divorce immediately 
after she has obtained an order from the court to ask her husband to provide 
the ordered maintenance, or has to wait for a certain period? The Algerian 
Family Law Code 1984 has no provision on this point. Referring to Islamic 
law some jurists fix this period at three days, others one month, whereas 
according to the Maliki view this period is submitted to the court's discretion 
depending on the circumstances of each case. However, Saad A b d e l - A z i z ^  
suggests the period of two months which corresponds to the rule in the 
Algerian Penal Code states article 331 above. But his suggestion could be 
challenged in that the period of two months in article 331 has been given as a 
chance to the husband before he is punished. Therefore the aim of the penal 
law in allowing this period is to dilute the punishment and give a chance to the 
person to pay the ordered sum of money. Whereas in the field of family law 
what is considered is the injured person in the family and removing the injury 
as soon as possible. For this reason, maybe, the English judges have
54 Saad Abdel-Aziz. op. cit. p. 225.
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introduced the theory of protection and required the reasonable apprehension 
of injury, as Lord Stowell says: "I say an apprehension, because assuredly the 
court is not to wait until the hurt is actually done; but the apprehension must be 
reasonable, not arising merely from diseased sensibility of m i n d . "5 5 
Furthermore, a husband who refuses to maintain his wife until she claims 
maintenance from the court which then grants her an order asking him to 
provide the ordered amount; is not entitled to a further period of time. 
Therefore, it would be better if the court when ordering the husband to 
provide maintenance, were to give him a period of grace depending on the 
circumstances of the case, after which the wife would have the right to divorce 
without any further delay.
2 -Sexual behaviour:
There are many kinds of sexual conduct between the spouses that may 
amount to cruelty. An important one that is mentioned in the Algerian Family 
Law Code of 1984 in article 53/3 is the refusal of the husband to share his bed 
with the wife for more than four months. As has already been seen in the 
section of obedience and head of the family, according to Islamic law one of 
the measures that the husband may take in dealing with his disobedient wife is 
to refuse to share with her his bed within the limit of four months. If the 
husband exceeds this period, it means that he has deprived the wife of her right 
to sexual intercourse which may cause injury to her health. This is also a 
breach of the mutual duty to cohabit. As a result, the wife has the right to 
claim divorce on the ground of cruelty even if her health has not been impaired 
by that behaviour.
Similarly, In English law persistent refusal of marital intercourse due to 
invincible repugnance or other uncontrollable psychological inhibitions can 
amount to cruelty as it is stated in the case of Sheldon v. Sheldon 56 where the 
husband although sharing with his wife the same bed, had refused to have 
sexual intercourse with her for six years. It is held that his refusal had to be
55 Evans v. Evans. 1 Hagg. Con. 35, as cited by Rosen, op. cit. p. 330.
56 Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] P. 62, [1966] 2 All E R 257, C. A.
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taken as deliberate and "persisted in the knowledge of the harm that was being 
done to his wife's h e a l t h " ^  in a number of recent English cases cruelty has 
been held when refusal to have sexual intercourse affected the health of the
other spouse.^
Correspondingly, in French law persistent voluntary refusal of the 
husband to engage in marital intercourse has been considered as c r u e l t y .^
Both in English and Scottish laws excessive demands for sexual 
intercourse to the detriment of the other spouse's health may amount to 
cruelty .^  It is important to note that persisting to have sexual intercourse 
against the wife's will may amount not only to cruelty but may be considered as 
rape in some legal systems.^
There are some other kinds of sexual behaviour which will be 
mentioned later under the title of adultery or serious immoral act.
3-Threatened and attempted violence:
As has already been said it is not necessary that a spouse waits until he or 
she is actually injured before asking for divorce. The spouse can at any time 
claim divorce from the court when he or she has been satisfied that the conduct 
of the other spouse will certainly affect him or her. "The court will not tell a 
wife that she must wait for the blow to be struck before seeking her remedy,
57 Clive refering to this case, op. cit. 1st ed.. 1974. p. 515.
58 p. (TO y. P. (TV [1965] 1 W. L. R. 963; [1965] 2 All E. R. 456; Evans v. Evans 
[1965] 2 All E. R. 789: Sheldon v. Sheldon [1966] P. 62; Dowden v. Dowden (1977) Fam. 
Law 106: B. fL.l v. B. (R.) [1965] 1 W. L. R. 1413; [1965] 3 All E. R. 263, C. A.; P. v. 
P. [1964] 3 All E. R. 919; see further discussion of these cases by Michaels Naomi; "Sexual 
Incompatibility in the Divorce Court", 29 Modem Law Review (1966) 196-199; and also 
Michaels Naomi, "Matrimonial Relief for Sexual Frustration: For and Against", 28 Modem 
Law Review (1965) 606-609.
59 Req. 12 novembre 1900, D. P. 1901. 1. 21.
60 Fulton v. Fulton (1850) 12 D. 1104 at 1109; Hutchison v. Hutchison. 1945 S. C. 
427 at 432; Walsham v. Wilsham [1949] P. 350; Cackett v. Cackett [1950] P. 253; Baker v. 
Baker [1955] 1 W. L. R. 1011; Knott v. Knott [1955] P. 249.
61 See rape of the wife by her husband under the section of non- financial rights and 
duties.
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provided that there is good reason in the husband’ s conduct to fear serious 
injury. "62 Jn the case of Baillie v. Murray^  where the husband, due to his 
extreme jealousy, wrote a number of letters threatening to murder his wife, 
the decree of separation was granted inspite of no physical violence having 
been done. Similarly, attempts at violence even if it is frustrated by chance, by 
escape or by intervention of a third party, may amount to cruelty as it was held 
in the case of D' Aguilar v. D* A g u ila r .^ 4
There is no doubt that there are cases like Baillie v. Murray mentioned 
above in Algeria where Arab Muslim husbands are moved by extreme 
jealousy; and cases such as D* Aguilar v. D' Aguilar where many times the wife 
was rescued from her husband's attempts at violence, by chance or by the 
intervention of one of the family members.
4-Habitual drunkenness or the abuse of drugs:
Habitual drunkenness or the abuse of drugs causing injury to health is a 
main factor of cases of cruelty. According to English law and Scots law 
habitual drunkenness or abuse of drugs may amount to cruelty if the pursuer 
justifies that she or he cannot reasonably be expected to cohabit with the 
defender.^
In Algeria and in the third word in general, habitual drunkenness is 
often accompanied by violent behaviour, as a result many wives and their 
children deeply suffer from the habitual drunkard husbands. In Muslim society 
alcohol and drugs should be prohibited in order to prevent the breakdown of 
families, or preventing grave injuries to the wife by inserting explicitly in
6^ Clive, Husband and Wife. 1974, p 514.
63 Baillie v. Murray (1714) Hermand, 124.
64 D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar (1794) 1 Hag. Ecc. 773.
66 McGan v. McGan (1880) 8 R. 279; Dunlop v. Dunlop , 1950 S.C. 227; Barker v. 
Barker (1955) 3 All E. R. 194; Hutchison v. Hutchison 1945 S. C. 427; Dalgleish v. 
Dalgleish (1958) 74 Sh. Ct. Rep. 35; Paterson v. Paterson. 1965 S. L. T. (Notes) 51; 
Harkins v. Harkins. 1966 S. L. T. (Notes) 31: Campbell v. Campbell. 1973 S. L. T. 
(Notes) 82.
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family law her right to divorce at any time she finds it intolerable to live with 
her habitual drunkard husband.
These are the main types of cruelty for which divorce may be granted. 
However, there are some other kinds of cruelty: false accusations particularly 
of infidelity as in some English and Scots c a s e s ;6 6  exposure to risk of disease 
as for example one spouse wilfully and recklessly attempting to communicate a 
venereal disease to the other s p o u s e ; ^  conduct towards a third party, for 
instance, a husband behaving cruelly to children in the presence of their 
mother, as a result of which her health has been a f f e c t e d ; ^  in the case of 
polygamous marriage as stated in articles 53/6, 37, and 8 of the Algerian 
Family Law Code of 1984 where the wife, whether she is the first or the 
second, has the right to divorce if she has been treated without justice.( see 
chapter three, section three, subsection no: IV justice to all wives).
II' Desentfoii mmd imprisommeM:
In Algerian law absence, whether it be due to desertion or 
imprisonment, has the same effect, as the wife suffers from the absence of her 
husband, being certainly deprived of her conjugal rights to cohabitation and 
sexual relations, and in many cases may suffer financial hardship. For this 
reason, the suffering spouse has the right to divorce on the ground of desertion 
or imprisonment in Algerian law as in many legal systems.
Absence of one spouse is a kind of desertion in English and Scottish laws 
on which ground divorce may be granted. So it is better here to discuss 
desertion in general and the position of Algerian law in this matter; and then
66 Williams v. Williams [1964] A. C. 698 (false accusations of adultery); Aitchison v. 
Aitchison (1902) 10 S. L. T. 331 ( false accusation of incest).
67 See The French case: Lyon, 4 april 1818, Sirey, Rec. gen. ler serie t. 5, at 370. 
English and Sottish cases : Browing v. Browing [1911] P. 161; Foster v. Foster [1921] P. 
438.
68 Suggate v. Suggate (1859) 1 Su. & Tr. 490; Wright v. Wright [1960] P. 85; Evens 
v. Evensf 19551 P. 129; Cooper v. Cooper [1955] P. 99.
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discuss imprisonment of the husband in Algerian law with reference to French 
law.
A-Desertion:
1-The quality of desertion:
The Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 provides in article 53/5 that the 
wife has the right to divorce on the ground of "the absence (of the husband) of 
more than one year without a valid excuse or provision of maintenance." The 
English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s. 1 (2)(c) states that the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down if it is proved that "the respondent has deserted the 
petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition." Similarly, the Divorce ( Scotland ) Act 1976 
provides in s. 1 (2)(c) that: "the defender has wilfully and without reasonable 
cause deserted the pursuer; and during a continuous period of two years 
immediately succeeding the defender's desertion."
It is not easy to give an exact definition of desertion, but it can be said 
that "there must be de facto  separation accompanied by the intention to 
d e s e r t " .^  It could be also said that it means one spouse refuses to perform the 
duty of cohabitation with the other spouse and intends to live apart from him 
or her. It is not true that every spouse who leaves the matrimonial home is in 
desertion. However, the husband who drives his wife from the matrimonial 
home may be in desertion. The definition of desertion will be clear by 
determining its elements.
2- The elements of desertion:
From the above it appears that the elements of desertion are:
a- living apart;
b- the intention of deserting;




e- a specific period of desertion.
a- Living apart:
Means that the spouses are in fact living separately or one of them has 
abandoned the matrimonial home. Algerian law uses the word "absence" of 
the husband in line with Islamic law, because absence of the husband is the most 
frequently encountered manner of living apart in Algerian and Muslim 
societies. Whereas, the use of the word desertion seems more apt in English 
and Scottish laws, and in western society in general, because either of the 
parties may leave the other, and because living apart is very common in these 
societies. In English law and Scots law where there is literal desertion when 
one of the spouses lives in another place far from the other spouse, no 
difficulties arise in establishing the fact of separation or desertion. However, it 
may happen that the spouses cease to cohabit as husband and wife but they 
remain in the same house owing for example to shortage of accommodation 
elsewhere. It is not necessary that the guilty spouse is the one who departs 
from the matrimonial home as in Algerian law. The guilty one may be the one, 
usually the husband, who drives the other away from the home. This husband 
is considered as if he himself had left the wife as in the case of Charter v. 
C h a r t e r ^  where it is held that: "it is perfectly good law that it is not 
necessary for the husband in order to desert his wife to actually turn his wife 
out of doors; it was sufficient if by his conduct he compelled her to leave the 
house." This is called constructive desertion in English law; in Scots law there 
is no constmctive desertion but the wife in this case can seek divorce under 
section 1 (2)(b) which is the ground of c r u e l t y .
In Algerian law, following Islamic law, absence or desertion of the 
husband means only his departure from the matrimonial home and living apart
70 Charter v. Charter (1901) 84 L. T. 272. See also Jones v. Jones [1952] 2 T. L. R.
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71 See Clive, Husband and Wife. 1982, pp. 456-457.
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in a different place far from his wife. Whereas, in English law and Scots law 
desertion means departure from a state of affairs rather than a p la c e .7 2  As 
has already been said, the husband who excludes his wife from the house by 
force, is in desertion inspite of the fact that he himself has not left the 
matrimonial home. This case is not clear in Algerian law, but it seems that the 
wife may claim divorce on the ground of cruelty as it is the case in Scots law.
b- The intention of deserting:
In English law as well as in Scots law desertion will not be established 
unless the cessation of cohabitation and the intention of the defendant is 
p r o v e d .7 3  There is no desertion if a spouse is absent on holiday or for reason 
of business, or if he or she is affected by a mental disease which prevents him 
or her from forming an intention to d e s e r t .7 4  The evidence of intention of 
desertion can be presumed from the act itself since the deserting spouse does 
not always express his or her intention in practical terms. The popular saying 
"actions speak louder than words" is expressed in the legal statement "a man is 
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his a c ts ."75
Algerian law, following Islamic law, does not require the intention of 
the absent or deserting spouse. However, it is unfair to treat the husband who 
is absent without intention to desert his wife with the one who has the intention 
to desert her. This distinction has a great importance since, even if the law 
requires reasonable cause for absence, there are cases where husbands may, 
for example, hidden behind a reasonable cause such as business or 
employment, have the intention of deserting their wives.
72 Pulford v. Pulford [1923] P. 18; McMillan v. McMillan. 1962 S. C. 115; Burgess 
v. Burgess. 1969 S. L. T. (Notes) 22; Thomson v. Thomson. 1965 S. L. T. (Notes) 54.
73 See Bromley, op. cit. 7th ed., 1987, p. 190, and Clive, op. cit. 2nd ed., 1982, p. 
455.
74 See_(L v._G. [1964] P. 133, [1964] 1 All E. R. 129; Cathcart v. Cathcart (1900) 2 
F. 404; Gilfillan v. Gilfillan (1902) 10 S. L. T. 295; Mudie v. Mudie. 1956 S. C. 318; 
Kaczmarz v. Kaczmarz [1967] 1 W. L. R. 317.
75 See Goodhart A. L., "Constructive Desertion", 71 Law Quarterly Review (1955) 
32-37, at p. 33; see also Edwards v. Edwards [1948] P. 268; Squire v. Squire [1949] P. 51.
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c-Lack of consent:
Both in English law and Scots law desertion will not be established 
unless one of the spouses has decided to live apart and the other has refused. In 
other words desertion must be against the wishes of the pursuer. If both of the 
parties agree to live apart it is a separation by agreement and not a 
desertion.76 This condition seems reasonable in English and Scots laws since 
it distinguishes between separation by agreement where both parties agree to 
live apart, and the divorce on the ground of desertion where there must be a 
willingness to adhere from the pursuer.
This condition does not exist in Algerian law and this is understable 
since there is no effect of separation by agreement in Algerian law. The wife 
who has been deserted by her husband, has the right to divorce whether she is 
willing to adhere or not.
d-Without justifiable cause:
The spouse who leaves the matrimonial home must have a justifiable 
reason or excuse, otherwise the other spouse has the right to seek divorce on 
the ground of desertion. There is no desertion if there is a reasonable cause for 
absence.^7 The reasonable causes for desertion or absence may be the 
defendant's or the pursuer's conduct. There are some causes related to the 
defender which may amount to reasonable causes for his absence; absence for 
business"^, absence to seek employment"^, absence for reasons of 
h e a lth ^ , or because of imprisonment.^ 1 However, according to the 
Algerian Family Code article 53/4 the husband's imprisonment for a period 
more than one year because of an infamous crime is a ground for divorce and
76 Pardv v. Pardv [1939] P. 288, [1939] 3 All. E. R. 779, C. A..
77 Algerian law art. 53/5; the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 1 (2)(c)(without reasonable 
cause); for English law see Day v. Day [1957] P. 202, at p. 211; G. v. G. [1964] P. 133.
78 See_G. v. G. [1930] P 72; Williams v. Williams [1939] P. 365 at p. 374.
7  ^See Thompson v. Thompson (1858) 1 S. & T. 231.
80 See Keelv v. Keelv [1952] 2 T. L. R. 756 C. A..
81 See Townsend v. Townsend (18731 3 P. & D. 125..
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not considered as a reasonable cause. There are also some reasonable causes 
due to the pursuer's conduct as has been seen in constructive desertion in 
English law where the husband drives his wife out from the house by force, it 
is he who is considered in desertion and not her.82 However, it is worthwhile 
to stress that even though the reasonable cause does exist, desertion may be 
established if the intention of the defender for his absence is the overriding 
reason.8  ^ Therefore, the court should not take into consideration the 
intention of the defender or the reasonable cause isolated from the 
circumstances of the case. The criterion that should be taken into account is as 
stated in the following passage: "the real question to which the courts have been 
addressing themselves in the rather unhelpful language of intention is whether 
the circumstances which are alleged to have given rise to a justification for 
separation are truly the real and predominant cause of the parties'
separation. "84
Regarding reasonable cause in Algerian law as well as in Islamic law, a 
question may arise, whether the divorce is to be allowed by law as a sanction to 
the husband who is absent without a reasonable cause, or it is to be allowed to 
remove the injury that the wife may suffer from her husband's absence which 
deprives her of her conjugal rights. If the view of sanction is taken into 
account, the law is right to require reasonable cause, but if the view of injury 
to the wife is taken into consideration, then there is no need to require 
reasonable cause.
It seems that it would be better if the law took into account the injury to 
the wife which is in fact the duty of the law to remove, and consequently it is 
not useful to require a reasonable cause.
82 See the previous cases of Charter v. Charter, and Jones v. Jones.
82 See Tolstoy & Kenworthy, Tolstov on Divorce. 7th ed. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1971), p. 83; Beeken v. Beeken [1948] P. 302 C. A .; Drew v. Drew (1888) 13 P. 
D. 97; Wvnne v. Wvnne (1898) P. 18; Williams v. Williams [1938] 4 All. E. R. 445.
84 Irvine Alexander; "’Reasonable Cause' and 'Reasonable Excuse' as Justifications for 
Separation", 30 Modem Law Review (1967) 659-669, at p. 669.
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e-Period of desertion:
According to both English law and Scots law the pursuer cannot make a 
claim to the court for divorce until desertion has lasted for two years 
continuously; before this period his or her petition is not accepted. In Islamic 
law the Maliki and Hanbali jurists disagree on the period which justifies this 
remedy. While the Hanbali jurists take it to be six months, some of the Maliki 
jurists fix it at one year and some others at three y e a r s .85 Algerian law takes 
the first view of the Maliki jurists and states the period to be one year.
It seems that one year is a reasonable period for the wife to wait before 
claiming divorce, a longer period seems too long for her to wait. This may be 
why the Scottish Legal Action Group has suggested that the sole ground of 
divorce should be one year of non-cohabitation. It is important to note that the 
previous period in both English law and Scots law was three years and has been
reduced to two years.86
According to the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 53/5 above 
the wife can seek divorce on the ground of her husband's absence for more 
than one year without a valid excuse or provision of maintenance. As has been 
noted in relation to some previous articles of the Algerian Family Law Code of 
1984, there is a differentiation also in this article, between the French version 
and the Arabic version. The French version requires the husband's absence 
without a valid excuse (or) provision of maintenance, whereas, the Arabic 
version requires the husband’s absence without a valid excuse (and) provision 
of maintenance. According to the Arabic version the wife has the right to 
divorce if both conditions of valid excuse and provision of maintenance have 
not been fulfilled or respected, whereas according to the French one she has 
the right if only one of the two conditions has not been respected. It seems that 
the French version is fairer since it gives the wife a greater chance to seek
85 See El- Arousi M., "Judicial Dissolution of Marriage", 7 Journal of Islamic and 
Comparative Law (Nig.) (19771 13-20. at p. 20.
86 Clive, op. cit. 1982, p. 441.
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divorce. However, requiring this condition of provision of maintenance seems 
a repetition in the same article since the first section of this article (53/1) grants 
divorce to the wife on the ground of default of payment of maintenance which 
has been discussed above as a kind of cruelty.
B- Imprisonment:
Imprisonment may be considered in some cases as a kind of cmelty and 
intolerable behaviour so that the other spouse cannot reasonably be expected to 
live with the guilty spouse, as in the case of imprisonment because of a crime 
that affects the honour of the family or the other spouse in a way that renders 
the conjugal life impossible. This ground exists in English and Scottish laws as 
well as in French and Algerian laws. The main difference between them is that 
in French and Algerian laws it is a separate ground for divorce apart from a 
kind of cruelty.
According to the Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 article 53/4 the 
wife has the right to divorce if the husband is condemned to "an infamous 
punishment depriving him of liberty for more than one year, in the nature of 
dishonouring the family and rendering impossible a life together and 
resumption of conjugal life." From this article it is obvious that the elements 
of this ground are:
1- "Infamous" punishment: this is not a correct designation, the correct 
phrase is infamous crime and not punishment, since it is not acceptable to 
describe punishment as famous or not, it may be described as severe or not; 
whereas the act or the crime may be described as infamous. Furthermore the 
word "infamous" which is the equivalent translation of the original word 
found in both the Arabic version and the French version (infamante), is not an 
accurate one, since any wrong act may be described as infamous. 
Consequently the question which may arise in Algerian law is what is an
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infamous punishment or crime? Is it determined by the Algerian Penal Code? 
There are many crimes in the Penal Code which may be described as infamous. 
Therefore, it would be better if Algerian law were to determine or limit the 
infamous crime as the French Civil Code has done when it states in article 243 
that: "it may be petitioned by a spouse when the other has been sentenced to one 
of the penalties provided by article 7 of the Penal Code in criminal matters."
2- Depriving of liberty for more than one year: the wife or the other 
spouse cannot claim divorce if the punishment has not been performed for any 
reason such as amnesty or rehabilitation, or the husband has not been put in 
prison for more than one year in Algerian law and for the periods described 
for the crimes mentioned in article 7 in French law; or if the guilty spouse is 
punished by a fine only. However, according to French law, if for example the 
amnesty has effaced the criminal character of the act for which the spouse is 
guilty, the other spouse may rely on the injurious character of that act as a 
grave injury which is a ground for d i v o r c e .^
Even though no evidence (cases or books) shows the position of 
Algerian law in the case of such amnesty, it could be said that the same position 
in French law and the same theory of injury could be applied; as a result the 
wife may seek divorce on the ground of cruelty or grave injury.
3- Dishonouring the family: as has been said related to infamous crime, 
the expression 'dishonouring the family' is vague, moreover any crime can be 
regarded as dishonouring the family. The law may intend to cover acts and 
crimes which are more closely related to mores and morals such as incest, 
homosexuality and bestiality. Such acts or crimes are considered in Scots law 
and English law as kinds of sexual behaviour which may amount to cruelty 
which is a ground of divorce. If Algerian law is meant to cover such acts or
87 See Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. p. 302, footnote no: 5; Trib. Civ. Seine, 15 janv. 
1953, D. 1953.124, Rev. Trm. de Droit Civil. 1953, p. 315, Observ. de M. Lagarde; Civ. 
2e sect. civ. 11 juin, 1954, D. 1954, Rev. Trim. Droit. Civil. 1954, p. 63.
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crimes the specific ground of imprisonment is not necessary because these acts 
or crimes are covered by the ground of committing any serious immoral act 
which is mentioned by section 7 of the same article (53/7). However, if the law 
does not intend such acts or crimes to be covered the question which must be 
asked is which acts or crime are regarded as dishonouring the family which the 
law wants to cover?
4- Rendering conjugal life impossible: this element is the same as 
required in the ground of cruelty or intolerable behaviour. It is the duty of the 
court to decide whether or not the act or the crime renders conjugal life 
impossible.
It is important to note that French law requires, besides the act being 
infamous and depriving from liberty, two other elements:
- condemnation must be pronounced by a French court;
- condemnation must be after the marriage contract.
According to French law, if one of these elements is not present the 
other spouse cannot claim divorce on this ground. However, the spouse still 
has the chance to rely on the acts or crimes, which do not cover the above 
elements -as for example if the condemnation has been pronounced by a 
foreign court- to claim divorce on the ground of grave injury,** 8 which has 
been discussed under cmelty and unreasonable behaviour.
It is not clear what is the position of Algerian law if one of these 
elements required by law has not been fulfilled, as for example if the period of 
condemnation is less than one year, or the crime is not considered as 
dishonouring the family ? Can the wife in these circumstances obtain divorce 
on the ground of injury that has been discussed under cruelty? By analogy to 
the Maliki view which allows the wife to claim divorce on the ground of her 
husband's absence for more than one year even with a reasonable cause - 
according to this view because of the injury that she suffers from that absence 
and deprivation of her conjugal rights- the wife could have the right to divorce
88 See Marty & Raynaud, op. cit. p. 303.
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for any condemnation of her husband for more than one year. Therefore, 
according to the Maliki view the Algerian wife could claim divorce if one of 
the above elements is not present.
EH- A tM to y  m m j  sarikms immoml mt:
As has been seen under the section of non-financial rights and duties in 
Chapter Three fidelity is a mutual duty upon the spouses to treat each other 
faithfully in having sexual relationship only with each other. Having sexual 
relationship outside the marriage constitutes a breach of this duty and 
consequently entitles the innocent spouse to seek divorce on the ground of 
adultery if sexual relationship is performed by the guilty spouse with the 
opposite sex, or on the ground of unreasonable behaviour if the sexual act is 
other than adultery -this according to English law and Scots law- and on the 
ground of serious or flagrant immoral outrage according to Algerian law.
Adultery is defined in Scots law and English law as voluntary sexual 
intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex who is 
not the other spouse.^
From this definition appears the elements of adultery:
1- Sexual intercourse: there must be some act of sexual intercourse 
between the parties.^ Artificial insemination, is not sexual intercourse and 
not adultery.^ 1 However, if this artificial insemination has been performed 
without the consent of the husband it may amount to unreasonable behaviour 
which justifies divorce both in English law and Scots law.92
2- Must be voluntary: the sexual intercourse between one of the spouses 
and a third party must be voluntary; if for example, the wife is raped she is not
89 See Clive, op. cit. 1982, p. 443; Bromley, op. cit. 1981, p. 195.
90 See MacLennan v. MacLennan 1958 S. C. 105: Dennis v. Dennis [1955] p. 153, 
[1955] 2 All. E. R. 51, C. A..
91 See MacLennan v. MacLennan. 1958, ibid.
92 See Bromley, op. cit. p. 196, footnote no: 3; Clive, op. cit. p. 444, footnote no: 12.
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considered to have committed a d u l t e r y . 9 3  Similarly a person who loses his 
consent or lacks mental capacity is not guilty of adultery. The onus of proving 
that the intercourse was involuntary is on the guilty spouse. Both in Scots law 
and in English law intercourse under the influence of drink or drugs raises 
much difficulties in this respect.94
3- The Parties must be a woman and a man: and that one or both of them 
be married not with this party but with another person. It is not necessary for 
both parties to be married, if for example a single woman has intercourse with 
a married man, he commits adultery.
These are the common elements of adultery in both English law and 
Scots law. There are two other elements, one in English law and another in 
Scots law:
1- the Divorce ( Scotland ) Act 1976 s. 1 (2)(a) requires adultery to be 
"since the date of the marriage". Commenting on this Thomson says tha t: "a 
defender's adultery is only relevant if it has occurred 'since the date of the 
marriage'. Thus, if a young man commits adultery with a married woman and 
subsequently marries, his spouse cannot rely upon his pre-marital adultery to 
found an action of divorce."^
2- The English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s. 1 (2)(a) requires that the 
petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. The court must be 
satisfied that the petitioner finds living with the adulterous spouse
intolerable.^
However, any sexual behaviour between one of the spouses and a third 
party which does not amount to adultery, may justify divorce on the ground of 
unreasonable behaviour under s. 1 (2)(b) in English law and the equivalent
93 See Stewart v. Stewart. 1914 2 S. L. T. 310; Stands v. Stands 1964 S. L. T. 80; 
Clarkson v. Clarkson (1930), 143 L. T. 775.
94 See Banton v. Banton [1958] p. 12; Goshawk v. Goshawk (1965), 109 Sol. Jo. 
290; see Clive, op. cit. 443, Bromley, op. cit. p. 196.
95 Thomson J. M.. op. _£lt, p. 94.
96 See Goodrich v. Goodrich [1971] 2 All E. R. 1340, 1342; Pheasant v. Pheasant 
[1972] Fam. 202, 207, [1972] 1 All E. R. 587, 590.
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section in Scots l a w .9 7  For instance, homosexual relationship or sodomy, 
bestiality, and lesbianism are types of sexual behaviour which may justify 
divorce for the innocent spouse depending on the circumstances of each 
case.98
According to Algerian law there is no explicit rule about adultery in the 
Family Law Code of 1984, but article 53/7 brings a general rule on which the 
wife has the right to divorce on the ground of her husband* committing a 
flagrant immoral outrage. Since adultery is not only a flagrant immoral 
outrage but is also a breach of the duty of fidelity that the marriage is based on, 
there is no doubt that it should be a ground on which the innocent spouse can 
claim divorce. It may be that for this reason Algerian law does not explicitly 
mention it in the above article, although it is mentioned clearly in the Penal 
Code as a crime on which the adulterous spouse is punished. Therefore 
according to the above article any serious sexual behaviour such as adultery, 
homosexuality, bestiality, incest or any such acts, are subjected to the above 
section and entitle the wife to claim d i v o r c e .^
The main difference between Algerian law and English and Scottish 
laws, is that in these latter adultery with the above elements constitutes itself a 
ground for divorce, but sexual behaviour falling short of adultery or any other 
sexual behaviour are regarded as kinds of unreasonable behaviour. Whereas, 
in Algerian law adultery or any serious sexual behaviour are regarded as kinds 
of flagrant immoral outrage.
97 See also Pinder v. Pinder (1954) 70 Sh. Ct. Rep. 23; Richardson v. Richardson. 
1956 S. C. 394: Wachtel v. Wachtel (1972) 116 S. J. 762.
98 Mitchell V. Mitchell, the Glasgow Herald, Jan. 28, 1971: Gardner v. Gardner 
[1947] 1 All E. R. 630.
99 See further detail by Saad F.. op. cit. pp. 298, 299.
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IV- InafamiHy or disease:
There are controversial views among Muslim jurists on defect or 
infirmity on the part of one of the spouses whether it entitles the other spouse 
to divorce or not. While some such as Zahiriz oppose the marriage being 
nullified on the ground of defect of whatever kind, others such as Ibn-qayyim 
consider that any permanent defect or disease justifies divorce at the instance 
of the aggrieved spouse. The Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali jurists are of 
the view that there are certain defects and diseases which are sufficiently 
fundamental to justify divorce. According to their view there are two types of 
defects:
1- defects which hinder sexual intercourse between the spouses such as 
impotence and castration,
2- and some diseases which may not necessarily hinder sexual 
intercourse, but may make the conjugal life and companionship between the 
spouses unbearable.
According to Scots law as well as English law impotence is a ground of 
nullity of marriage, whereas diseases are considered as types of unreasonable 
behaviour.
Impotence means incapacity for sexual intercourse. It differs from 
sterility or wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. Most of the Muslim 
jurists agree that if the husband is impotent the wife has the right to ask for 
divorce. However, they lay down some conditions concerning the knowledge 
of impotence and its incurability.
Regarding the knowledge of impotence the jurists require that:
1- the wife is entitled to divorce only if she is unaware of the husband’s 
impotence at the time of the marriage;
2- if being unaware at the time of the marriage and having discovered 
the impotence afterwards, she still consents to retain the marriage, she loses 
her right to divorce;
3- she has the right only if no single sexual intercourse has been had.
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The condition of knowledge of impotence exists also in Scots law. Clive 
says that: "a pursuer may be barred if he or she has entered into the marriage 
in full knowledge of the impotency and without any expectation of sexual 
intercourse.11100 The same position exists in English law except that the 
petitioner besides his or her knowledge of impotence of the other spouse at the 
time of the marriage, knows that this is a ground for nullity. This is 
considered as a bar on the assumption that the petitioner intends to treat the
marriage as valid. 101
Concerning the incurability of impotence Muslim jurists require a 
general condition for any defect that must be incurable or only curable after a 
long time. According to the second Caliph (Omar)’s view the impotent spouse 
should have a year for medical treatment, and if the defect still persists divorce 
will be granted.
Similarly both Scots law and English law require the impotence to be 
incurable. If it is curable the impotent spouse should have an opportunity to 
undergo the necessary treatment.!^
With regard to defects and diseases which may not necessarily hinder 
sexual intercourse between the spouses, but may make companionship between 
them unendurable, many Muslim jurists apply the same rules as above 
(knowledge, incurable, one year long treatment). In the Hanafi view a period 
of one year’s treatment should be allowed to a man who was mad previous to 
the marriage and is unable to have intercourse after the marriage, before he is 
considered as impotent. Whereas, according to one of the Hanafi jurists 
(Immam Muhammed) this year of treatment should be allowed only if the 
insanity is not perennial or constant; if it is perennial, divorce should be
1^0 Clive, op. cit. p. 114, see also footnote 74 : L. v. L.. 1931 S. C. 477 ( where the 
woman married a man paralysed below the waist, in full knowledge of his condition, in 
order to obtain support for herself and her illegitimate child; S. G. v. W. G.. 1933 S. C. 728 
at p. 734; F. v._F., 1945 S. C. 202 at 208; Thomson, op. cit. p. 37.
101 Bromley, op. cit. 1981, p. 94.
102 Thomson, op. cit. p. 36; M* v. W. or M. , 1966 S. L. T. 152; Bromley , op. cit. p.
86 .
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granted. The Maliki view is that the period of one year's treatment should be 
given whether the defect is perennial or not. Besides this, some Maliki jurists 
add that the wife is not entitled to divorce if (1) her husband was mad before 
the marriage and she knowingly married him; (2) she consents to live with him 
after the marriage knowing of his madness; (3) she allows him of her own free 
will to have sexual intercourse with h e r .  103
According to Scots law and English law insanity or mental illness at the 
time of the marriage may lead to nullity of marriage on the ground of 
defective c o n s e n t . 1 0 4  insanity after the marriage may cause divorce if it is 
accompanied by an unreasonable behaviour as is clear from the words: 
"whether or not as a result of mental a b n o r m a l i t y .  "105
A look at the contemporary Muslim family laws shows that most of them 
adopt the above conditions in order to grant divorce on the ground of defect on 
the part of the husband. Some of them take into consideration the knowledge 
of defect or impotence before the marriage contract, for example Egyptian 
law requires that if the wife knows the impotence existed at the time of the 
marriage, or if she consents after acquiring that knowledge, she will not be 
entitled to claim divorce. Jordanian law applies the same conditions of the 
wife's knowledge and consent about any defect on the part of the husband 
except for impotence.
Some of these laws take into account the distinction between curable 
defect or disease and incurable defect or disease. Jordanian, Iraqian, Syrian 
and Moroccan laws provide that the judge shall order a divorce forthwith if the 
defect or disease is incurable. If it is curable the judge shall adjourn the case 
for a year, at the end of which he shall order a divorce if there has been no 
cure.
Algerian law does not mention any of the above conditions (knowledge
103 See Maudoodi. op. cit. p. 87.
104 Thomson, op. cit. p. 29; Bromley, op. cit. pp. 87, 88.
105 The Divorce ( Scotland ) Act 1976 S. 1 (2)(b); see Clive, op. cit. p. 446; Purdie v. 
Purdie. 1970 S. L. T. (Notes) 58. (wife epileptic); see also cruelty and unreasonable 
behaviour above.
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or one year long treatment for curable defect), nor specify kinds of defects or 
diseases such as stated in the above mentioned laws ( impotence, castration, 
insanity...). Article 53/2 declares that: "infirmity/defect preventing the 
achievement of the aim envisaged by the marriage.” From this article it is 
clear that the wife is entitled to divorce if the husband is suffering from any 
defect or disease which prevents the achievement of the marriage aim, 
whatever the defect is whether it is a sexual defect which hinders sexual 
intercourse, or other defects which make conjugal life unbearable.
However, on the one hand, Algerian law by this general rule is more 
flexible than the above mentioned laws, in giving the wife more opportunities 
to claim divorce and the judge a large discretion in his decision. On the other 
hand, this generalization may lead to some uncertainty in law:
(1)- it may lead to conflicts between court decisions;
(2)- it is not clear whether a defect, even when medical evidence shows 
that it is curable within a short period of time, bars divorce or not, or delays it 
till the expiration of that period.
It would be more satisfactory if Algerian law took into consideration the 
distinction between curable and incurable defects as do Scottish, English and 
some Muslim family laws. It would be more logical if divorce was granted 
only when medical examination showed that the defect could not be cured 
within a reasonable time, or within one year, as stipulated by some Muslim 
jurists and Jordanian, Moroccan, Iraqi and Syrian laws.
Knowledge of the defect at the time of the marriage by one of the 
spouses or his consent to live with the defected spouse after acquiring that 
knowledge after the marriage, should not logically prevent this spouse from 
claiming divorce. A wife may accept to live with her husband even if he is 
impotent or mad because she loves him, so there is no reason to prevent her 
from divorce if then her husband' impotence or madness renders the conjugal 
life unendurable. This requirement by some jurists and some Muslim family 
laws used to prevent the wife from divorce, is contrary to the aims and the 
meaning of marriage in Islamic law. It is contrary to the Quranic verses which
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stress that marriage should be a relationship of kindness and love, and the bond 
of marriage should be free from any injury and maltreatment. Why should the 
man who knew and consented to live with his defective wife be able to divorce 
her or marry a second woman, whereas the woman can neither be divorced 
from him nor marry another man during his life time? Therefore it is unjust to 
prevent the wife who bears her defective husband for a certain period after the 
marriage, from seeking divorce because she consented to live with him in the 
first place. Even the woman who has married a defective man with full 
knowledge of his impotence in order to obtain support for her and her 
children, as it is in the precedent Scottish case of L. v.JL-^6 should not be 
prevented from divorce if she has no other remedy. The solution that seems 
logical is to give her the chance to choose between remaining with her husband 
or seeking divorce and recompensing him if she married him only for 
obtaining support for her and her children; without ignoring the fact that most 
women look for husbands who can support them and their children any way.
SECTION TWO 
BIWMQE H£Y MUTUAL AGMEEMENT
It has already been said that according to article 48 of the Algerian 
Family Law Code of 1984 divorce can occur by the will of the husband, by 
mutual consent or by the wife’s initiative on the ground provided in article 53. 
Since marriage in Islamic law is a contract which is established by the consent 
of both parties it can also be terminated by their mutual agreement. Islamic law 
permits the spouses on reason of incompatibility of temperament where they 
find it impossible to bear each other, to release each other from this 
unsuccessful bond. Divorce by mutual consent is of two kinds in classic Islamic 
law as well as in contemporary Muslim family law s:-^  the first one is called 
106 v.JL, 1931 S. C. 477, see note. 98 of this chapter.
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Khula (sometimes written Khul'), which means divorce by agreement with 
some financial inducement given by the wife to her husband, often involving “ 
the return of the d o w e r . T h e  second one is called in classic Islamic law . 
Mubara’a which means divorce by mutual agreement without any financial 
obligation to be given by either of the spouses to the other, or no compensation 
on either side is made. This last kind of divorce by agreement raises no 
problems since both spouses agree to it. However, divorce by mean of Khula 
raises some disagreements among Muslim jurists. They disagree whether 
compensation or financial inducement is an essential element in this kind of 
divorce or not. While most of them (the Hanafi, Maliki and many of the 
Hanbali jurists) regard that it is not necessary, the Shafii jurists hold that it is 
essential and if the spouses omit it in their agreement the wife is bound to 
provide to her husband the equivalent d o w e r .  1^9
With regard to the amount of Khula, there are differing views among 
the Hanafi jurists on whether or not the husband can take more from his wife 
than the amount provided by him to her as a dower. According to one view, 
the amount can be more than the dower since Khula is an agreement between 
the spouses. Whereas, the other view is that it should not be more than the 
dower. This view is based on the Prophetic tradition in which the Prophet 
asked a woman who wanted to separate from her husband, whether she could 
return her husband his garden which was given to her as a dower; she replied 
that she could give him that and with some other additions. The Prophet 
ordered her not to give him any thing more than his garden (dower).HO 
Therefore it is obvious that where the spouses disagree about the amount of 
Khula the court should fix it but not more but not more than the amount of the 
dower.
It is worthwhile to stress that divorce by means of Khula is the right of
107 s ee Fvsee. op. cit. pp. 138-141; Vesev-Fitzgerald. op. cit. p. 78; Pearl, op. cit. p.
121 et seq.
108 See Smith J. I., op. cit. p. 522, footnote no: 15.
109 p)e Bellefonds, op. cit. p. 424.
HO See Shalabi M.. op. cit. p. 571. -
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the wife, this makes a balance between the spouses since the husband has the 
right to divorce his wife if he dislikes her. The wife also should have the right 
—to separate from her husband,~if she finds that-she-cannot live-with-him, by—  
recompensing him or returning to him his dower. .This right is affirmed by 
the Holy Quran: "if you fear that they (the spouses) will be unable to keep 
within the limits prescribed by Allah, there is no blame on the two of them, if 
she (the wife) gets separation on payment of ransom." (ii, 229). The general 
assumption according to some jurists is that divorce is the right of the husband 
and the decision of the court is just an advice which he may ignore. But it is 
very clear from the above verse that "it speaks of the spouses in the third 
person (they). So the pronoun 'you' cannot refer to them. Inevitably it has to 
be conceded that it is the people invested with authority by the Muslims who 
have been addressed. The divine mandate means that in case the spouses can 
arrive at no agreement in a Khula case, the matter should be referred to the 
people of authority." m  Moreover, Ali Yucuf in his translation of this verse 
refers directly to the judges:( if you (judges)...)
The jurists who are of the view that Khula is the right of the wife agree 
that, in the case where the spouses agree on divorce but not on the amount of 
Khula, the court has the power to decide on an amount of Khula not exceeding 
the amount of the dower. According to these jurists the court cannot grant 
divorce or force the husband to divorce his wife, if he refuses to divorce her 
even if she recompenses him or gives him the amount of Khula. It is not clear 
why these jurists all agree that the court has the power to order divorce in cases 
such as cruelty, absence, failure to provide maintenance and so on even when 
the husband refuses to divorce his wife, but disagree on giving the court the 
power to order divorce in the case of Khula if the wife wants it and the husband 
refuses. This view is not related to a verse of the Holy Quran or Prophetic 
tradition, and although it is the view of many classic and modem Muslim 
jurists, it could be criticised for the following reasons:
Firstly, this view is contrary to the verse itself "if yu (judges) fear that 
HI Maudoodi. op. cit. p. 44. 1 v . . ' , : . . : - ; • - •?
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they (the spouses) will be unable to keep within the limits prescribed by 
Allah..." It is clear that this verse refers to the judges, and the verb "fear" 
clearly expresses that the judges have die power to decide divorce if they fear 
that the spouses are not able to keep within the limits prescribed by God. The 
objective test that the judges should take into consideration is the limits 
prescribed by God and not the view of the husband. Therefore, is it within the 
limits prescribed by God to keep a woman tied against her will to a man whom 
she does not like?
Secondly, the view is contrary to the aim of marriage, love and 
companionship. Will this aim and companionship be achieved in this case?
Thirdly, to keep a woman tied to a marriage with a man she does not like 
is contrary to the freedom as a human .right which Islamic law strongly 
protects.
Fourthly, this view is contrary to the equality between the spouses. 
Many jurists maintain, as already seen, that if the wife knew the impotence of 
the husband before the marriage or she acquired that knowledge afterwards 
and consented to live with him or if even one sexual intercourse took place, 
she loses her right to get the marriage dissolved. Whereas, according to all 
jurists the husband can divorce her in such cases, and furthermore, he can get 
divorce whatever the reason is. Even if inequality between the spouses is 
justified in certain cases in Islamic law, as has already been seen for example, 
in marriage with a second woman or in. inheritance, this should not be 
extended. Therefore it is not reasonable that the husband can get the marriage 
dissolved in cases where the wife cannot. Since she cannot get the marriage 
dissolved in those cases, her only remedy is Khula.
Fifthly, there were cases decided by the Prophet and his Caliphs and 
companions which leave no doubt that the court has the power in Khula 
cases.
It is clear from these arguments that the court has the power to order 
divorce in Khula, and the wife has the right to get the marriage dissolved by 
112 ibid. p p .  44-45.  • -
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giving the husband compensation agreed upon. If they do not agree upon it the 
court should decide the amount. --------------
This view has been adopted by the Supreme Court in Pakistan in the case 
of Khurshid Bibi v. Muhammad Amir where it was held that the court could 
enforce a Khula in cases of incompatibility even against the will of the - -  
husband, on the ground of the above verse, and a Prophetic tradition.H3 
Similarly , it was stated in the recent case of Rashidan Bibi v. Bashir 
Ahmad 1 ^  that:
"The principle of Khul' is based on the fact that if a woman has decided 
not to live with her husband for any reason and this decision is firm, then the 
court, after satisfying its conscience that not to dissolve the marriage would 
mean forcing the woman to a hateful union with the man, it is not necessary on 
the part of the woman to produce evidence of facts and circumstances to show 
the extent of hatred to satisfy the conscience of the judge, Family Court or the 
Appellate Court."
Most of the contemporary Muslim family laws adopt the classic mles of 
K h u l a . T h e  Algerian Family Law Code of 1984 has only one article on 
Khula which states that "the wife may separate from her husband on sum of 
money agreed upon. In the case of disagreement, the judge shall order a sum 
which should not be more than the equivalent dower at the time of the 
judgment."(art. 54). It is clear that this article gives the judge such power only 
in the case of disagreement of the spouses on the amount of Khula after 
agreement on separation; but it does not give the judge the power to order 
divorce in the case where the wife wants separation on an amount of money 
and the husband refuses this separation. This means that this wife will be
See Khurshid Bibi v. Muhammad Amir P. L. D. 1967 S. C. 97; and the case of 
Balqis Fatima v. Naim Ul-Ikram Oureshi P. L. P. 1959 Lah. 566, as cited by Anderson,
Law Reform.... pp. 80-81.
114 Rashidan Bibi v. Bashir Ahmad 1983 P. L. D. Lah. 549; see also Bilquis Fatima v.
Noor Muhamad 1978 P. L. D. Lah. 1109: Akhlaa Ahmad v. Kishwar Sultana 1983 P. L.
D. S. C. 169, cited by Pearl P .. op. cit. p. 125.
H3 As cited by Pearl P .. op. cit. p. 125.
H3 See Nasir J., op. cit. pp. 112, 113. 7 : . II ^r;:. ; ;:
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forced to stay in a hateful union, a view which is opposed by the above 
arguments. Therefore, in line with the Pakistan Supreme Court's view above, 
it would be more satisfactory if the above Algerian article were altered to give 
the court the power to decide also on the granting of the divorce if it is satisfied 
that the spouses cannot live in a peaceful union of love and companionship as a 
result of the strong demand by the wife for separation.
It is also important to remember that Algerian law in the above article 
has adopted the Islamic view which gives the spouses the right to agree on the 
amount of Khula whatever the amount is. But if they disagree, the judge shall 
decide it with reference to the circumstances of each case without exceeding 
the amount of the equivalent dower at the time of the judgment. Whereas some 
other Muslim family laws such as the Syrian and the Jordanian adopt the other 
Islamic view which states that in the case where the spouses fail to specify any 
consideration at the time of Khula, they will be discharged of all liabilities 
concerning the dower and the wife's maintenance.-^
Conclusion:
Algerian law as well as the other laws mentioned allow divorce when the 
marriage relationship becomes intolerable or when, because of the behaviour 
of one spouse, his absence or desertion, his condemnation or his defect or 
disease, the other spouse cannot reasonably be expected to live with him or her.
In some western laws (English, Scottish and French) because of equality 
between men and women the grounds on which the wife can seek divorce are 
the same as that of the husband. Whereas in Algerian law, as well as in Islamic 
law, the husband has the right to divorce without any limitation except 
compensation in his arbitrary divorce; but the grounds on which the wife can 
claim divorce are said to be limited. In fact they are not limited. Cruelty for 
example is a ground for divorce and in all above mentioned laws, including
117 See art. 99 and 106 respectively. . .
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Algerian and Islamic laws, acts which constitute cruelty are not limited. There 
are many types of cruel behaviour, physical, sexual, mental and so on which 
r are difficult for law to limit. Similar to cruelty,1 there is no"limitation i n " -  
infirmity or disease, nor in serious immoral act nor in condemnation of the 
husband in Algerian law.
What the court should take into consideration in deciding whether an act 
or behaviour is cruel or not, is the defendant's conduct and the health, 
temperament and conduct of the pursuer. One isolated act may be sufficient if 
it is serious. There is no necessity to require the conduct to be aimed at the 
spouse or regard insanity as a defence to cruelty. Regarding the wilful refusal 
of the husband to provide maintenance as a kind of cruelty, it would be better, 
in Algerian law, if the court were to give him in its first decision of ordering 
maintenance, a period of grace depending on the circumstances of each case, 
after which the wife has the right to divorce without any further delay. 
Alcohol and drugs should be prohibited or the wife should have the right to 
divorce when she finds it intolerable to live with her habitual drunkard 
husband.
Again in Algerian law it would be better to require intention in the 
absence of the husband as well as reasonable cause, since it is the intention and 
not the reasonable cause which shows whether the husband has deserted his 
wife or not. It seems that one year is a reasonable time that the wife may wait 
before seeking divorce on the ground of absence or desertion by her husband.
It seems logical, and this is also a Maliki view, that the wife should have 
the right to divorce for any condemnation of her husband for more than one 
year, especially since Algerian law does not restrict accurately the penalties as 
French law does.
Adultery is a separate ground for divorce in English law and Scots law, 
and any sexual act which does not amount to adultery may be a kind of 
unreasonable behaviour which may justify divorce. Adultery in Algerian law 
is not a separate ground, but besides being a crime in the Penal Code, it is 
covered by the general rule of committing any serious or flagrant immoral act
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which is a separate ground for divorce apart from cruelty.
Impotence at the time of the marriage is a ground of nullity in both Scots 
law and English law. .Impotence after the marriage or any other defect or 
disease may amount to unreasonable behaviour. Algerian law does not state 
the kinds of defects or diseases nor does it require any condition, as most of the 
Muslim family laws and English and Scottish laws do. Therefore, in seeking 
divorce the wife may rely on any defect or disease that prevent the 
achievement of the aim of the marriage. It would be better if Algerian law 
were to take the distinction between curable and incurable defect or disease 
into consideration similar to all the mentioned laws.
As marriage can be contracted by the consent of both parties it can also 
be dissolved by their mutual agreement. Financial inducement is not necessary 
in Khula according to most Muslim jurists. If the spouses disagree about the 
amount of Khula the judge fixes it but not at more than the equivalent dower at 
the time of the judgment. Since the husband has the right to divorce his wife 
and recompenses her in his arbitrary divorce, the court should have the power 
in the case of Khula to grant divorce if the wife strongly refuses to live with 
her husband and at the same time she is ready to recompense him.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear from this study that social change, rapid social and economic 
development and the idea of equality between men and women have affected 
western societies and have changed the perspective of family, marriage as a 
legal institution and the relationship of husband and wife. Whereas, owing to 
its own characteristics, to colonisation and the social circumstances that exist in 
most of the third world countries, family, marriage as a legal institution and 
the relationship of husband and wife remain different in some respects from 
that of the western world.
Nevertheless, many rules related to the position of women in Islamic law 
and Algerian law are similar to that in some western laws. For example in 
Algerian law as in Scots law engagement is only a promise of marriage and not 
a contract, and either party has the right to breach it. The difference between 
the two is that Scots law, as is the case in classic Islamic law, does not recognise 
any damages for the breach of promise for either pecuniary loss or solatium; 
whereas, the Algerian Family Code recognises recovery of both kinds of 
damages.
Most of the legal systems in the world including Algerian law fix 
different ages for marriage. However, it is not only difficult to fix a right age 
for marriage for all countries, but it is also difficult to choose between the 
absolute minimum age and the nominal or flexible minimum age. It is not 
necessary to establish different ages for men and women. Many legal systems 
today and classic Islamic law have no difference between males and females in 
the minimum age for marriage.
The requirement of Islamic law and Algerian law of the consent of the 
matrimonial guardian in addition to the parties’ consent must be understood as 
a kind of formality and not as a restriction of the woman’s consent.
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The topic of the wife's rights and duties shows the changes and the 
characteristic of both Algerian family and some western families. Algerian 
law still adopts the classic rule, which manifests the extended-patriarchal 
family, that the duty of maintenance is upon the husband towards all the family 
members. The trend in western laws is the equal duty of the spouses to 
maintain each other.
The importance of dower as a right to the wife and as one of the 
conditions of the marriage contract, shows another one of the characteristics of 
Islamic societies. Although,at present dower is still necessary, as it has many 
social advantages not only as a kind of matrimonial recompense but also as a 
guarantee for marriage stability, its increase is creating social problems.
Prohibition of any relationship outside marriage and the severe penalties 
imposed on adulterous husbands leave no space for the assumption that fidelity 
does not exist in Islamic law because Islam permits polygamy. On the 
contrary, this assumption may arise in the future in relation to some western 
laws since there is a trend towards abolishing "the obligation on spouses of 
sexual fidelity"
Both in Islamic law and in some western laws the obligation of the 
spouses to cohabit with each other does not mean that the husband has the right 
to rape his wife; this is seen clearly in the case where the wife is not expected to 
surrender herself to him.
Although, the notion of head of the family and its effect on the wife's 
capacity has had a useful function in the past, it is abolished now in many 
western legal systems. Whereas, in Islamic law and Algerian law, even if the 
wife has full capacity, the husband is still considered as the head of the family. 
This authority can be balanced and prevented from misuse only by giving the 
wife the right to oppose her husband's acts before the court by proving that 
they are not in the interest of the family.
Justice to all wives is one of the important conditions, besides others and 
under certain circumstances, for a marriage with more than one wife to be 
allowed. Even though marriage with more than one wife is not a social
1 O'Donovan K., op. cit, p. 431; see also chapter one. ........ -'•••• •
245
problem, the wife can insert a clause into the marriage contract preventing her 
husband from taking an additional wife. :
As has been seen in chapter four due to equality between men and 
women in western laws, the grounds on which a wife can claim divorce are the 
same as that of a husband. In Islamic law as in Algerian law the grounds on 
which a wife can claim divorce are said to be limited, but the fact is that they 
are not limited. Algerian law as well as western laws do not limit the acts that 
can amount to cruelty, infirmity and disease; nor does Algerian law limit 
immoral acts and condemnation to an infamous crime. Although, the view in 
western countries is that marriage cannot be dissolved by the consent of the 
spouses, the modem trend is moving towards the free terminability of the 
marriage by the mutual agreement of the spouses which is the case in Islamic 
law. Since the husband in Islamic law has the right to divorce his wife and 
recompense her in his arbitrary divorce, the court should have the power in 
the case of Khula to decide divorce if the wife refuses to live with her husband 
and at the same time she is ready to recompense him.
It is worthwhile to stress that the workings of Algerian family law 
would be more easily grasped if case law were available and published. But 
unfortunately, researchers do not have access to unpublished case law.
Indeed, the legal position of Algerian women cannot be fully discussed 
or clearly understood in isolation from sociological, economic and political 
circumstances. Therefore, the interplay of all these should be analysed to 
reach a complete picture of the position of the woman in any legal system.
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